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Abstract
Prodigious amount of data is generated daily. Nowadays, wearable devices
are on the rise, sensors are engrained even in miniature equipments for track-
ing. Should the overarching goals of internet of things reach full potential
- meaning every device can transmit or receive data, then the rate of data
generation will further soar exponentially. This avalanche of data is not only
rendering data analytics more complex, but it is also threatening individu-
als’ privacy. As a result, this thesis focuses on both knowledge discovery and
knowledge protection.
The data analytics challenges are self-evident across an array of indus-
tries such as in telecommunications, where organizations continue to lose
customers and are obsessed to identify patterns of such customers, or in life
sciences where researchers are striving to capture vital patterns in DNA or
better understand the human body using sensors. These challenges connote
the demand for new techniques to expose more hidden patterns. One ap-
proach to address these challenges is by the use of predictive analytics.
This thesis presents a wide range of novel data mining predictive analyt-
ics solutions, ranging from location prediction through activity recognition to
prediction in the medical domain using probabilistic graphical models such
as Markov chains, Hidden Markov Models and Conditional Random Fields.
Besides, it explores the usage of Wavelets to determine similarities or corre-
lations between time series.
Furthermore, to ensure that the privacy of an individual is not infringed,
this thesis provides new enhanced privacy preserving data mining techniques
to anonymize users, huge networks and hide locations.
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Zusammenfassung
Täglich wird eine Vielzahl von unterschiedlichen Daten generiert. Trag-
bare Geräte sind heutzutage auf dem Vormarsch und sogar in den Kleinsten
solcher Geräte sind meist Sensoren für z. B. Tracking verbaut. Sollte das
Internet der Dinge sein volles Potential weiter entfalten, so wird die Daten-
generationsrate weiter exponentiell ansteigen. Diese Datenflut erschwert
nicht nur die Aufgabe der Datenanalyse sondern bedroht zudem auch den
Datenschutz. Als Konsequenz fokussiert sich diese Arbeit sowohl auf Wissen-
sextraktion als auch den Schutz dieses Wissens.
Die Herausforderungen der Datenanalyse sind für ein weites Feld von In-
dustriebranchen offenkundig. Ein Beispiel hier ist die Telekommunikations-
branche, in der Organisationen verzweifelt versuchen, Muster für den Verlust
von Kunden aufzudecken oder im Bereich der Biowissenschaften, wo Wis-
senschaftler bestrebt sind entscheidende Muster in der DNA zu erfassen. Ein
Ansatz zur Bewältigung dieser Herausforderungen ist die Verwendung von
prädiktiven Analysemethoden.
In dieser Arbeit wird eine große Bandbreite neuer Data Mining Lösungen
zur prädiktiven Analyse vorgestellt, welche von der Positionsvorhersage über
Aktivitätserkennung bis zu medizinischen Vorhersagen unter Verwendung
probabilistischer, graphischer Modelle wie Markov-Ketten, Hidden Markov
Models und Conditional Random Fields reichen. Ferner wird die Nutzung
von Wavelets zur Erkennung von Ähnlichkeiten und Korrelationen zwischen
Zeitreihen untersucht.
Um die Privatsphäre eines Individuums zu schützen, werden zudem neue,
verbesserte Privacy Preserving Data Mining Techniken vorgestellt, welche
Nutzer und große Netzwerke anonymisieren sowie Positionen verbergen.
3

Chapter 1
Introduction
The volume of data generated from human social interactions is breathtak-
ing, data stemming from human sensors and wearables is on the rise, and
soon, machines are poised to start interacting too. Should the goals of in-
ternet of things reach full potential - meaning even miniature equipments
can autonomously send or receive data, then the quantity of data generated
will surge dramatically. The continuous accumulation of massive amounts
of data poses future challenges such as upending existing storage infrastruc-
tures. Yet, much focus has been given to a narrow polarized debate about the
impacts of the collected data on society. Opinions about the possible impacts
vary across organizations and individuals.
There are those who bet and view this overwhelming collection of hu-
man and machine data as a spectacular opportunity to perform data analyt-
ics, which might expose valuable vivid patterns and knowledge that would be
imperative to society. There are others who strongly believe that the abuse of
this data is inevitable, and any sensitive data that is subjected to abuse would
subsequently be used to compromise an individual’s privacy or bridge the se-
curity of an institution. Both narratives are profoundly important. Thus, they
connote the demand of both new data analytics techniques, as well as new
plausible approaches to better protect data. Towards this end, this thesis is
not only devoted to providing novel advanced predictive analytics solutions,
but also presents new privacy preserving data mining techniques that guar-
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Figure 1.1: The process of knowledge discovery.
antee an individual’s privacy and mitigate understandable privacy concerns.
Hence, ensuring a healthy cohesion between data mining and privacy. Be-
sides, performing advanced analytics on such data, coupled with a valiant
effort to protect sensitive or evasive data can be enormously beneficial to
society.
This thesis extensively deals with knowledge extraction from data. The
process of Knowledge Discovery in Databases coined KDD is chronologically
articulated in [HK06]. It entails 7 steps as depicted in Figure 1.1. Succinctly,
the KDD process commences with the elimination of noisy and missing data
at the data cleaning stage, followed by the fusion of data from a variety of
platforms or storage units during the data integration step. Then, depending
on the task at hand, the data is filtered and formatted at the preprocessing
stage. During the fifth step, known as the Data Mining step, the preprocessed
data is analyzed to unravel patterns and hidden insights from the data. The
extracted patterns and knowledge are then evaluated and presented to hu-
mans.
This thesis focuses on the Data Mining step of the KDD process. Data
mining is the process of extracting valuable knowledge and distinct insights
from data. Standing at the crossroad between databases, machine learning
and statistics, data mining is a vital and critical part of the KDD process. In
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particular, it comprises of a broad range of important tasks such as associa-
tion mining, classification, clustering and prediction.
At a more finer granularity, this thesis substantially concentrates on the
prediction task of data mining, which is broadly encompassed in the field of
predictive analytics. Predictive analytics is the process of utilizing historical
data for the behavioral analysis of humans, animals, systems or phenomena
with the prime objective of performing prediction of future events or trends.
There is a wide variety of methods that can be used to accomplish pre-
dictive analytics. This ranges from the exploitation of directed probabilistic
graphical models (e.g., Bayesian networks) to the use of undirected proba-
bilistic graphical models such as Markov networks. In this thesis, we focus
on the usage of some undirected probabilistic graphical model to perform
prediction. They include Markov chain, Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and
Conditional Random Fields (CRF). In addition, detecting the similarities be-
tween two objects play a profound role during pattern recognition. Unlike
Fourier transform that can only analyze a signal in either the frequency or
time domain, wavelet transform can analyze a signal in both the frequency
and time domain at the same time. Besides, wavelet transform is revered
for its ability to detect the similarities of signals at different frequency reso-
lutions. As a result, among others, we exploit the usage of discrete wavelet
theory to find distinct patterns in data.
Once proper statistical inference approaches have been defined or de-
rived, and a predictive model has been crafted, it could then be used in a
variety of applications to predict future events. Next, we discuss the impor-
tance and application of predictive analytics.
1.1 Predictive Analytics on Massive Data
While the ongoing data generation opens new opportunities to perform an-
alytics, the staggering volume and complexity of data is rendering analytics
quite challenging. This is self-evident across an array of industries fluctuat-
ing from customer retention services through predictions in Location Based
8 Introduction
((a)) Brain Analytics ((b)) Patient Monitoring ((c)) Smart City
Figure 1.2: Predictive analytics in health care and urban planning.
Services (LBS) to predictions in life sciences. This has fueled huge interest
for more advanced predictive analytics solutions in these industries. We now
articulate some applications of predictive analytics.
Customer Behavioral Analytics: As organizations continue to loose tons of
customers to competitors, they have become obsessed to find sophisticated
predictive analytic solutions that can highlight common behavioral patterns
of such customers.
Health Care Wearables: As the wearable epoch dawns, huge technology
firms have aligned platforms for the assimilation of health and physiologi-
cal data from smart phones and wearables (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure,
sleep pattern, location and accelerometer movements). Predictive analytics
on such data is used to predict hidden diseases before they surface or chronic
conditions such as heart attack or epilepsy before they strike, as depicted in
Figure 1.2(a) and Figure 1.2(b). As a case study, in this thesis, we demon-
strate how disordered movement time series stemming from the wearable
sensors of Parkinson’s disease patients can be used to predict Freezing of
Gait in Parkinson before it strikes.
Urban Planning and Location Based Marketing: Nowadays, most humans
carry a GPS-enabled phone - making humans to act as sensors. Massive
amounts of GPS data resulting from human movement is captured and stored
in different platforms. Also, intelligent sensors are tagged on strategic po-
sitions on streets in an effort to create smart cities as illustrated in Figure
1.2(c).
With proper predictive analytics algorithms, which have the capability to
predict a user’s future visit location with high veracity, this data can be uti-
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((a)) Data privacy ((b)) Wearables activity recognition ((c)) Sensors in sports
Figure 1.3: Privacy and sensor data analytics.
lized for marketing or for precise targeting in location based advertisements.
Besides, location prediction results can be leveraged by policy makers to
shape decisions during urban planning, and for traffic monitoring. In this
thesis, we present numerous future location prediction algorithms for sparse
and dense spatio-temporal data.
Smart devices: Incumbent companies are re-inventing themselves by shift-
ing from hardware sales to predictive analytics in order to re-define their
revenue collection strategies. Specifically, successes in miniaturization and
sensor technology have not only facilitated the incorporation of sensors into
traditional stand-alone equipments, but have also prompted the creation of
a new wave of smart equipments that are interconnected in a cloud. These
incumbents then utilize predictive analytics tools to monitor, maintain and
enhance performance of such smart equipments remotely. In the same light,
while data privacy remains a great concern, sensors are increasingly placed
in a broad spectrum of places such as on humans, cars, balls and tennis rack-
ets to improve future performance through analytics as shown in Figure 1.3.
Predictive analytics is also used in a broad range of areas such as DNA anal-
ysis, national security and trend analysis. To summarize, in this thesis, with
regards to predictive analytics, the datasets used for predictions include: i)
spatio-temporal data during next location prediction, ii) time series of phys-
iological data from smart phones sensors for activity prediction, iii) physio-
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logical data from Parkinson’s disease patients for gaits prediction. In the next
section, we discuss data protection.
1.2 Data Protection and Privacy
Another major objective of this thesis is aimed at data protection. A huge
chunk of data collected in this age originates from ubiquitous devices such
as smart phones and GPS- enabled devices. Such data captures human be-
haviors, routines, activities and affiliations. Also, with body related wearable
data on the rise, more intrusive and sensitive physiological information such
as heart rate and blood pressure is being stored in proprietary systems.
The huge volume of sensitive data collected from pervasive and non-
pervasive devices has propelled privacy concerns to a new dimension. Failing
to address such concerns will discourage individuals from releasing their per-
sonal information or may trigger an exodus of users from existing platforms.
This has prompted huge research interest to protect data and find a trade-off
between data mining and privacy. In this thesis, we provide novel privacy so-
lutions to anonymize users, anonymize huge networks, obfuscate the paths
of moving objects and sanitize other sensitive data prior to publishing. The
data protection techniques are based on two privacy paradigms. Namely,
differential privacy and k-Anonymity.
1.3 Contributions and Structure of Thesis
In this section, we describe how this thesis is organized and briefly highlight
the contributions made in each chapter. The thesis begins with an introduc-
tion of predictive analytics and privacy preserving data mining in Chapter 1.
Specifically, we discuss the KDD process, predictive analytics, as well as the
demand for advanced predictive analytics solutions. In addition, we outline
the concerns, significance and ramifications of data privacy, which is eroded
daily by sophisticated data mining techniques and the intrusive nature of
data collection.
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To effectively perform predictions, we study and utilize some existing
principles in pattern recognition, statistics, data mining and machine learn-
ing. In particular, to construct our predictive models, we employ wavelets,
as well as generative and discriminative undirected probabilistic graphical
models. Chapter 2 provides an introduction of wavelet transform and three
probabilistic graphical models used in this thesis. Namely, Markov chain,
HMM and CRF. It also introduces privacy preserving data mining.
In what follows, we divide the thesis into five distinct parts. Part I handles
predictions on sparse data while Part II deals with predictions on dense data.
In Part III, we focus on predictions on sensor data. In contrast, in Part IV,
we shift our attention from knowledge discovery to knowledge protection,
where we provide new privacy preserving data mining solutions to address
data privacy. Lastly, in Part V, we conclude and propose future works.
Part I
In the first chapter of Part I (i.e., Chapter 3), we present a location predic-
tive model that employs Poisson distribution, wavelets and CRF. Specifically,
we introduce a technique that investigates if a user’s mobility behavior is
governed by the Poisson distribution, and subsequently infuse the Poisson
probability in the user’s predictive model if a null hypothesis test is satis-
fied. In addition, we present a new social influence quantization technique
that utilizes the decay of wavelet coefficients across scales to estimate so-
cial influence. We use all mobility behaviors learned from a user’s and her
friends’ mobility historical data to synthesize CRF feature functions, which
are used to craft a holistic location predictor. This chapter has been published
in [AS14b] and [AFS15].
Unlike in Chapter 3, we propose a location predictive model in Chapter
4 that utilizes, among others, Gaussian Kernel Density Estimation (KDE),
wavelet spectral cross correlation and location influence. In particular, to de-
termine user preference, we devise an approach that derives time series from
Gaussian KDE clusters and employs wavelet spectral cross correlation to de-
termine the similarity of sparse location sequences. Besides, to understand
group dynamics in a Location Based Social Network (LBSN), we introduce a
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geo-social influence quantization technique that employs linear regression to
capture social influence in a friendship network. Also, we study the complex
relationships between locations and propose a location influence quantifica-
tion measure. We leverage this user preference, social influence and location
influence to build a CRF predictive model, which predicts future locations
with elevated veracity.
Part II
In Chapter 5, we present a new trajectory model called TMC-Pattern that
captures even a flash of movement of an object and all its nearest neigh-
bors. We demonstrate how TMC-Pattern can be coupled with Prefix Span
[PHMA+01] to discover frequent Region of Interest (ROI). In addition, we
propose an approach that employs TMC-Pattern and Markov chain to predict
future locations. This work has been published as a book chapter in the book
[AS14c] and in the proceedings of [AS12].
Moreover, in Chapter 6, we propose a next location prediction technique
that strongly relies on frequent nearest neighbors’ information. To capture
frequent nearest neighbors, we introduce a new sequence alignment algo-
rithm called Location Based Global Alignment, which effectively identifies
frequent neighbors with minimal or no gaps. We combine the mobility his-
tory of a user and all her frequent nearest neighbors to construct a TMC-
Footprint Tree, which is combined with a Markov chain to predict future
locations with enhanced accuracies. This chapter has previously been pub-
lished in [AS13a].
Part III
In this part, we present three predictive models for time series stemming
from sensors. We propose in Chapter 7 an activity recognition predictive
model, which utilizes dyadic wavelet transform, vector quantization and
HMM to predict human physiological activities from accelerometer sensor
signals. Specifically, we analyze and extract vital spectral feature vectors
from the sensor time series by performing multi-resolution wavelet trans-
form. We build a codebook using the extracted wavelet feature vectors by
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employing vector quantization, and subsequently tap the codebook to con-
struct dedicated HMM for each activity. The constructed HMMs are used for
activity recognition. This chapter has been published in [AS14a].
In Chapter 8, we follow the same procedure used in Chapter 7 to extract
important feature vectors. But during vector quantization, we introduce a
new technique to optimally design a codebook so that activities with striking
similarities such as walking (fast) and jogging can be effectively differenti-
ated. In addition, we utilize CRF instead of HMM to build the activity recog-
nition predictive model. We previously published this chapter in [AS14d].
Furthermore, in Chapter 9, we present a predictive analytics technique
for the medical domain. Specifically, we present a predictive model that uti-
lizes dysfunctional movement time series stemming from wearable sensors
of Parkinson’s disease patients to predict Freeze of Gait (FOG). The tech-
nique employs wavelets to analyze and detect distinct patterns between the
movement time series of a normal movement and that of a FOG episode. We
utilize these patterns to build a robust CRF predictive model that effectively
predicts FOG with high prediction performance. This chapter has been pub-
lished in [AS14e].
Part IV
In Part IV of this thesis, we present four chapters that focus on data protec-
tion in different domains ranging from network privacy through clustering
privacy to location privacy. Specifically, in Chapter 10, we introduce a new
attack model called k-core Attack that bridges the privacy of state-of-the-art
structural network anonymization techniques. We then present a new struc-
tural network anonymization technique called (k, δ)-core Anonymity, which
is - tailored for massive networks, prevents the k-core attack and anonymizes
vertices and edges of a published network. Besides, while existing structural
network anonymization techniques employ the degree property of graphs to
accomplish anonymization, (k,δ)-core Anonymity is the first network anony-
mization technique that is based on the k-core property of graphs. This chap-
ter has previously been published in [AHBS14].
DBSCAN [EKSX96] is a widely used clustering algorithm. In Chapter 11,
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we propose two private DBSCAN techniques to cluster sensitive data. Our
private DBSCAN approaches are based on differential privacy. Specifically,
we portray the DBSCAN heuristic as a binomial distribution process and con-
nect the DBSCAN binomial probabilities to the ratio of probabilities in dif-
ferential privacy. Using this, we design two differentially private DBSCAN
algorithms. The first is based on the notion of noisy density reachability
while the second uses a new notion of noisy core points. In addition, we
introduce a new approach to generate differentially private synthetic data
through a combination of DBSCAN and Markov chain.
On the other hand, we propose two location privacy techniques in Chap-
ter 12, which ensure privacy of moving objects through differential privacy.
The first approach guarantees location privacy through path perturbation
by injecting Laplace noise, while the second approach utilizes exponential
mechanism to accomplish location obfuscation. The techniques in this chap-
ter have previously been published in [AHS12a] and [AHS12b].
To guarantee the privacy of moving objects on road networks, the fine
granularity of road segments have to be considered. In Chapter 13, we
present a location privacy technique that enforces a strict constrain that the
anonymized or perturbed GPS points must lie on the road segments. We ad-
dress this problem by embedding privacy to map matching. Specifically, we
first introduce a novel HMM map matching technique to determine the exact
location of GPS points on a road segment. Then, given a set of user defined
sensitive locations, we define a cost function, which is utilized to compute
a minimum cost alternate private route in our shortest path problem. This
chapter has previously been published in [AS13b].
Part V
In this part, we conclude and discuss open research challenges.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
As recently alluded, in this thesis, we propose numerous predictive models
for sparse, dense and sensor data. One of our privacy techniques and all of
our proposed predictive models utilize foundation theories from areas rang-
ing from statistics through pattern recognition to signal processing. Specif-
ically, from statistics, we tap principles from undirected graphical models
(i.e., Markov chain, Hidden Markov Model and Conditional Random Fields)
to build predictive models. On the other hand, during similarity search or
when we intend to detect hidden correlations during prediction, we utilize
wavelets, which stem from signal processing and pattern recognition. To-
wards this end, before we present the findings of this thesis, we first provide
an introduction to these principles.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we provide an introduction to
wavelet theory in Section 2.1. Next, we explain the Markov Assumption,
and three graphical models that emanate from it. Namely, the Markov chain
in Section 2.2, the Hidden Markov Model in Section 2.3 and Conditional
Random Fields in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we introduce data privacy.
2.1 Wavelet Theory
Discrete signals are depicted as a collection of data points at a given time. In
digital signal processing, it known that the most important characteristics of
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a signal or time-series are buried in its frequency or spectral domain. Most of-
ten Fourier Transform is employed to represent time domain discrete signal
in the frequency domain. Specifically, Fourier Transform provides spectral
information of the entire time series by employing a infinite cosine wave of
a given frequency. An important assumption made by Fourier transform is
that the signal is stationary. However, time series signals are non-stationary.
Fourier transform is unable to illustrate a signal in both the time and fre-
quency domain at once. Although Short Time Fourier Transform has been
proposed for depicting a signal in both the time and frequency domain, the
windowing function that it employs to capture changes in the spectral and
time domain delivers either a poor time resolution and a better frequency
resolution with shorter window size or vice versa with longer window. In
order to analyze time and spectral domain information of a time series at the
same time, wavelet transform is required.
2.1.1 Wavelet Transform
Wavelet transform is widely used in image processing. In this thesis, we ex-
plore the usage of wavelets for spatio-temporal data mining. There are two
major kinds of wavelet transforms. Namely, Continuous Wavelet Transform
(CWT) and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). A mother wavelet is required
to perform wavelet transform. There is a wide variety of mother wavelets.
Some examples of mother wavelets include the Haar wavelet, mexican hat
wavelet and Daubechies wavelet. Wavelet transform is achieved by the dila-
tion and translation of a mother wavelet. Specifically, the wavelet transform
of a function f(x) is accomplished by determining a set of inner products at
different scales or dilations and translation. The continuous wavelet trans-
form of f(x) is formalized in Equation 2.1.
CWTψf(j, τ) = Wf (j, τ) = |j| 1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
f(x)ψ∗(
x− τ
j
)dx (2.1)
where j ∈ Z is the dilation or scale, τ ∈ Z is the translation and ψ∗(..) is the
complex conjugate of the mother wavelet. The mother wavelet is given by
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ψ(x) and when scaled with j, it yields a scaling function ψj.
Portraying a signal using CWT is redundant due to the fact that j and
τ are continuous. Towards this end, in several chapters of this thesis, we
utilize dyadic wavelets during prediction. Dyadic wavelets are also known as
Maximum Overlap Discrete Wavelet Transform (MODWT) or Undecimated
Wavelet Transform. Dyadic wavelet is a slight mutation of DWT, hence they
can be better described by first introducing DWT.
The Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) of a function f(x) is given by
DWTψf(j, τ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(x)ψ∗j,τ (x)dx (2.2)
where ψj,τ = 12j · ψ
(
x−τ
j
)
. Again, j ∈ Z is the dilation or scale, τ ∈ Z is
the translation while ψ∗(..) is the complex conjugate of the mother wavelet.
Moreover, there are two approaches to perform DWT. Namely, Forward
Discrete Wavelet Transform (FDWT) and Inverse Discrete Wavelet Transform
(IDWT). At a higher level, given a signal f(x), FDWT decomposes a signal
into fine and coarse wavelet coefficients at different resolutions or scales dur-
ing Multi-Resolution Analysis (MRA). We do not utilize IDWT in this thesis,
hence we provide only a brief description of IDWT as follows. Unlike FDWT,
IDWF which is also called Backward Discrete Wavelet Transform utilizes a
series of wavelet coefficients to reconstruct the original signal f(x).
2.1.2 Foward Discrete Wavelet Transform
Multi-Resolution Analysis using FDWT can be accomplished by employing
the algorithm proposed by Mallat [Mal89]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the MRA
of a signal S using FDWT. The decomposition of a sequence or signal starts
at a scale J = log2(N) − 1, where N is the length of the sequence. At each
scale j, FDWT yields a fine coefficient called the approximation coefficient
aj and a coarse coefficient termed the detail coefficient dj. In this thesis,
we utilize some of these coefficients as feature vectors during prediction in
Part I and Part III. The approximation coefficients correspond to the low pass
filter h while the detail coefficients correspond to the high pass filter g. The
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Figure 2.1: Multiresolution Forward Wavelet Transform.
algorithm iteratively moves from a higher scale j to a scale j − 1. At each
lower scale j − 1, the signal is subdivided into low pass signal and high
pass signal, and they are then down-sampled. Down-sampling involves the
reduction of the number of samples of the signal by half of its original size as
shown in Figure 2.1. That is, in Figure 2.1, the original sample size of signal
S is reduced after down-sampling from 512 to 256 samples to generate the
low pass signal A1 and the high pass signal D1, which is half its original size.
These are represented by the aj−1 = (aj ∗ h) ↓ 2 and dj−1 = (dj ∗ g) ↓ 2
respectively. The iteration continues and terminates at j = 0.
A major difference between MODWT and DWT is that there is no down-
sampling for MODWT. As a result, MODWT consists of redundant features.
In addition, while DWT requires that the size of the input data be a multiple
of a power of two, MODWT has no restriction on the signal length, thus
making it more practical to utilize.
In wavelet theory, suppose Cj = {c1, c2, c3, · · · , cn} is a set of wavelet
coefficients at a scale j, where Cj can be the set of approximation or detail
wavelet coefficients, then the sub-band energy of a set of wavelet coefficients
at scale j is given by
E(Cj) =
n∑
i=0
‖ci‖2 (2.3)
In some prediction methods presented in this thesis, we utilize wavelet spec-
tral sub-band energies as valuable feature vectors.
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2.2 Introduction to Markov Chains
Let’s assume we aspire to make a prediction on the outcome of the next soccer
match for a soccer club called Team A, using all historical results of Team
A. Suppose O =
{
ow1 , o
d
2, o
l
3, o
w
4 , · · · , odn−2, own−1
}
represents a set of historical
match outcomes of Team A for the past 20 years, where owi denotes a win on
match day i, odi means a draw on match day i, and o
l
i corresponds to a loss on
match day i. Mathematically, we can represent the prediction problem as:
P (on|O) = P (on|own−1, odn−2, · · · , ow4 , ol3, od2, ow1 )
Assume that Team A plays 30 matches per year, it implies all match outcomes
from the past 20 years are needed for the prediction. This is a huge amount
of historical data, which may not help in the prediction of the next match
result. To address this, we utilize the Markov Assumption which states that
the future depends on the recent past. In particular, the Markov assumption
assumes that the distant past is already encoded in the present or in the
recent past, and thus the future is independent of the past, given the present.
The Markov assumption led to the invention of the Markov Chain [MT09],
which can be employed to model the soccer match prediction problem as will
be described later.
The Markov chain [MT09] is a stochastic probabilistic model that com-
prises of a finite number of distinct states that are linked to one another.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a discrete time Markov chain for the soccer match pre-
diction. It consists of three states. Namely, win, draw and loss. The order
of a Markov chain depends on the Markov assumption. A first order Markov
chain depends solely on the present (i.e., current) state and no past states.
That is,
P (on|O) = P (on|own−1, odn−2, · · · , ow4 , ol3, od2, ow1 ) ≈ P (on|own−1)
Similarly, the second order Markov chain depends on both the current state
and the previous state that precedes the current state. That is,
P (on|O) = P (on|own−1, odn−2, · · · , ow4 , ol3, od2, ow1 ) ≈ P (on|own−1, odn−2)
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Figure 2.2: Markov chain of soccer games.
Generally, an n−order Markov chain depends on the current state and the
n− 1 previous states. A transition from state i to state j is associated with a
probability called the transition probability, which is represented by Tij. The
transition probabilities are stored in a matrix termed the transition matrix T .
The sum of the transition probabilities in each row of the transition matrix
must be 1. The determination of a transition probability (e.g., from win to
loss ) can be utilized to predict the outcome of the next soccer match.
Markov chains are widely used in areas such as bio-informatics and speech
recognition. Since a Markov chain suggests that information about the re-
cent past are sufficient to predict the future, in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of
this thesis, we employ Markov chains to construct our predictive models. On
the other hand, in Chapter 11, we utilize Markov chain instead of contin-
gency table to estimate and generate synthetic categorical data because of
its stronger inference capability.
2.3 Introduction to Hidden Markov Model
There is a special kind of Markov chain whereby the states are not provided
directly (i.e., hidden). For instance, consider the soccer Markov chain that
entails win, draw and loss states. Assume that the aforementioned states
where hidden and one has to observe the behaviors or modes of fans of Team
A to infer the outcome of each match. Let the observation joy corresponds
to the win state while the observations sad and quiet represent to the loss
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and draw states, respectively. Hence, the Markov chain can be represented
as shown in Figure 2.3. In the Markov chain of Figure 2.3, the observation is
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?????????
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Figure 2.3: Hidden Markov Model of a Soccer Match Prediction.
a probabilistic function of the state. Such a Markov chain is called a Hidden
Markov Model (HMM). A Hidden Markov Model [Rab89] is a generative
probabilistic undirected graphical model that is used in a broad spectrum of
areas such as speech recognition, text processing and DNA analysis.
An HMM is a discrete stochastic process which comprises of a finite set of
states and observations. The states Y = {y1, y2, · · · , yn} are hidden and can
be viewed through their corresponding observations X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}.
The HMM must adhere to two independence assumptions. First, it must
obey the first order Markov assumption, which requires that the future state
depends only on the current state. That is, P (yn|Y ) = P (yn|yn−1). Secondly,
at a given time t, the observation xt at time t depends only on the state yt
and no other state or observation.
An HMM is defined using the number of states N and the number of ob-
servations per state M . For the soccer example, the observations per state
are joy, quiet and sad. In addition, the HMM has three important parameters.
Namely, the initial distribution, the transition probability and the emission
probability. The transition probability Ti,j refers to the probability of mov-
ing from state i to state j and it is given by Ti,j = P (yj|yi). Also, it can be
used to build the transition matrix T . The emission probability e(xi) depicts
the conditional probability that an observation xi will be seen after a hidden
state yi has occurred. This is given by e(xi) = P (xi|yi) . Similarly, a collection
of emission probabilities is utilized to construct an emission matrix E. The
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initial distribution vector of a state π(yi) = P (yi). The initial distribution of
all states is represented as π. The model λ of an HMM is thus represented as
λ = (T,E, π).
Generally, the HMM is utilized to compute the joint probability distribution
P (X, Y ). The HMM can be employed to solve three problems [Rab89]. These
include i) Evaluation, ii) Decoding and iii) Learning.
Evaluation: Provided we already have a model λ, given an observation se-
quenceXq, the HMM evaluation task finds the probability thatXq stems from
the model λ. That is, it computes P (Xq|λ). The Forward algorithm [Wel03]
is used to determine P (Xq|λ). In Part III of this thesis that deals with predic-
tion on sensor data, we employ the evaluation principle of the HMM. Briefly,
we utilize a trained model λa of a given activity, and find which observation
from a sensor time series best suits the model. The activity whose HMM has
the highest likelihood probability is considered as the activity of the observa-
tion sequence.
Decoding or Inference: Given an observation sequence Xq, decoding de-
termines the most likely sequence of hidden states that may have generated
the observation sequence Xq. The Viterbi algorithm [RN93] is utilized to
solve the decoding problem. In Chapter 13, we depict and model the map
matching road segment inference task as an HMM decoding problem.
Learning: Another vital problem that is addressed by an HMM is the learning
or training problem. There are two kinds of learning using HMM. Namely,
supervised and unsupervised learning. Supervised learning is when the intial
model parameters of the HMM are provided. In contrast, unsupervised learn-
ing is when no model parameters are given. In this thesis, we perform only
unsupervised learning to obtain the parameters of an HMM. We accomplish
this using the Baum-Welch algorithm [Wel03].
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2.4 Introduction to Conditional Random Fields
A Conditional Random Field (CRF) [LMP01] is a discriminative probabilistic
graphical model that can be utilized for statistical inference. CRF has been
successfully used for a variety of inference tasks such as in in Part-of-speech
tagging and object recognition. In this thesis, we explore the usage of CRFs to
solve a variety of prediction problems. CRF performs inference by mapping
an ordered observation sequence X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn−1, xn} to a sequence of
labels Y = {y1, y2, · · · , yn−1, yn}.
While HMM focuses to determine the joint probability distribution P(X,Y),
CRFs are employed to determine the conditional probability of Y given an
observation sequence X (i.e., P (Y |X) ). CRF can sporadically utilize any
observation variable xi from the observation sequence X. Thus, CRF obeys
the independence assumption without taking into account every single ob-
servation of the observation sequence.
To determine P (Y |X) in a CRF, an undirected graph is described using
fully connected sub-graphs. Specifically, a CRF is an undirected graph G =
(V,E) with edges from yi−1 to yi, as well as edges from a state yi to any
observation in X. The edges of a CRF form a fully connected sub-graphs
called a clique. The maximal clique C of a graph G can be employed to
compute the probability distribution of an undirected graph. Specifically,
the probability of an undirected graph can be derived from the product of
potential functions Ψ(c) for each clique c over G. This is given by
P (V ) =
1
Z
∏
c∈C
Ψ(c) (2.4)
where Z is the normalization factor which ensures that the probabilities
sum to one. Throughout this thesis, we utilize only linear chain CRFs. Since
the cliques of a CRF comprises of edges with yi−1 , yi and X, the potential
function for each clique in a linear chain CRF is given by
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Ψ(c) = exp(i, yi−1, yi, X). Hence, P (Y |X) is given by
P (Y |X) = 1
Z(X)
exp
(
wa ·
I∏
i=1
fa (i, yi−1, yi, X)
)
(2.5)
where w is the feature weight and Z(X) is the normalization factor which
ensures that the probabilities sum to one. f is the feature function.
The feature function f can be a state feature or a transition feature. A
state feature captures the relationship of an edge given by f = fx(i, yi−1), yi)
while a transition feature corresponds to an edge f = gx(i, yi, X). A state
feature function and transition feature function of a CRF correspond to the
transition probability and emission probability of an HMM. In the next sec-
tion, we describe how f is used for prediction.
2.4.1 CRF Feature Functions
For each prediction problem, some hypothesis or underlying historical prop-
erties of the input data have to be provided to model the CRF. Such properties
are infused into the probabilistic predictive model by utilizing them as CRF
feature functions. For instance, suppose there are m properties or hypothesis
that have to be considered during prediction, they would be used to create
m CRF feature functions.
Before any of these features are added to the predictive model during
prediction, certain conditions must be satisfied. Specifically, for each CRF
feature function, we define a constraint that must not be violated. Hence,
prior to instilling any of the feature functions, we have to ensure that the
Markov property between the previous observation xt−1 and current observa-
tion xt or between the current observation xt and the current label yt fulfills
its corresponding constraint. If the constraint is satisfied, we add the feature
by assigning a real value number of 1. Otherwise, zero is added. In our pre-
diction settings, these conditions are usually some user defined thresholds.
After all CRF feature functions f have been defined, the CRF is trained as
articulated in the next section.
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2.4.2 CRF Training
There are two approaches to perform CRF training. These include the Maxi-
mum Apriori Estimation and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). In this
thesis, we employ MLE and a numerical optimization technique to learn the
model parameter w by maximizing the conditional log-log likelihood of the
training data as given in Equation 2.6.
w =
I∑
i=1
fa(i, yi−1, yt, X)− log(Z(X)) (2.6)
To avoid over-fitting, regularization is performed through the optimization of
a penalized likelihood using a Gaussian prior with a variance of σ2 as given
in Equation 2.7.
w =
I∑
i=1
fa(i, yi−1, yt, X)− log(Z(X))− ||w||
2
2σ2
(2.7)
This is followed by gradient ascent, which helps to maximize the log likeli-
hood.
For all our CRF predictive models in this thesis, we utilize a Gaussian prior
with a variance 0.5. We compute the gradient using Forward-Backward algo-
rithm [Wel03] and address the optimization task by employing the limited-
memory BFGS [LNLN89]. To predict an observation sequence X, our CRF
computes the likelihood probability that an observation sequence X would
yield a given output label. The output label with the maximum likelihood
probability is considered as the prediction result.
2.5 Privacy Preserving Data Mining
The growing significance to ensure privacy while performing data mining
was articulated in detail in Section 1.2. In this section, we provide a brief
introduction to Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM), define k-Anonymity
and introduce differential privacy.
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A broad spectrum of privacy definitions have been proposed by the data
mining, cryptographic and other research communities to tackle data privacy
and security. Privacy Preserving Data Mining focuses on ways to ensure data
privacy when executing database and data mining operations. Another vital
objective of PPDM is to maintain a good trade-off between data utility and
privacy. Numerous privacy approaches have been proposed to guarantee
privacy in databases, graphs and different data mining tasks. Many of them
stem from the notion of k-Anonymity [Swe02].
2.5.1 k-Anonymity Privacy Paradigm
k-Anonymity [Swe02] ensures privacy by suppressing or generalizing quasi-
identifiers. Quasi-identifiers are groups of attributes that can be combined
with external data to uniquely re-identify an individual (e.g., Date of Birth,
Zip Code and Gender). We now formally define k-Anonymity.
Definition 2.1 (k-ANONYMITY [SWE02]): Given a set of quasi identifiers in
a database table, the database table is said to be k−Anonymous, if the sequence
of records in each quasi-identifier exist at least (k-1) times.
k-Anonymity was initially proposed to handle privacy in databases. The no-
tion of k-Anonymity was then customized for graphs and it is now widely
employed to ensure privacy in networks. Our graph anonymization tech-
nique in Chapter 10 is based on the k-Anonymity privacy paradigm.
Although extensive research has been done on k-Anonymity, k-Anonymity
is still exposed to several attacks such as the unsorted and linkage attacks.
This led to the creation of a new privacy model called l-diversity [MKGV07],
which is aimed at addressing the homogeneity and background knowledge
attacks suffered by k-Anonymity. l-diversity does this by providing “well rep-
resented” sensitive attributes for each sequence of quasi-identifiers. But that
was also insufficient to prevent sensitive attribute disclosure. This in turn
led to the proposal of another privacy definition called t-Closeness [LLV07].
The latter tries to achieve privacy by keeping the distribution of each quasi-
identifier’s sensitive attribute “close” to their distribution in the database.
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k-Anonymity, l-Diversity, t-Closeness make a lot of assumptions about the
adversary and at times fall short of their goal to prevent data disclosure. Dif-
ferential privacy [Dwo06], which does not rely on background knowledge
was then introduced. It is known to be stronger that k-Anonymity, l-diversity
and t-Closeness. In the next section, we provide an introduction to differ-
ential privacy and some terms that are used in Chapter 11 and Chapter 12.
2.5.2 Introduction to Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a mathematical privacy definition proposed by Dwork
[Dwo06]. It ensures privacy through data perturbation. That is, by the addi-
tion of a small amount of noise to the true data, such that the true value of a
data can be masked from adversaries. Differential privacy is built around the
notion that, for any two databases that differ in one single row, the ratio of
the probabilities of their outputs released by a differential private algorithm,
should be small and bounded (as will be defined in Definition 2.2).
Example: Consider a database T that consists of 100 medical records,
and each record comprises of among others, the diseases and postal codes
of patients. Let’s assume that one row is removed from database T to form
a new database T1. Database T1 therefore contains 99 records. If databases
T and T1 are separately passed through a differential private randomization
mechanism, it will always add noise to the true count query results, such that
the ratio of the probabilities of the perturbed query output results (, which
might be of interest to an insurance company to discriminate a patient) is
almost identical. This means, with differential privacy, the removal of one
record from a database does not reveal any information to an adversary.
Formally,
Definition 2.2 (	-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY [DMNS06]): A randomized mech-
anism A(x) provides 	-differential privacy if for any two datasets D1 and D2
that differ on at most one element, and all output S ⊆ Range(A),
Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(	) ∗ Pr[A(D2) ∈ S]
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	 is the privacy parameter called privacy budget or privacy level.
Sensitivity: The sensitivity of a function is pivotal during noise deriva-
tion. The sensitivity of a function is defined as the maximum change that
occurs if one record is added or removed from a dataset. Formally, the dif-
ferent sensitivities are defined as follows.
Definition 2.3 (LOCAL SENSITIVITY [NRS07]): Local Sensitivity of a func-
tion f : Dn → Rd for all x and x′ which differ in one entry is LSf (x) =
maxd(x,x′)=1 ‖f(x)− f(x′)‖1.
Definition 2.4 (GLOBAL SENSITIVITY [DMNS06]): Global Sensitivity of
a function f : Dn → Rd is given by GSf = maxx LSf (x).
Definition 2.5 (SMOOTH SENSITIVITY [NRS07]): For β > 0, the β-
smooth sensitivity of a function f is Sβ,f (x) = maxx′∈Dn
(
LSf (x
′) · e−βd(x,x′)) .
Data Perturbation and Noise Types: Differential privacy is usually achieved
by adding calibrated noise to data. This can be accomplished using Laplace
noise, Gaussian noise or the Exponential Mechanism.
Laplace Noise: In Chapter 11 and Chapter 12, we employed the Laplace
noise to ensure differential privacy. The Laplace noise is drawn from the
probability density function of the Laplace distribution. 	-differential privacy
is achieved using Laplace noise if Theorem 2.1 is satisfied.
Theorem 2.1 For a given function f : Dn → Rd, which has sensitivity S(f) , a
mechanism A(x) = f(x) + Lap(S(f)

)d provides 	-differential privacy.
Gaussian Noise: Like Laplace noise, a Gaussian noise is derived from the
normal Gaussian distribution and ensures differential privacy as stipulated
in Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.2 ( (	, δ)−differential privacy [DKM+06]) Given a zero mean Gaus-
sian distribution with variance R and two outputs drawn from two input datasets
T1 and T2 that differ in one single entry, a randomized mechanism A (x) gives
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δ -approximate 	 - indistinguishability if Pr[A(T1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(	) ∗ Pr[A(T2) ∈
S] + δ and R is at least 2 log 2δ
2
.
Exponential Mechanism: We used exponential mechanism in Chapter 12.
The exponential mechanism [MT07] extends the notion of differential pri-
vacy to incorporate non-real value functions. It guarantees differential pri-
vacy by approximating the true value of a data with the help of a quality
function (which is also called the utility function). Specifically, it takes in
several input data and maps them to some outputs. It then uses the quality
function to assign scores to all the mappings. The output whose mapping
has the best score is chosen and sampled with a given probability such that
differential privacy is guaranteed. This is formally given as follows.
Theorem 2.3 [MT07] For a given input X and a function u : (X × y) → R,
an algorithm that chooses an output y with a probability ∝ exp(−	u(X ,y)
2Δu
) is
	-differential private.
Composition: There are two forms of compositions [McS09] in differential
privacy. These include Sequential Composition and Parallel Composition. Se-
quential composition is exhibited when a sequence of computation provides
differential privacy in isolation. The final privacy guarantee is said to be
the sum of each 	-differential privacy. On the other hand, Parallel Composi-
tion occurs when the input data is partitioned in disjoint sets, independent
of the original data. In this case, the final privacy from such a sequence of
computation depends on the worst computation guarantee of the sequence.

Part I
Predictive Analytics on Sparse
Data
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Chapter 3
Check-in Prediction with Poisson
Process and Lipschitz Exponent
The widespread adoption of ubiquitous devices such as smart phones, tablets
and wearables does not only facilitate the connection of billions of people,
but also leads to the generation of a staggering volume of mobility data at
an amazing rate. Such data pervades every aspect of an individual’s life -
but could be mined for noble purposes. Besides, the constant morphing of
social behaviors towards sharing in social networks, which cuts across differ-
ent ages, genders and demographics has fueled a culture of sharing. This has
led to the emergence of a new social attitude called "check-in". Check-in is a
phenomena whereby a person deliberately broadcasts her current location to
a group of friends in a Location Based Social Network (LBSN). Check-in data
is inherently sparse and discontinuous - yet it might entail additional contex-
tual meta-data that is capable of uniquely identifying the precise position,
name or context of a place with breathtaking veracity. This part discusses
the challenges posed by sparse data (i.e., check-ins) during prediction, and
provides novel robust predictive models that are tailored for predictions on
sparse data.
In this chapter, we present a novel enhanced location predictor for check-
in data that is crafted using Poisson distribution, wavelets and CRF. Specifi-
cally, we show that check-in generation is governed by the Poisson distribu-
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tion. In addition, among others, we utilize wavelets to rigorously analyze
social influence and learn elusive underlying patterns, as well as human mo-
bility behaviors embedded in check-in data. We utilize this knowledge to
institute CRF features, which capture latent trends that govern users’ mo-
bility. These CRF features are employed to build a robust predictive model
that predicts future locations with enhanced accuracies. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of our predictive model on two real datasets.
3.1 Motivation
Ubiquitous devices such as smart phones, tablets and wearables have be-
come imperative to society and business. The embrace of these pervasive
devices accounts for the production of a massive amount of spatio-temporal
mobility data in a variety of platforms. Mobility data exposes all visited lo-
cations and mimics the identity, behaviors, and affiliations of an individual
or group. This has sparked huge interest in the domain of predictive analyt-
ics to detect and predict emerging trends hidden in such data. Check-in is
a spatio-temporal mobility data stemming from an LBSN. Predicting future
locations from historical check-in data in an LBSN is utilized in a broad spec-
trum of applications such as Foursquare and Facebook Places. It can also be
used in fields such as location based advertisement, mobile recommendation
systems, health care patient monitoring, urban planning, traffic monitoring
and customer analysis. The prime objective of this chapter is to present a
technique to predict the top-1 and top-k future check-in locations of a user.
Although numerous techniques [CML11, YZC13, YYLL11, GTL12] have
been proposed for predicting future check-in locations. Most of them have fo-
cused on the usage of power law distribution and social influence. [CML11]
alluded that due to power law distribution, friends are less likely to check-in
at distant locations despite their social ties. Moreover, our in-depth analy-
sis of two LBSN check-in datasets reveals that within a state (e.g., Califor-
nia), the average time required by a user to visit a location that has been
checked-in by a friend is approximately 12 days. This suggests that despite
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geo-proximity, there is no strong global trend that demonstrates that friends
are prompted to visit a given location hours or under three days after a friend
visited. This highlights that at a city or state resolution, because mobility is
also driven by factors such as (sparse) routines, interests and not solely dis-
tance, the utilization of the power law distribution to determine influence
is not enough for our check-in predictive model; since our predictive model
aspires to predict check-ins within a given day. This motivated us to exploit
other distributions that can govern check-in mobility behaviors.
Surprisingly, although it is quite obvious that check-in data is generated
randomly at certain new locations or at a given time, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no existing work has studied the randomness of check-in data genera-
tion or how a user’s mobility behavioral pattern can be learned w.r.t. random
data generation. In mathematics, the Poisson distribution is leveraged to de-
termine the probability of a random event at a given space or time interval.
Towards this end, we explore if the Poisson distribution can be utilized to
govern the check-in behavior of users.
On the other hand, the effective quantification of social influence is piv-
otal for location prediction, since it can be employed to pin-point which
friend or friends can spur a user to visit a future location. While some ex-
isting works [BHMW11, TSWY09, ALTY08] have proposed formidable tech-
niques to compute social influence, most of these works did not rigorously
scrutinize and quantify influence in scenarios where there are more than one
influencers.
For instance, let C = {u1, u2, u3, u4} be a social-friendship clique in an
LBSN, where ui denotes user i of the LBSN. Assume that user u1 is the first
user in C to visit a location, lj. She broadcasts her visit of location lj to her
friendship network C through check-ins as depicted in Figure 3.1a. Figure
3.1a illustrates the evolution of friendship check-ins of users ui ∈ C at loca-
tion lj over the time period of t0 to t5.
After user u1 broadcasts location lj, no member in C visited location lj
between t0 and t1. At time t1, user u2 reacted by visiting lj and broadcasting
her visit of location lj to her friendship network C. Also, at t1, since user
u2 is the sole friend that visited location lj, it is easier to infer that user u1
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Figure 3.1: Quantification of Social Influence using Wavelets.
socially influenced user u2 to visit location lj. Meaning that at t1, user u1 is
the sole influencer. User u3 makes a check-in at time t2. In this scenario, it
is unclear who influenced user u3 to visit location lj. It might be user u1, or
user u2, or both; since at t2, both user u1 and user u2 had already informed
their network C about their visits at location lj. Hence, at time t2, user u1
and user u2 are potential influencers. In this work, we say the social influence
of u1 or u2 on user u3 to visit location lj is cascaded, and refer to such influence
as cascaded social influence.
Furthermore, at t4, user u4 visited the same location. User u4 may have
been socially influenced by users u1, u2, u3, since they are potential influ-
encers at time t4. The actual influence of each potential influencer on user
u4 w.r.t. location lj is ambiguous, and gets more complex as the size of the
friendship network increases. Properly estimating cascaded social influence
of users will significantly elevate prediction accuracy. As a result, we rigor-
ously study users’ social influence for each checked-in location as follows.
First, we depict the evolution of friendship check-in over a defined time pe-
riod as a time series as shown in Figure 3.1a. Then, we preform rigorous
analysis of social influence spectral using wavelets, as illustrated in Figure
3.1b.
In summary, we attempt to answer the following questions which are
crucial for building a future check-in location predictor,
1. Poisson Probability for Future Location: Given the historical infor-
mation of a user, how can we model the mobility behavior of the user
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at a given location or region, or at a given time interval.
2. Cascaded Social Influence Quantification: Given a social-friendship
network where more than one friends are influencers, how do we effec-
tively quantify or estimate the influence of each influencer for a given
location.
We subsequently utilize the answers of the aforementioned questions to craft
our predictive model.
3.1.1 Problem Definition
The main objective of the task handled in this chapter is to first utilize histor-
ical check-in data of users to study their mobility behaviors, as well as how
their social ties drive or impact mobility. Secondly, given a sequence of a
user’s check-ins at a given day, we intend to build a predictive model, which
can predict the top-1 and top-k future check-in location of the user. Formally,
Definition 3.1 (PROBLEM DEFINITION): Let Hi be the check-in history and Fi
denotes the social friendship graph of user ui in an LBSN. Given Hi, Fi and
an ordered sequence of check-in observations Cd = {c1, c2, · · · , cn}, where each
cj ∈ Cd is a check-in generated at location lj at time tj on the same day and
t1 < t2 < tj. Assume that lm is the current location of the user, predict the top-1
and top-k future locations of user ui on that day.
Our contributions in this chapter are threefold. First, we explore the us-
age of Poisson distribution and other statistical techniques to model and infer
the future check-in probabilities of users. Secondly, we present a novel holis-
tic approach to study and quantify social influence and group dynamics using
wavelets. In particular, we depict the evolution of friendship induced check-
ins at a given location as a time series or signal. Intuitively, sudden changes
or spikes in the signal after a user makes a check-in signify an increase in in-
terest and the number of friendship visits. Lipschitz Exponent (LE) [MH92]
is utilized in mathematics and signal processing to determine the singularity
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of a function or signal. We employ the Lipschitz Exponent to determine such
sudden changes by detecting the regularity of the friendship check-in signal.
We obtain the Lipschitz Exponent through rigorous analysis of the decay of
dyadic wavelet coefficients across scales. We then utilize the value of the
Lipschitz Exponent to quantitatively derive the cascaded influence of a user.
Thirdly, among others, we utilize the Poisson probability, wavelet social
influence and geographical influence to institute feature functions that cap-
ture specific user’s mobility behavior. These feature functions are incorpo-
rated into a CRF to predict the top-k future check-ins of a user.
Section 3.1.2 of this chapter focuses on relevant related works while Sec-
tion 3.2 analyzes the statistics of users’ historical check-in data and models
them using Poisson process. In Section 3.3, we introduce a technique to
quantify social influence using wavelets. We present a location prediction
technique that utilizes CRF and wavelet based features in Section 3.4. Sec-
tion 3.5 discusses the results of the conducted experiments and we conclude
the chapter in Section 3.6.
3.1.2 Related work
Location prediction and LBSN: [CML11] propose Periodic Mobility Model
(PMM) and Periodic Social Mobility Model (PSMM) to capture human mo-
bility. PMM is based on their assumption that a user can be found at home or
work state at each given time whereas PSMM is derived from the combina-
tion of PMM and several social factors that trigger mobility. Unlike [CML11]
that focuses on two hidden states to infer a user’s location, we utilize Pois-
son process to capture and predict the location of a user. [YZC13] propose
a location predictor, which first predicts the category using different HMM
classes. Then, they utilize the predicted category to predict the most likely
next location. Our predictive model in this Chapter differs from [YZC13]
since we utilize a CRF instead of an HMM. Also, we do not use category data
to predict next locations.
[GTL12] propose a prediction technique that uses geo-social correlation
for check-in prediction. In particular, their technique explores the usage of
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four geo-social circles to capture the strength of the geo-social correlations
between local and distant friends or non-friends. [WTM13] study the statis-
tics of first time visits, the importance of nearby locations, as well as the
impact of friendship in catalyzing mobility on two LBSNs. Then, they pro-
pose two algorithms that can be used in the recommendation of check-in
locations. Other recommendation system works include [HE14, YYLL11].
Influence: Numerous techniques [WLPZ14, BHMW11, TSWY09, AKM08]
have been proposed to quantify social influence. Like [TSWY09], we agree
that social influence must be determined for a given topic or location, but
while [TSWY09] introduce Topical Affinity Propagation approach to quantify
social influence at the topic level in a network, we propose a wavelet based
singularity detection technique to quantify social influence. [BHMW11] pro-
pose a technique to estimate influence of tweets, while [LFN10, AKM08]
study the difference between social correlation and influence. Homophily is
a phenomenon whereby people become friends because they share a similar
behavior. [LFN10] perform a randomization test over linked attributes and
measure their correlation gain to determine if the relationship between the
two attributes is simply social correlation or homophily. Our social influence
technique presented in this chapter differs from [LFN10, AKM08] in that,
we rigorously examine and quantify the probability distribution of cascaded
social influence using wavelet spectral.
3.2 Historical Mobility Statistics and Modeling
We commence by outlining a solution for the problem statement (i.e., Def-
inition 3.1). Next, we discuss the outcomes of our statistically analysis of
two datasets. Lastly, we describe how Poisson distribution is used to model
check-ins.
3.2.1 Approach Overview
Let L = {l1, l2, · · · , ln} be a set of locations (or regions), where each lj de-
notes a candidate next location. Assuming that the current location of user
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ui at time t−1 is location lm, where lm /∈ L; we solve the problem articulated
in Definition 3.1 by finding the probability P ti,j. P
t
i,j denotes the check-in
probability of user ui at a candidate location lj ∈ L at time t. Using CRF, the
candidate region or location lj with maximum probability is considered as
the predicted future location. P ti,j is computed using Equation 3.1,
P ti,j = ΩpP
p
i,j + ΩsP
s
i,j(Fi) + ΩdP
d
i,j(lm) (3.1)
where P pi,j is the Poisson check-in probability of user ui at location lj, P
s
i,j(Fi)
denotes the social friendship influence of user ui to visit location lj given user
ui’s friendship network Fi, P di,j(lm) is the geographical influence on user ui
governed by the power law distribution between location lj and lm.
Ωp, Ωs and Ωd denote the weights of the Poisson check-in probability, so-
cial influence and geographical influence, respectively. These weights are
determined by the CRF from the underlying historical data of a user and her
social network friends. In what follows, Section 3.2.3 elaborately discusses
how we utilize Poisson distribution to model the check-in behavior of a user,
whereas we briefly describe geographic influence in Section 3.2.4. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we provide a holistic approach to quantitatively determine social
influence using wavelets.
3.2.2 Datasets
To study the human mobility properties encapsulated in check-ins, we uti-
lize two LBSN datasets. Namely, the Gowalla and Brightkite datasets. Both
datasets are publicly available at the Stanford Large Network Dataset (SNAP)
repository ∗ †.
Gowalla Dataset: Gowalla is a location based social network that has been
acquired by Facebook. Facebook now offers the LBSN functionality under
Facebook places. The Gowalla LBSN dataset comprises of 196,591 members,
who made 6,264,203 check-ins. Besides, it consists of 950,327 edges which
correspond to the social ties between members.
∗http://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-gowalla.html
†http://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-brightkite.html
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Brightkite Dataset: The Brightkite dataset entails 58,228 members who sub-
mitted a total of 2,627,870 check-ins. Moreover, there are 772,933 social ties
or edges among members.
In order to gain significant insights about check-ins and the mobility be-
haviors of humans, we commence by performing a thorough in-depth anal-
ysis of the underlying historical statistical properties of the aforementioned
check-in datasets. At a higher level, we made two major statistical obser-
vations. First, the first visitor within a friendship network to visit a given
location is not necessarily the major influencer. We found that only 13.19 %
and 11.84 % of first visitors are major influencers of the corresponding loca-
tions for the Gowalla and Brightkite datasets, respectively. Secondly, 71.03%
of Gowalla and 67.51 % of Brightkite active users’ mobility pattern is gov-
erned by the Poisson distribution. An active user is a user with atleast 60
check-ins. Section 3.2.3 discusses the Poisson distribution of check-ins.
3.2.3 Poisson Distribution of Check-ins
Check-ins and Poisson Distribution: Check-in is a rational event performed
by humans at a given location or region (i.e., space interval), or at a given
time interval. The event of a check-in is associated with a high degree of
uncertainty, thus making the event of a check-in to be random in nature.
For instance, a user who visits a location might decide to check-in or not,
irrespective if it is her first visit or last visit.
Theorem 3.1 The check-in behavior of a user ui follows the Poisson distribu-
tion iff user ui possesses historical mobility information at a given space or time
interval.
Proof 3.1 The proof of Theorem 3.1 stems from the fundamental requirements
of a Poisson distribution. A Poisson distribution is required to satisfy two crite-
ria. First, an event must occur at random and independently at a given space
or time interval. Secondly, the mean occurrence of the random event must be
known. Inherently, check-ins are created by deliberate human actions at ran-
dom at a given space interval (e.g., location ) or at a given time interval. If
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a user ui has historical check-in data at the aforementioned interval, then the
mean occurrence of a check-in event at the given space interval (i.e., location or
region) or time interval is known, since it can be extracted from user ui’s his-
torical check-in data. These demonstrate that the event of a check-in fulfills the
two criteria of a Poisson distribution. Thus, check-in behavior is characterized
by a Poisson distribution.
Simply put, Theorem 3.1 states that the check-in behavior of a user at a given
space or time interval is governed by the Poisson distribution, so long as the
user has historical check-in data at that interval. To study the human mobil-
ity properties encapsulated in check-ins, we investigate the characteristics of
a Poisson check-in process in a given time interval and space interval (i.e.,
the randomness of check-ins w.r.t. a given location or region).
Expected Check-in Probability: Without loss of generality, let X denotes
the number of check-ins at a given location lj (i.e., space interval) and λj be
the mean number of check-ins at that location lj. Given that X is governed
by the Poisson distribution (which is represented by X ∼ Po(λj) ), then,
mathematically, the expected probability of the event that k check-ins occur
at location lj is given by Equation 3.2.
Pj (X = k) =
	−λj · λkj
k!
(3.2)
While Equation 3.2 depicts the Poisson probability for location lj, the same
equation can also be utilized to compute the expected check-in probability
at a given time interval. In this case, the mean number of check-in will
correspond to the average check-in within the given time interval.
We extend Equation 3.2 to a scenario whereby we intend to obtain the
probability of check-ins for a given region, which comprises of a set S of
neighboring locations, where S = {l1, l2, · · · , ln}. Assuming that the neigh-
boring locations in S are independent and their respective mean number of
check-ins in each lj ∈ S is λS = {λ1, λ2, · · · , λn}. Then, mathematically, the
total probability Ptot of the event that check-ins occur at region S is given by
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Equation 3.3.
Ptot ∼
n∑
i
Po(λi) (3.3)
Furthermore, Equation 3.2 defines the probability of a specific number of
check-ins (i.e., Pj (X = k). However, during location prediction, in some
cases, we might rather be interested to know the probability of a thresh-
old number of check-ins at a given space interval or time interval. For in-
stance, the Possion probability of at least k check-ins at location lj is given
by Pj (X ≥ k). Lemma 3.1 stipulates the probability for a threshold number
of check-ins.
Lemma 3.1 Given that the event of a check-in is observed randomly at a given
space interval lj and the mean occurrence of check-ins at the interval lj is λj,
the Poisson distribution that at least k check-ins occur at lj is given by
Pj (X ≥ k) = 1−
k−1∑
i=0
	−λj · λij
i!
(3.4)
Proof 3.2 Consider that the event of a check-in is observed randomly at a given
space or time interval. Let λ be the mean occurrence of check-in at the space
interval lj. The probability to observe at least k check-ins at the interval lj is
given by
Pj (X ≥ k) = Pj (X = k) + Pj (X = k + 1) + · · · (3.5)
where · · · represents the continuous addition of an infinite number of probabil-
ities. Equation 3.5 can be re-written as
Pj (X ≥ k) = 1− Pj (X < k)
= 1 - (Pj (X = 0) + Pj (X = 1) + Pj (X = 2) + ...
... + Pj (X = k − 2) + Pj (X = k − 1))
= 1 -
∑k−1
i=0 Pj (X = i)
⇒ Pj (X ≥ k) = 1−
∑k−1
i=0
−λj ·λij
i!
This completes the proof.
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Lemma 3.1 can also be used to determine Poisson probability w.r.t. a time
interval.
Historical Poisson Check-in Distribution of Datasets: The last section
provides the theoretical basis of modeling check-in data as a Poisson pro-
cess. Prior to incorporating the expected Poisson probability to the predictive
model of a user or her friendship network, we first verify if the prediction of
the Poisson check-in process is empirically consistent with the user’s historical
mobility behavior. This will help to reduce prediction errors.
Specifically, we require sufficient statistical evidence that the Poisson check-
in probability strongly and empirically agrees with the user’s past mobility
behavior at a given space or time interval. As a result, we conduct a null hy-
pothesis test with a claim that the Poisson check-in process empirically agrees
with the user’s check-in history at a given space or time interval (using the
Gowalla or Brightkite datasets). The corresponding counter claim coined the
alternate hypothesis is that the Poisson check-in process deviates empirically
from the user’s mobility history. If there is strong evidence to reject the null
hypothesis, the alternate hypothesis will be accepted and the Poisson prob-
ability will not be utilized as a feature in the predictive model of the user.
We test the null hypothesis using the p-value and a strict significance level
α = 5%. We utilize the Poisson probability for the predictive model of each
user whose p-value is higher than the significant level of 5%.
a) Check-in probability for given location or region: Figure 3.2(a) illustrates
the expected Poisson check-in probability of a region around Location 57155
for a given user (i.e, user 4) of the Gowalla dataset. We determine the p-
values of the probabilities in Figure 3.2(a) and if the p-values are above α,
then there is strong statistical evidence that the predicted Poisson check-in
probability is consistent and agrees with the user’s historically mobility be-
havior at that location or region. In that case, the Poisson characteristic is
tapped and utilized by the predictive model of the user. We observe that
while friendship drives mobility, the check-in time interval of users heavily
depends on the user’s preference than on the user’s network check-in time
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((a)) User 4 Space Interval Poisson PDF. ((b)) User 4 Hourly Poisson PDF.
((c)) User 4 Hourly Poisson CDF. ((d)) Poisson PDF of User 4 and her Friends.
Figure 3.2: Gowalla Data: User 4 Location.
interval. We incorporate this finding in our predictive model. For example,
Figure 3.2(b), 3.2(c), 3.2(d) illustrate the check-in probabilities for 24 hours
time interval for the user, its corresponding the cumulative distribution fre-
quency, and the Poisson check-in probability of the user’s friendship network.
They show that while the user’s network check-in time interval is between 2
P.M. to 7 A.M., the user checks-in typically around 2 P.M. to 8.PM.
3.2.4 Geographical Influence
The capabilities of geographical influence to trigger mobility have been ex-
tensively studied [CML11, GTL12, WTM13, YYLL11]. Hence, we provide only
a brief description of geographical influence and how we utilize it in our pre-
46 Check-in Prediction with Poisson Process and Lipschitz Exponent
dictive model. These works reported that the relationship between mobility
and distance is governed by the power law distribution. Specifically, empir-
ical analysis conducted by [CML11] on the Gowalla and Brightkite datasets
alluded that the behavior of human mobility w.r.t. distance obeys the power
law distribution. Since the same datasets is utilized in this work, we adopt
the findings of [CML11], and utilize the power law distribution to capture
geographical influence. Hence, given two location lj and lm, we embed the
geographical influence P di,j(lm) on user ui by using the power law distribution
given in Equation 3.6
P di,j(lm) = a · xb (3.6)
where a and b are the parameters of the power law distribution, while x is
the distance between location lj and location lm. We employ linear regression
to compute the parameters a and b, and embed the geographical influence
P di,j(lm) into our predictive model using Equation 3.1.
3.3 Social Influence Detection and Quantification
using Wavelets
In this section, we utilize historical data to investigate the relationship be-
tween mobility and friendship within an LBSN. This relationship can be cap-
tured by studying the social influence between friends and how it induces
friends to visit different locations. We commence by introducing the social
influence check-in probabilities of a user for visited and unvisited locations.
Then, we propose a novel approach to detect and quantify (cascaded) social
influence from check-ins in an LBSN.
3.3.1 Social Influence Check-in Probability
At a Visited Location: The social influence check-in probability P s−vi,j (uk) of a
user ui to check-in at a visited location lj due to the influence of user uk is
given by
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P s−vi,j (uk) =
T∑
t=1
Φk,i · Ck,i(t)
T∑
t=1
Φk,i
(3.7)
where t denotes each visit of both user ui and user uk at location lj. Φk,i
refers to the weight of the (cascaded) social influence of user uk on user
ui. Specifically, Φk,i is utilized for the high precision quantification of social
influence using wavelets. This will be discussed in great details in the next
section.
Given that Fi is the friendship network of user ui, the overall social influ-
ence from user ui’s friendship network to visit location lj is given by
P s−vi,j (Fi) =
∑
uk∈Fi P
s−v
i,j (uk)
|Fi| (3.8)
At an Unvisited Location: To determine the social influence probability
P s−uvi,j (uk) of a user ui to check-in at an unvisited location lj due to the in-
fluence of user uk, we explore the historical social correlation of n random
locations that user uk visited before user ui. P s−uvi,j (uk) is derived from histor-
ical common visits of both user ui and uk as given in Equation 3.9
P s−uvi,j (uk) =
N∑
n=1
Φk,i · Ck,i(n)
N∑
n=1
Φk,i
(3.9)
We should emphasize that Equation 3.9 is different from Equation 3.7 in
that, in Equation 3.9, n different locations are used to infer the unvisited
location lj, whereas in Equation 3.7 only historical visits of location lj are
employed to derive the social influence check-in probability. Also, the overall
social influence check-in probability of user ui to check-in at an unvisited
location lj is given by
P s−uvi,j (Fi) =
∑
uk∈Fi P
s−uv
i,j (uk)
|Fi| (3.10)
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In the next section, we present a novel approach to quantify the social
influence Φk,i between two users ui and uk at a location lj .
3.3.2 Cascaded Influence in Friendship Network
In Section 3.1, we illustrated the evolution of check-ins of user’s u1 network
after she checked-in at location lj. Using Figure 3.1a, we also highlighted the
complexity of determining social influence in a scenario whereby a user vis-
its a location after more than one of her social network friends have already
broadcast the location. In fact, Figure 3.1a actually examines the variation
of the friendship check-ins and the reaction time. The term reaction time
refers to the time taken by a user, to visit a location, which has already been
checked-in by her friend. Our rational to analyze the reaction time is be-
cause, it can be utilized as a good measure to indicate the interestingness
and curiosity of one user’s action on her friends, thereby portraying the in-
fluence of friends in an LBSN. In addition, we also introduced the notion of
cascaded social influence in Section 3.1. Formally,
Definition 3.2 (CASCADED INFLUENCER): Let the subgraph
Gi = {ui, uk, un, uo, up} be the friendship social network of user ui in an LBSN.
A cascaded influencer is a set of users u ⊂ Gi that had broadcast their check-ins
at a given location lj prior to the visit of user ui at that same location lj.
Definition 3.3 (CASCADED INFLUENCE): is the probability distribution of in-
fluence from a set of cascaded influencer Uˆ = {u1, u2, · · · , un} who triggered a
user ui to visit a location lj.
Simply put, the social influence of each cascaded influencer for a given
location ranges from 0 to 1. The sum of influences from all cascaded in-
fluencers is 1. Our prime objective is to quantitatively estimate the social
influence of each cascaded influencer that probably triggered a user to visit a
given location. Our approach employs wavelets to quantitatively determine
the influence distribution of each cascaded influencer.
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3.3.3 Social Influence Quantification
In this work, given a time-series that depicts the evolution of check-ins at a
location over a specified time period, we utilize Lipschitz Exponent to detect
sudden changes or spikes in the time series. The intuition is that, once an
influencer broadcasts a location, there is a high tendency to have a spike or
discontinuity in the time series. Such spikes signify a jump in the number of
friendship check-ins at that location which is probably triggered by the influ-
encer. From a digital signal processing perspective, a spike can be considered
as an impulse in the signal. In contrast, we anticipate to see smoother sig-
nals if the broadcaster is not a strong influencer. Towards this end, the task
of measuring influence can be reduced to determining the regularity of a
signal, which is represented by the evolution of friendship check-ins over a
defined time.
Given a signal, noise or irrelevant small changes can easily be confused
and considered as an impulse. Hence, one challenge which arises during this
analysis is to exclude noise or irrelevant small changes during the computa-
tion of the smoothness of the signal. [MH92] showed that, given a signal
f(x), a point xo and a set of points x = {xa · · · xg}, which are in the neigh-
borhood of xo, the local regularity of f(x) at point xo is characterized by the
Lipschitz Exponent α, if for all xi ∈ x, there exists a constant C such that
|f(x)− f(xo)| ≤ C |x− xo|α (3.11)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. α = 0 means discontinuity. The strength of singularity is
determined by α. Assuming that f(x) is a friendship check-in time series or
signal, the higher the α, the smoother the signal. A smoother signal corre-
sponds to little changes in the check-in, which indicate little or no influence
by the broadcaster. In contrast, discontinuities or impulses within the signal
signify strong influence. Mallat and Hwang [MH92] proved that any wavelet
transform φ(t), which entails n vanishing moments satisfy Equation 3.12.∫ +∞
−∞
tkφ(t)dt = 0 (3.12)
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Wavelets with higher vanishing moments yields better singularity detection
results [MH92]. Towards this end, we employ Daubechies 8 wavelets. Equa-
tion 3.13 is formed by transforming Equation 3.11 using the property speci-
fied in Equation 3.12.
|Wf (s, x)| ≤ Csα (3.13)
The Lipschitz Exponent α is derived from Equation 3.13 by converting it
to the log scale as given by Equation 3.14.
α =
log |Wf (s, x)|
logs
(3.14)
We utilized MOWDT instead of DWT because during singularity detection, if
DWT is employed, it becomes ineffective during detection of noise or irrele-
vant features at higher scales [Mal98], since its sample size is halved during
down sampling.
Social Influence using Lipschitz Exponent: We capture sudden changes
and differentiate them from noise or irrelevant features by examining the
decay of the wavelet coefficients across scales. While the real signal impulse
of a check-in time-series produces modulus maxima across all scales, noise
or irrelevant features have large coefficients only at finer scales and their
wavelet coefficient will decrease as scale increases [Mal98] [MH92]. Hence,
if the modulus maxima of the decomposed check-in time-series decreases as
scale increases, then its a noise or an irrelevant feature. On the other hand, if
the modulus maxima increases as the scale increase, then its salient regions
correspond to sudden changes or spike from the signal.
As previously mentioned, since the wavelet-based Lipschitz exponent sig-
nifies the regularity of a signal at the neighborhood of a point x0 (where
the neighborhood interval is [xa · · · xg]), from the evolution of a check-in
time-series perspective, x0 corresponds to the time t0 a user broadcasts her
check-in. Hence to determine the social influence of the check-in in the
neighborhood of t0, we derive the user’s social influence using the Lipschitz
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exponent value, as formalized in Equation 3.15.
Isi,j =
α + 1
2
(3.15)
Note that α corresponds to the gradient of the decay of wavelet coefficients
across scales as given in Equation 3.14. Our empirical results in Section
3.5 demonstrate that Equation 3.15 effectively captures and quantifies social
influence.
3.4 Check-in Prediction with CRF
In Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, we provided an introduction of CRF. In this sec-
tion, we discuss how we couple CRF to Poisson distribution, cascaded social
influence and other mobility properties to predict future check-in locations.
3.4.1 Modeling Daily Check-in Sequences as CRF
In our location prediction settings, we utilize the historical data to model
our CRF as follows. For a given day, assuming a user ui makes a sequence of
check-ins from time t = 1 to T and we are asked to predict the next check-in
at time t = T + 1 within the same day, we represent the observed sequence
of check-ins as an ordered observation sequence X = {x1, x2, · · · , xT}. Also,
we utilize the user ui’s historical movement pattern, as well as the mobility
history of friends of user ui to derive a set of candidate next check-in loca-
tion Y = {y1, y2, · · · , ym}, where each yi ∈ Y corresponds to a candidate next
location. We utilize our modeled CRF to determine the conditional proba-
bility of Y given an observation sequence X (i.e., P (Y |X) ). As explained
in Section 2.4, we need certain feature functions f from the historical mo-
bility behaviors of a user to effectively model the CRF. In the next section,
we describe how the features functions f are derived and used for location
prediction.
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3.4.2 Embed Mobility Behavior as CRF Features
In Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, after rigorous statistical analysis of users mo-
bility behaviors, as well as the interconnection between mobility and friend-
ship, we presented some approaches that can be utilized to capture a user’s
mobility behavior. These include, Poisson distribution, social influence and
geographical influence. In this section, we incorporate the learned mobility
behaviors in our predictive model using CRF features f . As a recap from
Section 2.4, to add any of the aforementioned mobility properties as a CRF
feature, we first verify if the Markov property between two random variables
fulfills a given condition. If so, we embed the feature by assigning a real
value number of 1. Otherwise, zero is added. For the prediction task in this
chapter, these conditions are some thresholds values. The only exception is
the Poisson features where the condition is to verify if the null hypothesis is
satisfied.
Poisson Features: The Poisson Space feature captures the expected Pois-
son probability that a user voluntarily makes at least k check-ins at a candi-
date next location yt. However, prior to embedding this feature to the CRF,
we perform the null hypothesis test using the p-value and a significance level
α = 5% as described in Section 3.2.3. If the null hypothesis is accepted,
we allocate the location yt a real-value of 1. Otherwise, a zero is assigned.
Formally, the Poisson Space feature is given by,
gj(X, yt) =
{
1 if H0 : Po(λyt) > 0.5
0 otherwise
The Poisson time feature learns the expected Poisson probability of a user to
check-in at a given time interval, while the joint Poisson space feature cap-
tures the transition of a user from the current location xt to a candidate next
region yt by utilizing the joint Poisson check-in probability in Equation 3.3.
We should note that, for this scenario, yt is a region which entails several lo-
cations. On the other hand, the Joint Poisson Space-Time Feature enables our
model to learn the joint Poisson probability of a user to check-in at location
lj and at a given time Interval.
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Wavelet-based social influence Feature: To infuse social influence into
the predictive mobility model of a user, we compute our wavelet-based social
influence of the user to check-in at a given location using Equation 3.15.
We set a threshold minimum social influence to τsi = 0.05. If the user’s
social influence for that location is greater or equal to τsi, the social influence
feature will be incorporated into the user’s mobility model by assigning a real
value of 1. Otherwise, zero is assigned.
Geographical Influence Feature: We define a threshold distance of τgi =
1000m, which corresponds to the maximum bounding box square distance
from the current location xt. If the distance between the current check-in
location xt and any of the candidate next location yt is less than or equal
to τgi, this feature is added by assigning a real value of 1. Otherwise, it is
omitted.
Check-In Frequency Feature: captures the frequency of a user at a given
location. The threshold frequency is given by τf = 1.
Covered Distance Feature: is used to capture the routine of the distance
traveled by the user between two locations xt and yt during weekdays and
weekends. If the threshold covered distance τcd = 400m is not exceeded,
the feature is added into the model. After feature derivation, we train the
CRF with part of the historical data as described in section 2.4, and perform
predictions as reported in the next section.
3.5 Experiments
To evaluate our check-in predictive model, we based our experimental anal-
ysis on three major aspects: (a) the effectiveness of Poisson process to model
human mobility and predict future locations; (b) the analysis of cascaded so-
cial influence on mobility using wavelets; and (c) the effectiveness of check-
in prediction using a combination of Poisson distribution, cascaded social
influence and geographical influence. In addition, we compare our tech-
nique with state-of-the-art check-in predictive models. They include, the
PMM proposed by [CML11] and the check-in predictive model proposed by
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[YZC13]. Throughout this section, we refer to these previous works as PMM
and WYNM respectively. We carried out our experiments on a Microsoft HPC
cluster with 250 GB RAM. Our algorithms were implemented in Java.
3.5.1 Data Preparation
As alluded in Section 3.2, we conducted our experiments on the Gowalla
and Brightkite datasets. Prior to performing any of the experiments, we
extracted the Gowalla and Brighkite data for active users with at least 60
check-ins. We extracted data from 5719 users from the Gowalla dataset and
7024 users from the Brighkite dataset. We partition the dataset for each user
into two sets. Namely, the training set and the test set. We allocate 75% of
each dataset for training, while the remaining 25% is utilized as the test set.
Candidate Next Location: We observe that one crucial factor which pro-
foundly influences the prediction accuracy of our CRF is the set of candidate
next check-in locations. From the CRF perspective, if the ground truth lo-
cation is missing from the set of candidate next locations, then the top-1
or top-k prediction accuracy to predict that location will be zero. On the
other hand, there are so many unique check-in locations in the Gowalla and
Brightkite datasets that are visited only once. Having too many locations
in the set of candidate next location might lead to an erosion of prediction
accuracy. To harness this challenge, we perform k-means clustering to deter-
mine candidate next check-in region. We also experimented with predictions
based on a candidate next location.
3.5.2 User Preference Prediction with Poisson Probability
We evaluate the Poisson process based on space and time intervals. The space
interval corresponds to a prediction where each candidate next location is a
single candidate location, as well as a cluster. The latter cluster is obtained
through k-means clustering by spatially clustering nearby locations. We re-
fer to these clusters as regions. We term the aforementioned predictions
as Poisson Single Location Prediction (PSLP) and Poisson Region Prediction
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(PRP), respectively. Also, the Poisson Time Prediction (PTP) predicts the fu-
ture check-in of a user at a given time interval. We perform three separate
experiments for each dataset. In each experiment, we set the CRF feature
function to capture the Poisson behavior of a user based on a candidate next
location (PSLP), a region about a candidate next location (PRP), and a time
interval (PTP) between tj to tm, where tm is user defined and tj < tm. We
use the Most Frequently Visited Locations (MFV) that was also employed in
[CML11] as our baseline. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show the top-k prediction
Top-1 Top-2 Top-3
PSLP 31.62 34.17 37.04
PRP 52.73 61.89 64.31
PTP 45.14 53.18 57.84
MFV 24.44 29.72 33.49
Table 3.1: Gowalla: User Preference Accuracy.
Top-1 Top-2 Top-3
PSLP 32.44 36.81 37.92
PRP 51.18 63.94 66.31
PTP 42.31 55.38 58.94
MFV 26.03 32.44 34.79
Table 3.2: Brightkite: User Preference Accuracy.
accuracies when using our CRF with the aforementioned three features for
both datasets. These tables show that for both datasets, our approach yields
better prediction accuracies for all three Poisson measures when compared
to the baseline MFV. For PRP, we perform a K-means clustering to obtain can-
didate regions, and after trying with several values of k, we used k = 11 for
all prediction due to the sparsity of CRF training data to predict a given lo-
cation. The Poisson feature function for a given candidate region (i.e., PRP)
has a 21.1 % and 18.7 % jump in prediction accuracy when compared to
PSLP for the Gowalla and Brightkite datasets, respectively. Also, surprisingly,
PTP outperforms predictions that where made using PSLP for both datasets.
One explanation for this is that, using the time interval reduces the candidate
next location space drastically during CRF gradient determination of feature
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weights. Specifically, by producing very little weights for check-ins that are
historically absent at a given location for the specified time interval. These
tables also show that the check-in within a region (i.e., PRP) yields the best
prediction result.
3.5.3 Evaluation of Cascaded Social Influence
To evaluate our wavelet based social influence quantization technique, we
utilize two existing social influence quantization techniques as our base-
lines. Namely, the Random Walk Restart (RWR) [WTM13] and one of the
approaches proposed by [BHMW11], which quantifies social influence by
equally distributing the influence to all potential influencers. RWR has been
quite successful in weighing social influence in LBSN for collaborative item
based recommendation. We conduct the experiments by utilizing only the
social influence feature function as input to our CRF. Figure 3.3(a) and Fig-
ure 3.3(b) show the results of the experiments on Gowalla and Brightkite
datasets. Our influence quantization approach outperforms the RWR and
the approach of [BHMW11] by 12.1 % and 15.7 % respectively w.r.t. the
top-1 prediction accuracy on the Gowalla dataset. These margins increase
w.r.t. the top-k accuracies. We observe a similar trend on the Brightkite
dataset with wider margins as depicted in Figure 3.3(b). These results em-
pirically show that our wavelet based social influence approach is formidable
and effectively captures social influence.
3.5.4 Check-in Prediction using User Preference and Geo-
Social Influence
Table 3.3 depicts the overall prediction results when all CRF feature functions
(i.e., Poisson features, cascaded social influence, geographical influence, fre-
quent check-in and distance covered features) are combined and utilized.
The table shows an increase in the overall prediction result of the top-1 ac-
curacy when compared to a scenario whereby only the Poisson process or
social influence is utilized. We obtained a maximum prediction accuracy
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Figure 3.3: Check-in Prediction Evaluation.
of 53.03% and 54.17% for the Gowalla and Brightkite dataset, respectively.
This is quite good given the sparse nature of check-in data, which provides
very little CRF training data for the prediction of a given location. In addi-
tion, when comparing our social influence CRF prediction results with that
of the user preference (using Poisson features), we notice that the user’s his-
torical mobility behavior plays a far more significant role in predicting future
check-ins than social influence.
3.5.5 Comparison with Other Predictive Models
We commence by comparing our weekdays and weekend check-in predic-
tions with the results of the PSMM prediction model reported by [CML11].
We should note that both our work and [CML11] use the same dataset. Fig-
ure 3.3(c) shows the results of the comparison. It illustrates that our tech-
nique outperform PSMM[CML11] with a wide margin of 21 % accuracy w.r.t.
weekdays predictions and a moderate margin of 14.8 % in terms of weekend
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predictions. This can be explained by the fact that the Poisson process can
effectively handle uncertain and random behaviors than the PSMM, and our
cascaded social influence more accurately detects friends.
Top-1 Top-2 Top-3
Gowalla 53.03 64.21 66.49
Brightkite 54.17 66.09 68.33
Table 3.3: Prediction accuracy using all CRF features.
Top-1 Top-2 Top-3
PMM 17.43 27.31 36.74
SDM 45.63 58.80 62.81
CRF-Wave 54.17 66.09 68.33
Table 3.4: Comparison of Check-in Location Predictors.
We also compare our work with the PMM [CML11] and WYNM predic-
tive models as shown in Table 3.4. The table shows that our predictive re-
sults (CRF-Wave) surpass that of PMM by a 36.74 % margin for the top-1
and WYNM by 8.54 %. The reason why our technique performs better than
PMM is because the Poisson process captures routines and it is robust when
dealing with uncertainties. In addition, CRF is known to be better in statis-
tical inference than HMM, this might account for why our prediction results
surpass that of WYNM. To conclude, the empirical results show that the pre-
diction accuracy our techniques outperforms that of PMM [CML11] by 36,74
%. Thus, our predictive model which utilizes the Poisson process, wavelets
and CRF is formidable for future location prediction.
3.6 Conclusions
We presented a novel predictive model that utilizes Poisson process, wavelets
and CRF to predict future check-ins. In addition, we proposed a technique
to capture and quantitatively estimate social influence in friendship network
using Lipschitz Exponent. We demonstrate through experiments the effec-
tiveness of our predictor, which yields better prediction results than state-of-
the-art works.
Chapter 4
Exploring Gaussian Kernel
Clusters for Check-in Prediction
As highlighted in many existing check-in prediction works [CML11, YYLL11],
check-in predictions suffer from low prediction performances due to the
sparse nature of check-in data. While our predictive model [AS14b] pre-
sented in the previous chapter yields a surge in prediction performance when
compared to state-of-the-arts work [CML11, YZC13], in this chapter, we fur-
ther explore ways to improve check-in prediction performance in an LBSN.
Specifically, we propose a novel location predictive model that, among
others, employs Gaussian Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) and linear re-
gression to predict the top-k future check-in locations of a user. In particular,
we utilize 2D KDE to model the check-in trajectories of users and portray
their mobility patterns as ordered sequences of Gaussian KDE clusters. We
introduce a novel user preference measure that utilizes wavelet spectral cross
correlation to capture check-in behaviors of users. In addition, we present
a technique to determine social influence using linear regression. Moreover,
we propose a location influence quantification measure. We tap the afore-
mentioned user, social and region properties to synthesize CRF feature func-
tions, which are leveraged by our CRF to learn and predict the mobility be-
haviors of users. We demonstrate on real LBSN datasets that our predictive
model predicts with an enhanced veracity.
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4.1 Motivation
After over a decade of significant advancements in phone and wearable tech-
nologies, the usage of ubiquitous devices is high, mobility geo-spatial data
disposal is unprecedented, new social cultures have emerged, and economies
have tilted. Yet predictive analytics on such data is still challenging and at
times quite complex due to the volume and pace at which mobility data is
generated. In particular, as previously alluded, check-in data is inherently
discontinuous and sparse because its synthesis is governed by deliberate hu-
man actions. This scarcity of users’ check-ins renders it quite challenging to
capture and extract detail mobility information of users on the move. The
direct utilization of these sparse discontinuous check-in points for location
prediction makes the predictor to become more susceptible to errors, thereby
plunging prediction performance. To hinder this, prior to prediction, we ex-
plore the usage of Gaussian Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) to model the
mobility of check-in trajectories.
Besides, in many existing check-in location prediction techniques [YYLL11,
WTM13], a user’s preference is determined using collaborative filtering, which
utilizes a collection of single check-in locations that were visited by the user
and other users. However, given a current location, the solution of a next lo-
cation prediction problem is to accurately choose a candidate location from
a sequence of locations. Hence, from a stringent location prediction per-
spective, deriving a user preference from check-in sequences instead of single
check-in locations might lead to an elevation in prediction accuracy. Based on
this hypothesis, we were motivated to derive a new user preference measure
that is based on check-in sequences and probe if it yields better prediction
results.
Also, while everybody is an influencer [BHMW11], our analysis of two
LBSNs suggests that most friendship networks entail a handful of major in-
fluencers, whose movements have higher likelihoods of being replicated by
their friends. This prompted us to study social influence in an LBSN, with the
prime goal of capturing and estimating the social influence of each influencer
within a friendship network.
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In addition, a lot research efforts have been made to study social influ-
ence [CML11, YYLL11] and geographical influence[YYLL11, WTM13]. Less
attention has been focused on studying the influence of one location on an-
other to trigger mobility. From our analysis of two LBSNs, we observe that
a complex interconnection of locations can be derived from locations vis-
ited by a user and his friendship network. Understanding such relationships
between locations in an LBSN and how they can catalyze friendship and
non-friendship visits can be immensely beneficial during top-k location pre-
diction. Towards this end, we study the complex interconnections between
locations to determine location influence.
Succinctly, in this chapter, we aspire to answer the following questions,
which are instrumental in crafting a check-in location predictor.
1. User Preference Similarity using Wavelet Spectral: Given the check-
in mobility histories of users, how can we use wavelet spectral to cap-
ture user preference based on check-in sequences from check-in data.
2. Social Influence with Linear Regression: Given a friendship network
and a bivariate, can linear regression be effective in quantifying social-
influence.
3. Location Influence Estimation: Given a location graph, how can we
estimate the influence of a location or KDE Region to trigger visits.
Answering these questions will provide significant insights about a user’s
mobility behavior and her corresponding social network group dynamics. We
will then utilize the gained knowledge to institute a robust location predictor.
4.1.1 Problem Definition
Definition 4.1 (PROBLEM DEFINITION): Let Hi be the check-in history and Fi
denotes the social friendship graph of user ui in an LBSN. Given Hi, Fi and
an ordered sequence of check-in region observations Ru = {R1, R2, · · · , Rn},
where each Rj ∈ Ru is a check-in generated at any location within region Rj at
time tj on the same day and t1 < t2 < tj. Assume that Rm is the current region
of the user, predict the top-1 and top-k future regions of user ui on that day.
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Simply put, Definition 4.1 aims to predict the top-1 and top-k future check-in
region from an ordered sequence of regions visited by a user. It is important
to highlight that while the problem definition of this chapter (i.e., Defini-
tion 4.1) is similar to that in Chapter 3 (i.e., Definition 3.1) in that they
aim at predicting the top-k future location of a user; a major difference be-
tween them is that this chapter utilizes region sequences instead of location
sequences.
In this chapter, we made three major contributions. First, we propose a
novel user preference measure that uses Gaussian KDE clusters. Secondly,
we introduce a linear regression approach that studies the variation of a
bivariate within a defined time interval to determine social influence in a
friendship network.
Lastly, we propose a new location influence estimation technique. Specif-
ically, we commence by constructing a location graph using users’ historical
visit information. We then study the interconnections between locations in
the location graph, and utilize the k-core of the complex interconnections be-
tween locations, as well as the duration between successive visits to estimate
a region’s influence to attract users. The aforementioned user preferences,
social influence and region influence are employed to derive CRF feature
functions that are instilled in our CRF-based predictive model to learn and
predict the top-k check-ins of a user. Our empirical evaluations reveal that
our predictive model yields better results than state-of-the-art works such as
[YYLL11] and PMM [CML11] as articulated in Section 4.6. Our results also
strongly suggest that properly modeled CRFs are better than collaborative
filtering for next check-in location predictions.
In what follows, Section 4.1.2 of this chapter discusses some related
works whereas Section 4.2 describes how Gaussian kernel density estima-
tion is utilized to derive check-in regions and model daily human mobility.
Then, prior to the presentation of our predictive model in Section 4.5, we
first introduce a new wavelet based user preference inference technique in
Section 4.3, followed by the presentation of social and location influence
estimation techniques in Section 4.4. We evaluate the predictive model in
Section 4.6 and provide a summary of the chapter in Section 4.7.
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4.1.2 Related work
[LZX+14] propose an approach to recommend check-in locations in an LBSN.
This work is similar to [LZX+14] since they also utilize kernel density estima-
tion to overcome the check-in sparsity problem. However, while [LZX+14]
utilize matrix factorization to predict top-k locations, we used CRF and other
influence measures for prediction. In Chapter 3, we present a location pre-
dictor that uses Lipschitz exponent and CRF. [LS14] propose a Mixture KDE
model that fuses an individual’s mobility distribution and that of the entire
population, and then utilize them for location prediction. In contrast, our
KDE models the entire population, and it is then combined with CRF for pre-
diction. While PMM [CML11] assumes that a user has just two states and
thus employs two distributions to predict a user’s location, we utilize more
than two Gaussian states to capture and predict the next location of a user.
Unlike the social influence in [TSWY09], we introduce a linear regression
approach to compute social influence.
In addition, [YYLL11] propose a location recommendation approach that
utilizes a combination of geographical influence, social influence and user
preference to recommend future check-in locations. Our work is different
from [YYLL11] in that, our user preference is based on the wavelet analysis
of check-in sequences while theirs is based on collaborative filtering.
4.2 Modeling using Gaussian Kernel Clusters
In this work, we utilize the Gowalla and Brightkite LBSN datasets that were
described in Section 3.2.2 of Chapter 3. We now introduce an approach that
uses Gaussian kernel density estimation to model check-ins emanating from
the aforementioned datasets.
4.2.1 Check-in Density Estimation and Clustering
Prior to prediction, we model users’ mobilities by searching for dense regions
in check-in data. This can be achieved through clustering. Specifically, we
find clusters by performing kernel density estimation on check-in data as
64 Exploring Gaussian Kernel Clusters for Check-in Prediction
follows. Given a dataset consisting of sparse check-in points, we extract only
the latitudes and longitudes, and represent each check-in point as a 2D vector
x. We then partition the latter vector space 2 into n × n equi-distance grid
of sample points. Let p(x) be the sample space. Given that a check-in vector
x is drawn from a distribution p(x), we model the check-in as a distribution
P (x) of N-component Gaussian mixture given by
P (x) =
N∑
j=1
Λf(x− x¯j) (4.1)
where Λ denotes mixture weight and f(x) is a Gaussian kernel function
which is symmetric. f(x) is given by Equation 4.2
f(x− x¯) = (2π)−d/2Δ−1/2	(1/2(x−x¯)TΔ−1(x−x¯)) (4.2)
where x¯ denotes the mean, whereas Δ is the covariance matrix. Also, d rep-
resents the dimension, which is 2. The kernel density estimation is obtained
through the convolution of the sample distribution P (x) and the bandwidth
H as written in Equation 4.3.
PKDE(x) = fH(x) ∗ P (x) =
N∑
j=1
ΛfH(x− x¯j) (4.3)
We use the bandwidth to alter the size of the Gaussian kernel and control
the results of the KDE of check-ins. To avoid over smoothing or small band-
widths, we adopt the standard bandwidth selection approach called Minimal
Integral of Square Error (MISE), which is alluded in [WJ95]. This standard
approach determines a bandwidth by choosing the bandwidth that delivers
the Minimal Integral of Square Error, which is given by
hMISE = argmin
{
E
[
PKDE(x)− P (x)2
]}
(4.4)
The process of KDE leads to the creation of several Gaussian components.
Each Gaussian component represents a cluster or region with dense check-
ins. To determine the cluster to which a check-in point belongs to, we com-
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pute the posterior probability that the point was drawn from each of the out-
putted Gaussian components. We assign the check-in point to the cluster or
Gaussian component with the highest posterior probability. Also, to prevent
very small clusters or outlier points, we set a threshold posterior probability
kt, where kt = 0.009. Any point whose posterior probability is lower than kt
is considered as noise. During prediction, we neglect all noise points.
4.2.2 Gaussian KDE Cluster Refinement
The straight forward implementation of KDE on check-in data yields elon-
gated and at times so many small clusters, which cannot be directly used for
prediction. A post processing step is required to refine and produce better
quality check-in clusters for effective prediction. As a result, we introduce a
Gaussian cluster refinement step in a post processing phase. During cluster
refinement, small clusters are merged to form larger clusters. To accomplish
this, we use the Gaussian components, as well as other statistically infor-
mation that were produced during the KDE as inputs. Then, we perform a
new KDE using these inputs. The fusion of clusters results in the production
of hierarchical structured Gaussian clusters. For example, Figure 4.1(a) de-
picts the refined Gaussian clusters from a 2D KDE of all active user Gowalla
check-ins from San Francisco. Our active user is any user with at least 60
check-ins. Figure 4.1(b) shows the probability distribution from Gowalla
check-ins, while the red regions in Figure 4.1(c) depict some Gaussian KDE
clusters from the Brightkite dataset.
4.2.3 Check-in Trajectory Modeling
To model a sequence of check-in points as a trajectory, we simply replace
each check-in point in the sequence with its respective Gaussian cluster la-
bel and record the time at which the check-in was made. Specifically, given
a set P = {p1, p2, · · · , pn} of check-in points, we model the trajectories in
P by performing Gaussian kernel density estimation, followed by the re-
finement of the constructed Gaussian clusters to produce a hierarchical set
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((a)) Gowalla:Refined
KDE.
((b)) Gowala:PDF.
?
((c)) Brightkite: Gaussian KDE Clusters.
Figure 4.1: Determination of dense mobility clusters using Gaussian KDE.
of clusters or regions R = {R1, R2, · · · , Rk}. Each cluster or region Ri =
{l1, l2, · · · , lm} consists of one or more location lj within the region, where
j, k,m ≤ n. We utilize the sequence of regions in R to derive a trajectory
T = {(R1, t1), (R2, t2), · · · , (Rk, tk)}, where each Ri is a region and ti is the
time at which the check-in was generated in region Ri.
4.3 User Preference Inference using Wavelets
In this section, we propose a novel wavelet based approach that uses check-
in sequences to estimate user preference. At a higher level, to determine user
preference, we first derive time series from a user’s daily check-in sequence
as articulated in Section 4.3.1. Then, we employ wavelet transform to rig-
orously analyze the time series spectral at multiple resolutions, in order to
detect elusive similarities between check-in sequences, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3.2. Finally, we utilize the spectral similarities between users’ check-in
sequences to craft a user preference measure as described in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Time Series Derivation from Daily Check-in Sequences
Let R¯ = {R1, R2, · · · , Rk} be the set of regions or Gaussian clusters produced
by the KDE when using all user check-ins. To derive a time series from check-
ins, we commence by representing daily check-in sequences as trajectories
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using Gaussian clusters (cf. Section 4.2.3). Since two trajectories or sub-
trajectories maybe identical or similar but might occur at different times of
the day. During time series derivation, we ensure that our similarity measure
incorporates time.
Specifically, given a trajectory T = {(R1, t1), (R2, t2), · · · , (Rk, tk)}, where
Ri ∈ R¯, we portray each single daily check-in trajectory T as a 2D time series
S as follows. First, we partition a day into t equal time intervals, where
t = {t1, t2, · · · , tN} . We consider t as the x-axis, where tN = 1040 and each
time interval [ti, ti+1] corresponds to 1 minute. Then, to derive the y-axis of
the time series S, we define a reference cluster R∗. The reference cluster is
determined by choosing any cluster in R¯. The y-coordinate of each region
Ri in T is given by the Haversine distance dist(R∗, Ri) between the reference
cluster R∗ and cluster Ri. During distance computation, we use the centroid
of each region’s Gaussian cluster as its geo-spatial position. Our in-depth
analysis reveals that the similarity results are insensitive to the choice of R∗.
Upon the computation of these distances, each 2D point in the time series
S at time ti is given by (dist(R∗, Ri), ti). Without loss of generality, let DRi
be the short form of dist(R∗, Ri). The 2D time series S deduced from T is
then given by S = {(DR1 , t1), (DR2 , t2), · · · , (DRk , tk)}. Once the time series
for all daily check-in sequences have been obtained, we utilize their wavelet
spectral to define user check-in sequence similarity, as discussed in the next
section.
4.3.2 Wavelet Analysis of Check-in Sequence Time Series
To compute the similarity of check-in sequences, we utilize MODWT to ana-
lyze and extract important spectral feature vectors of the time series S.
Check-in Sequence Spectral Analysis and Feature Selection: Given a
check-in sequence time series S, we perform multi-scale wavelet transform
decomposition of the time domain time series S. We record all the approx-
imation and detail wavelet coefficients produced at each scale and choose
only crucial feature vectors that highlight the unique signatures of a check-in
spectral during similarity search.
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Approximation Coefficients: We observe that at the maximum scale of
j = 7, the spectral of the approximation coefficient strongly resembles its
corresponding time domain check-in signal. However, as we move to lower
scales, the spectral becomes gradually distorted up till scale j = 5. Below
scale j = 5, the distortion significantly increases. Since the spectral degra-
dation between scale j = 7 to j = 5 was gradual, yet exhibits a similar and
consistent spectral behavior across the aforementioned scales; we choose the
wavelet approximation coefficient of scale j = 5 and determine its sub-band
energy. The sub-band energy of scale j = 5 is utilized as the approximation
feature vector.
Detail Coefficients: The detail coefficients comprise of salient regions that
hold unique characteristics of a signal. We study the undulation of the detail
wavelet coefficients at different frequency resolutions. We notice that the
detail coefficients at lower resolutions are more effective in detecting miss-
ing components between two spectral. As a result, to capture and segregate
dissimilar portions of two check-in spectral, we select detail wavelet coeffi-
cients from scale j = 4 to j = 1 (i.e., dj = {d4, d3, d2, d1}), compute their
detail sub-band energies, and utilize them as discriminative feature vectors.
Succinctly, for each decomposed check-in time series S, we utilize the
selected sub-band energies as signature feature vectors in our user preference
measure as described in the next section.
4.3.3 User Preference from Check-in Sequence Spectral
Consider that Wf is a selected wavelet coefficient of a given scale that was
chosen in the last section, and σ2(Wf ) denotes its variance. Suppose Si and
Sk denote the N-dimensional signature wavelet spectral feature vectors of
the decomposed time series of user ui and user uk respectively, such that the
time domain trajectories of both Si and Sj passes through region Rj, then
the wavelet based user preference Pwi,j of user ui to visit an unknown region
Rj is given by
Pwi,j =
∑
uk
Φτk,i ·Ψjk,i(Sk, Si)∑
uk
Φτk,i
(4.5)
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where Ψjk,i(Sk, Si) is the check-in sequence similarity of spectral Sk and Si,
while Φτk,i denotes the wavelet cross correlation of the power spectral (i.e.,
wavelet sub-band energies) at time shift τ of n random daily check-in se-
quences made by user ui and user uk.
The check-in sequence similarity Ψjk,i(Sk, Si) is given by
Ψjk,i(Sk, Si) =
√√√√ N∑
f=1
(Sk(f)− Si(f))2 (4.6)
where Sk(f), Si(f) ∈ d denote the sub-band energies of the f approxima-
tion or detail wavelet features, respectively. Also, the wavelet cross correla-
tion Φτk,i at time shift τ is computed using Equation 4.7 and Equation 4.8 as
alluded by Percival [PW00, Per95].
Φτk,i =
∑N
f=1 ϑ
τ
k,i(f)∑N
f=1 σk(Wf ) ·
∑N
f=1 σi(Wf )
(4.7)
where ϑτk,i(f) is the wavelet cross covariance of the f
th wavelet coefficients
from Sk, and Si, and it is given by
ϑτk,i = Cov(W
t
f,k,W
t+τ
f,i ) (4.8)
where Cov(W tf,k,W
t+τ
f,i ) denotes the covariance of the wavelet coefficient
W tf,k of user uk at time t, and the shifted wavelet coefficient W
t+τ
f,i of ui at
time t + τ . We use the shift about τ to capture time lags between the com-
pared check-in time series at different resolutions.
It is worth noting that our wavelet based user preference measure in
Equation 4.5 has two major differences w.r.t. the collaborative filtering user
preference used in [YYLL11, WTM13]. First, the collaborative filtering ap-
proach in [YYLL11, WTM13] is very punitive, since it simply checks and as-
signs a discrete real value of 1 or 0, depending on if two users checked-in at
a given location, but does not take into consideration the distances between
that region and any neighboring regions, in case of a miss.
An advantage of our approach is that even if there is no match in the spec-
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tral sequences Si and Sk, when computing the check-in sequence similarity
Ψjk,i(Si, Sk), an outright zero is not awarded. Instead, Ψ
j
k,i(Si, Sk) outputs a
similarity value by taking into consideration the distances of the neighboring
regions and partial matches.
Secondly, we use wavelet cross correlation, whose advantage is twofold.
Namely, it captures any delays or similar sub-sequences between the com-
pared spectral, and it also computes the correlation between two users check-
in sequences in the frequency domain. Furthermore, our rational of us-
ing wavelet cross correlation during the determination of user preference
is as follows. [TC98] alluded that the cross wavelet transform can be used
to quantify the similarity between two wavelet power spectral because its
power distribution has a high confidence level that is directly proportional
to χ2 distribution. As a result, we utilize the wavelet cross correlation to
determine the magnitude and direction of the relationship between any two
check-in spectral Si and Sk. After shifting a spectral by τ , areas with maxi-
mum peaks signify the coherence or strong correlation between two check-in
spectral.
4.4 Geo-Social and Location Influence Estimation
In this section, we propose two techniques to quantify influence. We begin by
presenting the first technique which deals with Geo-social influence. Next,
we provide an approach to capture location influence in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Geo-Social Influence Estimation
Generally a major influencer within a friendship network exhibits two char-
acteristics. First, a large chunk of members in her network replicate her
actions, which will translate into a jump in check-in counts for that location.
Secondly, her influence spans consistently across multiple locations.
Geo-Social Influence Bivariate: To estimate geo-social influence, we exam-
ine the osscilation of two properties within an LBSN. They include i) nor-
malized check-in count NCi,j, ii) average distance Davg(j). NCi,j which is
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given in Equation 4.9 denotes the normalized jump in friendship check-in
count at location j within a time span of ζ after a user ui visits location j,
where |Fi| is the size of the friendship network of user ui. On the other
hand, Davg(j) refers to the average distance of the homes of all friends who
visited location j within ζ. Davg(j) home distances’ capture the effects of
geographical influence, which is governed by the power law distribution
[CML11, YYLL11, GTL12].
NCi,j =
ζ∑
e=1
vi,j
|Fi| (4.9)
Linear Regression Geo-Social Influence Estimation: We assemble a col-
lection of normalized check-in counts (NCi,j) and their respective average
historical visited distances (Davg(j)) for N locations. Then, we estimate the
percentage of friends in user ui’s network that are likely to check-in at an
unknown location lm due to geo-social influence as follows.
We make a scattered plot of each set of the aforementioned bivariate
using the Gowalla and Brightkite data. Then, we find the line y = a+ bx that
best fits the distribution of the data. In particular, y corresponds to NCi,j,
while x represents Davg(j). We determine the parameters a and b of the
latter line ( i.e., y = a + bx ), which is usually called the line of best fit by
employing least square regression. After the computation of the regression
line, for a given x, we determine the predicted normalized number of check-
in yˆ that will be generated due to social ties for an unknown location lm.
Larger values of the predicted normalized check-in yˆ suggest higher like-
lihood that network friends will replicate the user’s action based on historical
trends from other locations. Thus, higher social influence. yˆ quantifies the
social influence of a user for an unknown location. To determine major and
minor influencers in an LBSN, we set a threshold normalized check-in count
Γs. If yˆ is at least Γs, the user is a major influencer in her friendship net-
work. Otherwise, she is a minor influencer. Section 4.5.1 discusses how Γs is
employed for prediction.
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4.4.2 Region and Location Influence
In this section, we study the influence of locations and the affinities of Gaus-
sian KDE regions to trigger the influx of users. To determine a region’s affin-
ity, we introduce two measures that capture the interestingness of a region.
They include the k-core of a region and the average duration between suc-
cessive visits of a region. K-core [Sei83] is a network centrality measure that
highlights how connected a region is to other regions. While k-core captures
the likelihood of a user to pass through or visit a neighboring region due to
its connectedness, we can study the actual attraction of users to a region by
analyzing the average duration between successive visits.
Learning the Interconnections and Relationships between Locations:
When the number of nodes approaches or exceeds a million nodes, it be-
comes quite challenging to understand the complex interconnections be-
tween attributes of the nodes and the vital relationships between their edges.
To determine the influence of a location or region, we derive a network of
locations from the mobility dataset and study the complex interconnections
between the locations. Specifically, we represent a collection of locations
from a mobility dataset as a simple graph G = (V,E), where V corresponds
to a set of vertices v ∈ V and E ⊆ V ×V refers to the set of edges linking the
vertices. Then to construct G, we model each location lj as a vertex vj ∈ V .
To create edges, for each location in the mobility dataset, if at least one user
visits two locations lj and lm, we connect the two locations by introducing
an unweighted edge ej,m ∈ E between node vj to node vm that correspond
to these locations.
The influence or affinity of a location or region to attract users can be in-
ferred from its connectedness, which can be obtained from the k-core prop-
erty of the region. The k-core of a graph is obtained by recursively pruning
all nodes whose degrees are less than k, until a new subgraph whose nodes
have at least k degrees is constructed. The coreness of a node signifies to
how connected a node is in a network. After the construction of the location
network graph G, we perform k-core decomposition to study the complex
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((a)) K-Core: Active Users. ((b)) Active Users and their Friends.
Figure 4.2: Analyzing the complex interconnection between locations.
interconnections between nodes or locations and any crucial relationships
between their edges that can enhance prediction accuracy. Figure 4.2(a) and
Figure 4.2(b) depict the k-core decompositions of the location graphs of the
Gowalla dataset for all locations visited by active users and active users with
their friends in San Francisco, respectively. We observe that for active users
without friends (i.e., Figure 4.2(a)), there are far more transitions between
locations at higher cores to lower core (e.g., edges between Core 1 or 2 to
Core 13 or 14). This signifies a higher visit likelihood probability. In con-
trast, when friendship information is considered like in Figure 4.2(b), there
is a high tendency that users transit to location with neighboring coreness.
We incorporate such information in our CRF during prediction.
Since we model movements using Gaussian regions instead of the ac-
tual locations, to determine the coreness of a region, suppose a region Rj =
{l1, l2, · · · , lm} entails a set of locations, the coreness of the region is given by
the coreness of the location c(li) with the highest coreness within the region,
as written in Equation 4.10.
KC(Rj) = max (c(l1), c(l2), · · · , c(lm)) (4.10)
Average Duration of successive visits: The duration of a user’s visit at a
given location can be used to infer the interestingness of that location. While
the check-in of a user at a location does not reveal the duration of the user’s
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visit at a given location, we tap the average duration between successive vis-
its of a user to infer the interestingness of a region. The shorter the duration
between successive visits, the more interesting the region. We compute the
average duration between successive visits of a region in a straight forward
manner using Equation 4.11
Durationavg(Rj) =
1
N
N∑
m=1
t(vjm+1)− t(vjm) (4.11)
where t(vji ) is the date of the i
th visit at region j.
Location or Region Influence: We determine the region influence (Aff(Rj))
to attract visitors to region Rj by using a combination of the k-core of the re-
gion and the average duration between successive visits at that region as
formalized in Equation 4.12.
Aff(Rj) = KC(Rj) +
KC(Rj)
2 ·Durationavg(Rj) (4.12)
4.5 Check-in Prediction using CRF
In this section, we provide a concise explanation on how the aforementioned
human mobility properties (i.e., user preference, geo-social influence and lo-
cation influence) are consumed by our CRF-based predictive model to deliver
enhanced prediction results.
4.5.1 Construction of Mobility CRF Feature Functions
As discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, to instill each of the recently al-
luded mobility behaviors into our CRF, we need to craft a CRF feature func-
tion f for each mobility property. Generally, prior to the embedding of any
of the aforementioned mobility properties as a CRF feature, we set certain
stringent conditions that have to be satisfied; as alluded in Section 2.4 and
demonstrated in Section 3.4.
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Wavelet based User Preference Feature: During prediction, the CRF vets
the probability that a candidate region yt will be the next check-in region.
We utilize Equation 4.6 to compute the wavelet based check-in sequence
user similarity. However, prior to embedding this feature, we set a threshold
user preference similarity of Γu as the average user preference of all can-
didate next regions and ensure that the latter threshold is satisfied before
adding the feature in the model. If the wavelet based user preference for
a candidate region yt is equal to or above Γu, we assign a real-value of 1.
Otherwise, a zero is awarded.
Social influence Feature: We tap the geo-social influence measure articu-
lated in Section 4.4.1 to create a linear regression CRF feature that captures
the social influence within a user’s friendship network. We define a thresh-
old minimum social influence Γs as the average geo-social influence of a user
at all candidate regions. If the geo-social influence of a user to transit to
a candidate region yt is at least Γs, the geo-social influence feature will be
instilled into the mobility model of that candidate region yt by assigning a
real value of 1. Otherwise, zero is allocated. Adding a feature in the model
of a candidate region yt increases the overall likelihood probability that the
candidate region is chosen over the other candidate regions (depending on
the gradient ascent results).
Region and Location Influence Feature: We set a threshold region affinity
of Γr as the average region influence for all candidate regions. Given a can-
didate next check-in region yt, we compute the influence of the region yt to
trigger the influx of visitors using Equation 4.12, which considers the k-core
and average visit duration information of yt. If the region influence is greater
or equal to Γr, we infuse the region influence feature in the model of that
candidate region yt.
Also, other obvious mobility features that are automatically captured by
our CRF during learning includes the check-in frequencies and the frequen-
cies of frequently occurring mobility sequences. Once the CRF features have
been derived, we learn the model parameter w by maximizing the condi-
tional log-log likelihood of the training data using the maximum likelihood
estimation and a numerical optimization technique. We then perform gradi-
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ent ascent to maximize the log likelihood.
4.6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our check-in location predic-
tion technique. We performed our experiments on a Microsoft HPC cluster
with 250 GB RAM. The implementations were done in Java. To investigate
the strength of our predictive model, we focus on four major aspects. They
include i) the effectiveness of our wavelet based user preference ii) the im-
pact of our geo-social influence measure to improve prediction veracity iii)
the effects of region and location influence on prediction, and iv) the varia-
tion of prediction performance on different cluster sizes.
In each of these aspects, we utilize the Precision and Recall to illustrate
the prediction performance. Besides, we use the term Precision@N and
Recall@N to denote the prediction precision and recall when predicting a
total of N locations from different users. Also, we report the coverage of the
experiment. The coverage signifies the percentage of friends or users training
data used during prediction. Furthermore, we compare our technique with
state-of-the-art check-in predictive models such as [YYLL11] and [CML11].
4.6.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate our prediction results, we consider the mobility of users at a city
resolution. In particular, we focus on the city of San Francisco. We extract
only check-ins generated in San Francisco. For the Gowalla San Francisco
extract, there exist 148486 check-ins, whereas the Brightkite San Francisco
extract entails 73482 check-ins. We predict only the future location of active
users.
Data Preparation: As a recap, each future region that has to be predicted
corresponds to the refined Gaussian KDE cluster. As a result, in this section,
we interchangeably use the term next region prediction and next location
prediction. Besides, on average, the refined KDE clusters consist of 14 and
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19 unique locations for the Gowalla and Brighkite datasets respectively; and
have a radius ranging from 0 to 2.2 km. During the evaluation of our model,
we do not randomly choose a location (or region) for prediction. Instead,
any current location whose next location has to be predicted must occur in
a daily check-in sequence as stated in Definition 4.1. Secondly, there should
be a threshold historical training data about that current location. We term
this threshold number of training data as Minimum Sequence Length (MSL).
4.6.2 Impact of Mobility Properties on Prediction
Impact of Sequence Length: Since we perform prediction by depicting
daily check-ins as sequences, to better understand the predictive model, we
evaluate the prediction performance w.r.t. the MSL. Figure 4.3(a) - Fig-
ure 4.3(c) show the impact of MSL during training of the Gowalla and
Brighkite datasets for prediction at N different locations where N = 140.
For the Gowalla dataset, we observe that the best prediction result is ob-
tained for MSL = 22. The top-k precision and recall fall for MSL = 30 for
k = 1, 3, 5. For the Brightkite dataset, the lowest prediction result is obtained
for MSL = 30 when k = 1. However, better results are obtained for k = 3, 5.
Lower MSL means more check-in sequence will be available for training. This
accounts for the surge in prediction performance.
Prediction Based on User Preference (UP): To demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our wavelet based user preference, we implement the collabo-
rative filtering user preference (UCF) that uses Pearson correlation as men-
tioned in [YYLL11], and compare it with our wavelet based approach. Figure
4.3(d) - Figure 4.3(g) depict the top-k prediction results for the Gowalla and
Brightkite datasets for N = 140 locations and MSL = 30. The figures show
that the precision and recall of the wavelet based user preference outperform
that of the collaborative filtering user preference in [YYLL11] respectively.
This can be attributed to the fact that our wavelet approach is not punitive
as the collaborative filtering user preference as discussed in Section 4.3.3.
Since the amount of users used in the experimental analysis may affect the
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((o)) Gowalla: Accuracy@N.
Figure 4.3: Predictive Model Analysis.
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prediction outcome, we perform the same experiments for different cover-
ages of user training data. Generally, it can be seen from the figures that as
the coverage (i.e., number of user information) increases, the prediction per-
formances of our approach increase, while those of the collaborative filtering
stays constant or slightly decrease.
Impact of Linear Regression Social Influence (SI): To evaluate our lin-
ear regression social influence estimation approach in an LBSN, we compare
it with a baseline social influence technique called Friend collaborative fil-
tering (FCF) that is popularly used in other check-in prediction works such
as in [YYLL11]. Figure 4.3(h) - Figure 4.3(k) depict the top-1 and top-3 pre-
diction results when considering the friendship information. For the Gowalla
dataset, we observe that our linear regression based approach has higher
precision and recall than the friendship collaborative filtering in [YYLL11].
We notice a similar trend for the Brightkite dataset. In addition, we observe
that for the top-1 prediction, the collaborative filtering precisions and recalls
are less than 0.09 while those from CRF are above 0.3. This high margins
of prediction performances suggest that CRF is more effective in check-in in-
ference and prediction than collaborative filtering. We also notice in Figure
4.3(h) and Figure 4.3(i) that prediction veracity improves as more friendship
information is incorporated.
Effects of Location Influence (LI): During the evaluation of the effects of
location influence on future check-in prediction, we consider all the CRF fea-
tures (i.e., the location influence feature, as well as the user preference and
social influence features). We then check if there is an increase in prediction
performance when compared to a scenario whereby only the user preference
and social influence features are used, and MSL = 30. Figure 4.3(l) and
Figure 4.3(m) illustrate the overall prediction performances. For Brightkite
dataset, we notice an increase in precision and recall when compared to us-
ing only the user preference and social influence features. A similar pattern
is exhibited by the Gowalla dataset. These results demonstrate that location
influence assists in the enhancement of the prediction performance. Further-
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more, we compare the overall performance of our predictive model with the
fusion framework of [YYLL11] by setting α = 0.25 and β = 0 as depicted
in Figure 4.3(l) - Figure 4.3(m). α and β are weighing parameters defined
in [YYLL11]. The figures show that the prediction performance of our tech-
nique surpasses that of [YYLL11].
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((l)) Gowalla Cold Start.
Figure 4.4: Location Prediction Performance Analysis.
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4.6.3 Analysis of Prediction Performance
Using all mobility properties: We perform further analysis of our predictor
when the CRF feature functions of all mobility properties are used by exam-
ining its performance as N varies. Figure 4.4(a) - Figure 4.4(d) illustrate
the variation of N with precision and recall for the top-k predictions, where
k = 1, 3, 5 and MSL = 30. There are two take away from these figures. First,
for both datasets, the prediction performances plummet from 20 < N < 37
and then increase slowly as the number of location N increases. This is
because, the figures actually show the average precisions or recalls over N
predicted locations. So if some failed predictions occur when N is small,
this causes a drop in the overall precision@N or recall@N. Secondly, our
approach predicts at an enhanced top-5 precision of 70.23 % and 65.77 %
when N = 105 for the Brightkite and Gowalla datasets respectively.
Size of Gaussian clusters: Our objective is to investigate the prediction
performance for smaller region radii. At times, some of the refined clusters
alluded in Section 4.2 are still to big (i.e., up to 2.2 km). In order to evaluate
the prediction performance based on region radius r, we further imploded
any refined Gaussian KDE cluster whose radius is greater than r by using
KMeans clustering. Specifically, we breakup the refined KDE Gaussian clus-
ter into k clusters, where k =
⌊
RClu
Rd
⌋
, and RClu denotes the radius of the
refined Gaussian KDE cluster whereas Rd is the desired cluster radius. Fig-
ure 4.4(e) - Figure 4.4(h) show the prediction precisions and recalls of the
Gowalla and Brightkite datasets for different cluster radius Rd (i.e., regions
sizes within San Francisco) ranging from 0.1 km to 1.2 km.
The figures show that as the radius increases, the prediction results im-
proves. For the Brightkite dataset, for a small region size of 0.3 km, our
predictor achieve a precision of 53% (for k = 3) and this inreases to 61 % to
a region size of 0.6 km. We observe a similar trend with the Gowalla dataset,
where the top-5 prediction result for a cluster radius of 0.2 km is 52 %. Also,
from the figures, for the radius of 1.2 km, the top-5 precisions of 69.7 % and
66.9 % are attained from the Gowalla and Brightkite datasets, respectively.
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Cold Start Prediction: To evaluate cold start predictions, we do not in-
clude the user’s check-in history in the training data. We use only historical
mobility data of the user’s friends to perform predictions. While some predic-
tions in some regions failed to find the correct next location, on average our
model could predict the future check-in region of a user with good veracity
when using only friendship data. Figure 4.4(i) - Figure 4.4(l) show the pre-
cisions and recalls of our cold start predictions when considering N = 140
and MSL = 22. We should note that MSL = 22 allows more training data
and performs better than MSL = 30 that was used in the previous experi-
ments. We also compare the cold start predictions results of our technique
and the fusion framework of [YYLL11]. The results shows that our technique
performs better than [YYLL11]. One reason is that our CRF learns all combi-
nations of candidate check-in locations from friendship histories.
Comparison based on Check-in Modeling: Figure 4.3(n) and Figure 4.3(o)
show a comparison of the accuracies of our location prediction technique
with the approach proposed in PMM [CML11] for N = 140 and MSL = 30.
The figures illustrate that our location predictor produces a better result than
PMM for both the Gowalla and Brightkite datasets for all values of k. The
performance of PMM is lower because they use only two Gaussian compo-
nents, which is more susceptible to errors. We use more. In summary, our
predictive model produces a top-k prediction performance of up to 70.23%.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a novel wavelet based user preference approach
that utilizes the spectral of check-in sequences. Besides, we present a method
to quantify geo-social influence in an LBSN. Furthermore, we introduce a
technique to quantify location influence. We construct a CRF based pre-
dictive model for future location prediction, which utilizes the derived user
preference, geo-social influence and location influence. We illustrate through
numerous experiments that our predictor delivers enhanced results.
Part II
Predictive Analytics on Dense
Data
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Chapter 5
Trajectory Modeling and
Prediction using TMC-Pattern
In this part, we perform predictions on dense spatio-temporal data which is
generated from an object’s movement. Unlike in Part I where the volume of
data (i.e., check-in) per object is sparse and most often discontinuous, this
part deals with moving objects that entail continuous and huge amounts of
mobility data. Their data gathering process involves the automatic and con-
stant logging of the geo-positions of an object at a defined sampling rate.
This is in stark contrast with check-in data synthesis, where data genera-
tion is characterized by deliberate human actions and emotions, thus making
check-in data not only sparse but also discontinuous. The dense and continu-
ous nature of data used in Part II alleviate some of the prediction challenges
faced when dealing with check-ins (e.g., the data sparsity problems).
Dense mobility data emanating from pervasive devices consists of a com-
bination of spatio-temporal dimensions, as well as some additional contex-
tual dimensions that may range from diseases to telephone calls. In this
chapter, we propose a novel trajectory model called Time Mobility Context
Correlation Pattern (TMC-Pattern), which considers a wide variety of dimen-
sions and utilizes subspace clustering to find contextual regions of interest.
We show how TMC-Pattern can be employed for frequent location sequence
mining and location prediction.
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5.1 Motivation
Modeling trajectories from users’ past location histories is of great impor-
tance because most location mining tasks such as location prediction, loca-
tion recommendation or outlier detection strongly rely on an underlying tra-
jectory model or scheme. Failing to properly model trajectory data will have
adverse effects in the aforementioned location mining tasks. Data generated
by ubiquitous devices is usually called spatio-temporal data. However, this
data often consists of more than three dimensions (space and time). That
is, mobility data does not only associate location to time, but it also binds
location and time to one or more additional attributes (or dimensions). The
additional attributes can range from social network activities, twitter mes-
sages, diseases, pollution, age to telephone calls as depicted in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Dimensions of state-of-the-art devices.
Numerous techniques have been proposed for trajectory modeling and for
mobility data extraction [GNPP07, ZZXM09, AS03, YKUM05]. However, they
focus only on the spatio-temporal dimensions to extract or build a trajectory
model from raw geospatial data. Social network activities, telephone calls or
disease attributes are not considered.
Mobility data emanating from state-of-the-art ubiquitous devices have
a finite but wide variety of dimensions. Since existing trajectory models
[GNPP07, ZZXM09] are unable to handle or utilize these non-spatio-temporal
dimensions, we strongly believe a new trajectory model that incorporates
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TMC-Pattern T-Pattern
[GNPP07]
Li et al.
[ZZXM09]
Ashbrook et
al. [AS03]
Dimensions > 3 3 3 3
Dimensions
Type
Space, Time, Dis-
ease, Phone Call
Space and
Time
Space and
Time
Space and
Time
Significant
Regions
Stay Mode, Pass
Mode, Brief Stop
Mode
Time Inter-
val Annota-
tion
Stay Time Stay Time
Embed Infras-
tructure
Yes No No No
Frequent Re-
gions
Prefix Span Prefix Span
and MISTA
Hub-based -
Clustering SUBCLU (Sub-
space)
Grid and
DBSCAN
(Fullspace)
Hierarchal
Clustering
(Fullspace)
KMeans
(Fullspace)
Table 5.1: Comparison of Trajectory Models.
and processes dimensions beyond space and time is required to meet the
demands of this rich diverse multi-dimensional geospatial data. Due to this
observation, we propose a novel trajectory model called TMC-Pattern.
Table 5.1 shows the differences between our proposed TMC-Pattern and
some state-of-the-art trajectory models. TMC-Pattern considers a wide vari-
ety of dimensions and utilizes subspace clustering to find contextual Regions
Of Interest (ROI). In addition, using new notions such as Stay Mode, Pass
Mode and Brief Stop Mode, TMC-Pattern rigorously captures and embeds
infrastructural, human, social and behavioral patterns hidden in geospatial
data into the trajectory model. Furthermore, TMC-Pattern incorporates the
context of a user and a region into the pattern.
Our contributions in this chapter can be articulated as follows. First, we
introduce a new trajectory model called TMC-Pattern. TMC-Pattern will be
beneficial to location mining. Besides, unlike most existing trajectory model-
ing techniques, TMC-Pattern can be used to study the relationship between
disease (or pollution) and mobility. We propose an approach that employs
TMC-Pattern and Prefix Span [PHMA+01] to discover context-aware ROI. We
also introduce a novel technique that uses TMC-Pattern and Markov model to
predict future locations. Furthermore, we demonstrate how twitter messages
and TMC-Pattern can be used to track the existence or spread of a disease.
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The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Next, we provide the
relevant related works, followed by the introduction of the TMC-Pattern tra-
jectory model in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we show how TMC-Pattern can
be leveraged for location mining. Section 5.4 provides detail results of the
conducted experiments and we conclude in Section 5.5.
5.1.1 Related work
T-Pattern [GNPP07] is a trajectory pattern modeling technique that partitions
a geospatial data into different regions based on frequently visited sequence
and a travel time. Works that focus on semantic location extraction and con-
text inference include [EP06, LFK07]. Our proposed TMC-Pattern is quite
different from the movement pattern in [GNPP07, LFK07] in that it strongly
correlates mobility to time periods and uses objects modes and network prop-
erties. [LZX+08, ZZXM09] proposed a trajectory modeling technique that
models the location history of a user and finds similarities between multiple
users. They utilized the notion of stay point to create geo-regions where ob-
jects stay for a given period of time, and then employ a hierarchy clustering
algorithm to group multiple objects in these regions. While their model uses
the notion of stay time to get stay regions, our model extends the notion of
stay time and proposes novel notions like Pass Mode and Brief Stay Mode to
capture passers-by.
[GP09] introduce a novel approach to efficiently capture and extract long
and sharable frequent paths of trajectories. This is achieved by effectively
pruning the search space, thus preventing the generation of large amounts of
sub-routes. The predictive models of [AS03, AMSS11] are based on Markov
model, and our technique differs from them in that we use a different score
metric to compute the transition probabilities. [YKUM05] proposed methods
to predict future locations using association mining rules.
5.2 Trajectory Modeling
The primary objective for modeling trajectory is to extract and model the
trajectory history of an object and then use the model for location mining.
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5.2.1 TMC-Pattern
In this section, we present Time Mobility Context Correlation Pattern (TMC-
pattern). Figure 5.2 depicts an overview of our modeling technique.
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Figure 5.2: TMC-Pattern:Data Extraction and Modeling
Determining Meaningful Location: In many previous works [AS03, ZZXM09],
significant or interesting locations are extracted from large mobility datasets
by selecting locations where an object stays for at least a given period of
time (usually termed "Stay Time" ). Stay Time is the time interval between
two successive traces of an object’s trajectory. TMC-Pattern also utilizes Stay
Time to identify "meaningful" locations from raw mobility data, however, in
a different way. In TMC-Pattern, if an object resides for more than a thresh-
old Stay Time in a given region, the object is said to be at a Stay Mode in
that region.
Definition 5.1 (STAY MODE (SM)): is the mode of an object in a given region
with its duration of stay in that region greater or equal to the Threshold Stay
Time Tst.
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Figure 5.3: A sample journey from home to work
In previous works, the notion of Stay Time is overgeneralized. They dis-
card or ignore GPS points if an object’s stay time in a region is short. For
example, Figure 5.3, illustrates the trajectory of a person that visits six lo-
cations, and the time spent at each location. From Figure 5.3, a trajec-
tory model that considers a location interesting or significant only if the
stay time threshold is at least five minutes will have a trajectory sequence:
Home → Work → Restaurant; which fails to capture the person’s short vis-
its at the Bank, School and Coffee shop, simply because their stay times are
less than five minutes. We stress that this example reflects real human mo-
bility, as visiting an ATM Machine at the bank or dropping a kid at school or
picking up a coffee in most cases takes less than five minutes. We argue that
failing to integrate such important locations (under five minutes) during data
extraction truly results in information loss, which can, among other things,
degrade location prediction accuracy. To address this information leakage,
we propose a new threshold time, namely Threshold Pass Time (Tpt), as well
as two new modes called Brief Stop Mode and Pass Mode.
Definition 5.2 (PASS MODE (PM)): is the mode of an object in a given region
with its duration of stay in that region less than the Threshold Pass Time (Tpt).
Definition 5.3 (BRIEF STOP MODE (BSM)): is the mode of an object in a
given region with its duration of stay in that region greater than the Threshold
Pass Time (Tpt) but less than the Threshold Stay Time (Tst).
Throughout this chapter, the term residence mode will be used to refer to
Stay Mode, Pass Mode and Brief Stop Mode. Our rational for these residence
modes is to capture flash of movements exhibited by neighboring objects.
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Time Correlation: The time at which an object (frequently) traverses a re-
gions is instrumental in making prediction decisions. TMC-Pattern correlates
time to regions and infrastructures by associating a time period to each resi-
dence mode (SM, BSM, PM) in a given region. Specifically, we segment time
into a consistent and finite set of time periods or intervals.
Definition 5.4 (TIME PERIOD): is a finite set T that comprises of time in-
tervals T = {t1, t2, t3, · · · , tn} and the time intervals are formed by breaking up
the Original Time (Tφ) into several time ranges.
Each time interval can be represented by a label. For example, we use a
TMC-Pattern whose Time Period is given by the set T = {M,A,E,N} where
the time labels M,A,E,N refer to Morning, Afternoon, Evening and Night,
respectively. The partitioning of T into time ranges should depend on task.
Location Context Awareness: TMC-Pattern entails the context of a user
or a region. The context of a user refers to the activities or the state of mind
of the user at a given time and region. Likewise, the context of a region
refers to a finite set of events that occur in the region (at a given time).
Definition 5.5 (TMC CONTEXT): is a finite set Ctmc of activities or events
Ctmc = {i1, i2, i3, · · · , im} about a region and the user at a given time period T .
For example, the context of a region consisting of a mall is given by Ctmc =
{Shopping,Restaurant}.
Relevance Measures of a Region: Given a raw trajectory dataset, we se-
lect the relevant dimensions and use the Subclu [KK04] subspace clustering
algorithm to find clusters. Each cluster corresponds to a region (also called
TMC-Region). To strongly infuse the infrastructural properties of a region
into TMC-Pattern, we model a region as a node and the transition from one
region to another as an edge. TMC-Pattern utilizes the betweenness to depict
the importance of a region. The betweenness centrality measure is based on
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the shortest path. The betweenness of node b is given by:
f(b) =
∑
a =b =c
σa →c(b)
σa →c
where σa →c is the sum of all shortest paths from node a to node c while
σa →c(b) is the number of the latter shortest paths that pass via b. The other
relevance measures adopted by TMC-Pattern are User Frequency and Node
Frequency. User Frequency refers to the frequency at which a user has visited
or passed through a region for a particular Time Period, whereas Region Fre-
quency corresponds to the total frequency by which all objects have visited
or passed through a region for a given Time Period. (e.g., 11/770 denotes that
a user frequency in a region is 11, while the region frequency is 770).
5.2.2 TMC-Pattern Representation
In this section, we present TMC-Pattern.
Definition 5.6 (TMC-FEATURE): is a 7 dimensional vector summarizing mo-
bility information about an object in a given region and it is represented by:
〈R, u,TP,RM,UNF,C,NB〉
where R is a region id or label, u is the user id, TP denotes the Time Period, RM
is the Residence Mode, UNF refers to the User and Node Frequency , C and NB
stand for TMC Context in Definition 5.5 and Node Betweenness, respectively.
For example, consider that the Time Period T = {M,A,E,N}. Let the object
id of an object O be 10 and the region id of region A be RegA and its Be-
tweenness is 0.7. Given that object O resides in region A with the Stay Mode
(SM) in the Morning time period (i.e., TP = M) and and its TMC Context
is Ctmc = {Bar, Shopping}. If Object O’s frequency at region A during this
time period is 114, and the node frequency of region A is 1400, then the
TMC-Feature of O is:
〈RegA, 10,M, SM, 114/1400, {Bar, Shopping} , 0.7〉
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Definition 5.7 (TMC-PATTERN): is a sequence of two or more TMC-Features
that correspond to the trajectory of an object. It is represented by:
〈R1, u,TP,RM,UNF,C,NB〉 → 〈R2, u,TP,RM,UNF,C,NB〉
.... → 〈Ri, u,TP,RM,UNF,C,NB〉
where Ri is the region id or label and TP, RM, UNF, C, NB are w.r.t. the region
id Ri as in Definition 5.6.
Determining Residence Mode of a Region: If an object transverses a re-
gion several times (different days), it is possible that at times, the object
stays in a region (Stay Mode), make a brief stop in the region (Brief Stop
Mode) or passes quickly through it (Pass Mode). Determining the residence
mode when an object makes multiple visits to a given region with different
residence modes can be ambiguous. We tackle this ambiguity by utilizing the
association mining notion of Confidence.
Definition 5.8 (RESIDENCE CONFIDENCE (ConfRM )): of a region at a given
Time Period from a list of TMC-Features is given by:
ConfRM =
Count of Specific Residence Mode
Total Count of Residence Modes
(5.1)
Given a list of TMC-Features, the net residence mode of a region is deter-
mined using Equation 5.1 and a pre-defined Minimum Confidence (minConf)
by choosing the residence mode with the highest confidence (maxConfRM).
Also the later confidence (i.e., maxConfRM) must be higher or the same as
the minConf . Suppose the highest confidence is lower than minConf , we
use the following precedence rules to obtain the net residence mode :-
1. SM ∨ SBM ∨ PM ⇒ SM
2. SM ∨ SBM ⇒ SM
3. BSM ∨ PM ⇒ PM
where Stay Mode (SM) precedes Pass Mode (PM) which in turn precedes
Brief Stop Mode(BSM).
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5.3 Trajectory Mining
5.3.1 Frequent Locations from TMC-Pattern
Frequent location subsequences or Region Of Interest (ROI) can be discov-
ered using sequential pattern mining. There are several techniques to mine
sequential patterns. Due to the fact that location datasets are inherently
large, we adopt the PrefixSpan [PHMA+01] pattern mining technique, since
it does not involve candidate generations, and has the best overall perfor-
mance. Given a minimum support, frequently occurring regions can be ex-
tracted from the TMC-Pattern.
Algorithm 5.1 depicts a customized version of the PrefixSpan algorithm
which is utilized to find frequent TMC-Regions. While the original PrefixSpan
algorithm deals with frequent items, our customized version aims at discov-
ering frequent TMC-Region sequences. The first step of 5.1 is to create a
mobility sequence database (Line 4). Subspace clusters which correspond to
TMC-Regions are used to form a sequence database. This is accomplished by
representing each trip made by a user as a sequence of TMC-Regions. Each
TMC-Region in the sequence database is chronologically listed w.r.t. the time
and direction of motion. For example, assume a trip T1 where a user passes
through three TMC-Regions, namely Home (H), School (S) and Bank (B) at
time t1, t2, t3, respectively; where t1 < t2 < t3. Then the region sequence al-
phabet in the sequence database should be labeled as H → S → B not H → B
→ S or B → H → S. To mine frequent location subsequences, we employ the
prefix and suffix approach of PrefixSpan to construct the projected-Databases
that correspond to a region sequence.
After the sequence database has been created, we start by scanning all
1-length sequence of the sequence database (Line 7 and Line 8). If the sup-
port of the 1-length sequence (or TMC-Region) is not less than the minimum
support (Line 9), the sequence is considered as a prefix. After all 1-length se-
quences have been determined, the search space is partitioned intom disjoint
subsets, where m is the number of 1-length prefix TMC-Regions. A projected
database of a 1-length prefix is constructed (Line 11) for each of the latter
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Algorithm 5.1: frequentTMCPattern(α, l,Dα, Sup_min,C)
Input: Subspace Clustered Regions C, α−projected Database, pattern
length l, minimum support Sup_min
Output: Sequence of ROI R = r1 → r2 → · · · → rn
1 R ← ∅; Dseq ← ∅ ;
2 /* Sequence Database Dseq is created once */
3 if ( C != NULL ) then
4 Dseq ← getRegionSequences(C) ;
5 end if
6 Freg ← {frequent Regions in Dseq} ;
7 ( ri ∈ Freg ) do
8 α = (β1 → · · · βn ∪ {ri}) ;
9 if ( Support(α , Dseq ) ≥ Sup_min) then
10 Freg ← Freg ∪ α ;
11 D|α ← α−projected Database ;
12 /* PrefixSpan Recursion */
13 R = R ∪ frequentTMCPattern(α, l + 1, D|α, Sup_min,NULL);
14 end if
15
16 return: R
disjoint subset and their sequential patterns are computed. Line 6 runs re-
cursively until all frequent sequential patterns are found. That is, 2-length
sequences are found after scanning the 1-length projected databases. All
the 2-length sequences are recursively utilized to form their corresponding
projected database (Line 13). Scanning a 2-length sequence projected data-
base leads to the creation of 3-length sequence, which is recursively used to
form a projected database. The process continues recursively until no more
projected database can be formed.
5.3.2 TMC-Pattern and Markov Chain for Prediction
Markov Chain from TMC-Pattern: Markov Chain is a probabilistic model
that was introduced in Section 2.2 . Figure 5.4(a) shows the movement of
a user from Region A (start) to the current Region E. All regions in Figure
5.4(a) correspond to the Subspace clusters formed during TMC-Pattern tra-
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((a)) Subspace Clustered TMC Regions ((b)) Markov Chain
Figure 5.4: Probabilistic Model from TMC-Pattern
jectory modeling. Using TMC-Pattern, we build a Markov Chain of a user’s
movement as shown in Figure 5.4(b). Based on our second order Markov
chain and the intuition behind it, it means that even though the object’s
movement started from Region A (ra), the joint probability distribution re-
quired to predict that the object’s next location is Region C (rc), w.r.t. Figure
5.4(b) is given by: P (rc |ra, re) . Generally, for a location sequence that starts
from Region r1 to rk, the joint probability distribution is given by:
P (r1 · · · rk) = P (r1)P (r2 |r1)P (r3 |r2, r1) · · · , P (rn |rk−1, rk−2)
In the current region (Region E), the user has the possibility to transit to
Region B, Region D, or Region C. Each state of the Markov chain is repre-
sented by its corresponding region in the TMC-Pattern and the regions are
tagged with their respective TMC-Features. To predict the next location, we
utilize scores from TMC-Pattern and transition probabilities from the second
order Markov chain.
Computation of Markov Chain Transition Probability: We compute the
transition probabilities of a second order Markov chain by considering the
frequency at which the user has visited a region from the current region and
the region that precedes the current region. That is, we find the frequency of
the sequences: A → E → B, A → E → D, A → E → C from the user’s mo-
bility history; and then compute the transition probabilities based on these
frequencies.
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Computation of Scores from TMC-Pattern: Let η denote the number of
candidate next locations. If the current location is Region E, (η = 3) the
scores of the candidate next regions is computed as follows. First, the user’s
TMC-Features history at all candidates’ next locations (i.e., Region B, Region
D and Region C) are retrieved. When using the past location history of a user,
only locations that have a similar time period to that of the current location
will be considered.
Secondly, we compare the vectors (i.e., User Frequency, Node Frequency,
Node Betweenness) embedded in the TMC-Feature of the current region’s
TMC-Feature and that of each candidate next location, and scores are awarded.
These vectors and their corresponding scores are awarded as follows. The
residence mode of the current region is compared to that of each candidate
next locations; a match of the residence mode is given a score of 1
2η
while
a mis-match is assigned a 0. Scores arising from User Frequency, Node Fre-
quency, and Node Betweenness are determined by comparing the candidate
next locations to each other. The region with the highest User Frequency is
given a score of 1
η
and all other regions are levied with a score of 0. Likewise,
the Node Frequency and Node Betweenness of all candidate next locations
are compared. For each of these measures, the region with the highest value
is given a score of 1
η
and the others are assigned a score of 0.
Finally, we sum all the scores derived from the TMC-Features and the
transition probabilities from a second order Markov chain. The candidate
region with the highest value is considered as the next location.
5.4 Experiments
Experiments were conducted on an Intel 8GB RAM PC and the algorithms
were implemented in Java. To evaluate our TMC-Pattern trajectory model,
we based our experimental analysis on three major aspects: (a) extracting
and modeling raw mobility data; (b) detecting frequent location (sub) se-
quences; and (c) location prediction using TMC-Pattern. In each of these as-
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pects, we compare our technique with state-of-the-art works. They include,
the T-Pattern algorithm [GNPP07] and the techniques proposed by [AS03]
and [ZZXM09]. Throughout this section, we refer to these previous works as
TP, UGLSL and MCBL, respectively.
5.4.1 Experimental Dataset
We conducted our experiments on the GeoLife [ZZXM09] Microsoft Asia hu-
man mobility real datasets. The Geolife dataset entails the mobility history of
165 users mostly around Beijing and China. We utilized the mobility data of
52 users, which comprises of more than 700K raw GPS points. Furthermore,
in order to evaluate the capability of TMC-Pattern for finding contextual re-
gion of interest (other than location) in social networks, we created a real
dataset called Twitter-Geolife Disease Dataset. To create the latter dataset,
we utilized longitudes and latitudes from points in the Geolife dataset to
search for the "‘flu"’ keyword on the twitter search API. Our search queries
retrieved tweets in year 2009 which were within a radius of 150 km from the
inputted coordinates. The dataset consists of 11 users and 14247 traces.
5.4.2 Evaluation of TMC-Pattern Extraction
We evaluated the strength and capabilities of our technique to extract and
model both single and multiple user mobility histories.
Single User: We conducted several experiments on the trajectory of a
single GeoLife user’s mobility history. We first determine the residence mode
from raw single user trajectory GPS points. Since the Geolife dataset consists
of only spatio-temporal domains, to find significant regions or TMC-Regions,
we selected the space and time domains as the relevant dimensions. We
carried out the experiments several times for a radius R that ranges from
2.5 ≤ R ≤ 50 kilometers (km). Figure 5.5(d) depicts the number of TMC-
Regions found. The latter figure shows that as the radius increases, the num-
ber of clusters reduces as expected by intuition. It also illustrates the num-
ber of clusters found for the same dataset and radii when the customized
K-Means clustering algorithm of UGLSL [AS03] is utilized. It shows that our
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((d)) Single User Extraction.
Figure 5.5: Analysis of Trajectory Extraction.
technique detects more clusters than UGLSL for a given radius.
Multi User Data: Multiple user trajectories are extracted and modeled by
first pre-processing single user data. Then all single user datasets are com-
bined and clustered using subspace clustering. We processed 52 different
user trajectory histories. We utilized an eps-radius (distance of the SUBCLU
algorithm) that corresponds to about 10 km. We ran the experiments sev-
eral times for different threshold stay times ranging from 2.5 to 30 minutes.
We performed the same experiments with the same threshold stay times for
two state-of-the-art works, MCBL and UGLSL. MCBL and UGLSL employ Hi-
erarchy clustering and K-Means clustering, respectively. Figure 5.5(a) de-
picts the result of this comparison. It shows that the TMC-Pattern extraction
technique outperforms MCBL and UGLSL in terms of number of significant
locations found for a given threshold time. This can be explained by the fact
that during extraction, our approach captures even a flash of movement of
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an object and its nearest neighbors, while the other techniques ignore points
prior to the modeling.
We performed another set of experiments using multi user data where
Time Period was selected as a relevant dimension. This translates into the
formation of clusters such that points are clustered based on the time range
(T = {M,A,E,N}). Figure 5.5(b) illustrates the result, which shows that
more clusters are found in the afternoon than in the morning and evening.
MCBL and UGLSL do not have the capability to accomplish this. Further-
more, we analyzed the number of points in a TMC-Region or cluster as de-
picted in Figure 5.5(c), which shows that as the radius increases, the number
of points in a TMC-Region increases. We compared this with UGLSL and ob-
served that the TMC-Regions had more GPS points for a given radius than
UGLSL clusters.
5.4.3 Frequent Patterns
To evaluate the ability of TMC-Pattern to discover frequent patterns, we in-
putted multi user TMC-Regions created by our extraction technique into our
customized PrefixSpan algorithm (Algorithm 5.1). We should note that dur-
ing the creation of the latter TMC-Region only space and time were cho-
sen as the relevant dimensions. We carried a second experiment using the
Twitter-Geolife Disease dataset to find regions of interest which are based
on the "‘flu"’ disease context rather than location. This is accomplished by
first passing the flu dataset into our extraction algorithm and choosing space
(longitudes and latitudes) and disease as the relevant dimensions. This leads
to the clustering of points based on the latter dimensions. The disease TMC-
Regions are then passed onto Algorithm 5.1. Figure 5.6(a) illustrates the
results of both experiments for different values of minimum support rang-
ing from 0.2 to 0.6. The figure compares our TMC-Region ROI with the
ROI generated by T-Pattern [GNPP07]. With respect to location, our tech-
nique produces a better result, since it detects more frequent patterns than
T-Pattern for the same minimum support. T-Pattern could not detect any ROI
for the Twitter-Geolife dataset because its trajectory model was tailored to
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handle only location and time. Our technique found 24 disease related ROI
from the twitter search API when using the China-based Geolife dataset. Fig-
ure 5.6(a) also shows that as the support increases, the number of frequent
locations and disease patterns decreases.
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Figure 5.6: Analysis of TMC-Pattern for Data Mining.
5.4.4 Location Prediction
We utilized only single user trajectory histories for location prediction. Sec-
tion 5.3.2 described how scores emanating from TMC-Pattern are combined
with Markov model to predict the next location of a user. We extracted and
utilized single user TMC-Pattern from the Geolife dataset and the Twitter-
Geolife Disease dataset for prediction. In order to evaluate the effects of
utilizing TMC-Pattern scores or weights, during the experiments, apart from
coupling scores from TMC-Pattern to a second order Markov chain during
prediction, we created two other predictive models. The first utilizes only
a second order Markov chain while the second employs only scores from
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TMC-Pattern to predict the next location. In addition, we compared our
next location predictor with the prediction technique proposed by [AS03].
We evaluated our prediction results with the use of the accuracy metric as
shown in Figure 5.6(b) and Figure 5.6(c). The coverage is given by Equation
5.2.
Coverage =
Number Of TMC-Patterns
Total Number of Records in Dataset
(5.2)
The result demonstrates that the combination of TMC-Pattern scores and
second order Markov model yields the best results. The latter combination
has an accuracy of 94% for smaller datasets which is an 11% increase in
prediction accuracy when using only Markov chain, and 14% increased ac-
curacy when compared to UGLSL (i.e., KM-MM in Figure Figure 5.6(b)). This
increase of prediction accuracy is credited to the use of TMC-Pattern scores.
The prediction result of the twitter flu dataset, whose goal is to predict
the next location of the spread of the flu disease, is depicted in 5.6(c). Our
technique achieved an 81% accuracy for a coverage of 20% for TMC-Regions
with Time Period T = {M}, while for TMC-Regions in the evening (T = {E})
an accuaracy of 73% is garnered for the same coverage. We observed that
the accuracy decreases as the coverage increases. We further evaluated the
impact of the TMC-Pattern vectors. Our results in Figure 5.6(d) reveal that
residence mode and Time Period are the most important attributes of a TMC-
feature.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a novel trajectory model called TMC-Pattern
which utilizes subspace clustering to find contextual regions of interest. In
addition, we presented a new technique that utilizes our customized variant
of the PrefixScan to project frequent patterns. Furthermore, we proposed
a novel location predictor that employs TMC-Pattern, subspace clustering
and Markov chain. Our experiments demonstrate significant increases in
prediction accuracy when TMC-Pattern is utilized.
Chapter 6
Location Prediction using
Frequent Neighbors and Markov
Model
The prediction of future locations is of enormous research interest, partly
due to the fast growing number of users of pervasive devices, as well as
the tons of spatio-temporal data generated by such devices. TMC-Pattern
was presented in the previous chapter, as well as a next location predictor
that is based on Markov chain. However, the location prediction technique
discussed in the previous chapter considered only the historical data of the
user whose next location has to be predicted. No historical data from other
users were considered.
In this chapter, we propose a more advanced next location prediction
technique, which utilizes the TMC-Pattern and sequence alignment to mine
correlations between an object and its nearest neighbors. In particular, hid-
den mobility patterns drawn from such correlations are utilized in the syn-
thesis of weighted trees called TMC-Footprint trees. The weighted TMC-
Footprint trees are employed together with a Markov chain to predict the
next location of an object with an elevated accuracy. Furthermore, we intro-
duce the novel notion of Surprise Path to predict locations that are absent
from a user’s mobility history.
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6.1 Motivation
The ability to correctly predict the next location from dense mobility data
has garnered enormous research interest due to the broad scale utilization
of ubiquitous devices. Several techniques have been proposed for location
prediction [MPTG09], [YZC13], [AS03] and [YKUM05]. Unlike [MPTG09]
which predicts the next location based on popular locations taken from multi-
user trajectory histories, in this chapter, we propose a novel user-centric next
location predictor. Our location predictor utilizes the TMC-Pattern trajectory
model, which captures and models even a flash of movement of an object
and its nearest neighbors.
Specifically, the core idea of our predictive model is as follows: Frequent
Nearest Neighbors are good indicators of an object’s next location. The effective
and diligent coupling of valuable information tapped from frequent Nearest
Neighbor (frequent NN) with an object’s trajectory history will result in a
sharp increase in prediction accuracy. Figure 6.1 illustrates an overview of
our next location prediction framework.
Figure 6.1: Location Prediction with TMC-Pattern
Definition 6.1 (PROBLEM DEFINITION 1): Given the TMC-Pattern of an object
and its captured frequent NN information, predict the next location of the object.
6.1. Motivation 105
Our contributions in this chapter can be highlighted as follows. A challeng-
ing problem in location prediction is the radical degradation in prediction
accuracy, which is suffered when a user abruptly takes a new next location
that is not in her trajectory history, as also mentioned in [AS03]. We present
a novel notion of Surprise Path to address this problem.
While some existing works [MPTG09] use global trajectory models to
predict next location, we propose a novel technique that explores and uti-
lizes frequent NN to build a location predictor. Prior to prediction, our tech-
nique first focuses on identifying frequent NN. Frequent NN are searched
and detected from a crowd of trajectory histories by the use of Sequence
Alignment and a minimum Support. We propose a new sequence alignment
algorithm coined Location Based Global Alignment (LB-Global Alignment)
for searching frequent NN. After all frequent NN have been captured, we
then exploit the synergy and hidden information tapped from the frequent
NN in three steps: TMC-Footprint Tree Construction, which describes how
the TMC-Footprint tree of frequent NN are built and weighted; Merging
TMC-Footprint Tree, which binds all frequent NN TMC-Footprint trees to the
object’s TMC-Footprint tree; and the Surprise Path Detection step, which sys-
tematically uses a merged TMC-Footprint tree to extrapolate Surprise Paths.
Finally, the merged TMC-Footprint tree with Surprise Paths is combined with
a second order Markov chain to compute the next location of an object.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Subsection 6.1.1 focuses
on relevant related works. In Section 6.2, we present the location prediction
technique. Section 6.3 provides detail results of the conducted experiments.
We conclude in Section 6.4.
6.1.1 Related work
[MPTG09] proposed a novel technique that uses the global trajectory history
of all users to predict the next location of an object. Unlike [MPTG09], our
technique carefully extracts and utilizes only frequent NN during location
prediction. [SMM+11] presented at technique that forecasts the arrival time
and residence time of an object in addition to its next location prediction.
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While [YKUM05], [JLSZ08], [Mor07] proposed methods to predict future lo-
cation using association mining rules, [AS03], [NN08], [AMSS11] proposed
prediction models that are based on Markov model. [EP06] demonstrates
how context can be predicted from a user’s daily movement and from so-
cially significant locations. Other works that focus on location prediction
include [YNLK06] and [YZC13].
6.2 Trajectory Prediction
To predict the next location of an individual, a location predictor has to uti-
lize a trajectory model that is related to the individual and her immediate
neighborhood. Towards this end, we utilize a trajectory model called TMC-
Pattern, which was introduced in the previous chapter. Our predictive model
is based on the human (and at times animal) behavior that frequent NN of
an object at a given time period can be used in the determination of next
location. In the next section, we introduce a holistic approach to capture
frequent NN.
6.2.1 Discovering Frequent NN with LB-Global Alignment
Lots of complexities are involved in the process of assessing and ramping up
frequent NN, partly due to the large number of irrelevant (moving) objects or
nearest neighbors that are not frequent. When searching for frequentNN, the
location sequence we intend to search (given a pool of trajectory histories) is
referred to as search sequence. The search sequence must include the current
position of an object, and may consists of the entire trajectory or a sub-
trajectory.
Definition 6.2 (MAXIMUM SEQUENCE LENGTH (MSL)): is the maximum pos-
sible length of a search sequence.
The search sequence is determined by extracting an entire or a subset
of locations from an object’s trajectory, spanning from the current location
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up to a given number of previous locations such that the resulting location
sequence do not exceed the MSL.
Our objective is to retrieve location (sub-)sequences of neighboring ob-
jects that are similar to the search sequence using sequence alignment. Our
frequent NN search is obliged to fulfill two minimum criteria: neighboring
location sequence or sub-sequence ought to be 1) Similar 2) Frequent. The
similarity is support driven. Specifically, a location sequence is considered
similar if the support equals or exceeds a minimum support.
Although global alignment [NW70], [SW81] and local alignment per-
form well in protein or DNA Sequencing and Text alignment [WKS11], they
can not be directly utilized for location sequence alignment. This is be-
cause the optimal alignment results produced by these algorithms have a
very high likelihood of inserting gaps in the search sequence. The presence
of gaps in the search sequence is not conducive for modeling a Markov chain
during location prediction. As a result, in this work, we propose the LB-
Global Alignment algorithm, which is borne from the Needlemann-Wunsch
[NW70] global alignment algorithm. LB-Global Alignment is a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm which adopts the initialization and matrix fill steps of
the Needlemann-Wunsch technique, but to find the optimal alignment, LB-
Global Alignment uses a novel traceback approach that is tailor for location
alignment, as follows.
Assume we have two sequences, namely sequence 1 (i.e., the search se-
quence) and sequence 2 with lengths Y and X, respectively. Scores are then
allocated to each alignment depending if there is a Match, Mismatch or a
Gap. Also, assume that matches are awarded a score of 1 while mis-matches
and gaps are assigned a penalty of 0. A Y +1 columns and X+1 rows matrix
M is created, and the first column and first row of M are initialized with the
gap penalty. The matrix fill step ushers the maximum alignment score for
sequence 1 and sequence 2. A traceback step is required to determine the
optimal path or alignment that created the maximum alignment score.
To find the predecessor of each maximum score cell in M, the traceback
heuristic of LB-Global Alignment looks at the gap in sequence 1 (i.e., right
neighboring cell), match or mismatch (i.e, diagonal neighboring cell) and
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gap in sequence 2 (i.e., left neighboring cell) and utilizes their scores to
determine which cell is the possible predecessor as shown in Figure 6.2a. If
the right neighboring cell ( i.e., gap in sequence 1) is a possible predecessor
with either the diagonal cell or left cell or both, the right neighboring cell
will not be chosen. This helps to prevent gaps in sequence 1 during the
optimal alignment of the two sequences. We should note that there are
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Figure 6.2: Gap deficient traceback.
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Figure 6.3: Optimal location sequence alignment.
cases whereby the right cell can be the only possible predecessor to provide
the best path. In this case, the heuristic adds gap to sequence 1. Figure
6.2b depicts the optimal path of the Needlemann-Wunsch global alignment
technique; such a path leads to gaps in the search sequence.
The main advantage of LB-Global Alignment is that it determines the
best optimal alignment with minimal or no gap insertion in the search se-
quence. Figure 6.3a and Figure 6.3b show the optimal alignment results of
the search sequence H-G-M-A-T-B-C when using LB-Global Alignment and
global alignment respectively, where alphabet C = Cinema is the current
location. Besides, H = Home, G = Grocery Store, M = Mall and likewise
symbolsA, T,B represent other locations. Both algorithms have a complexity
of O(n2). The figures illustrate that LB-Global Alignment finds optimal align-
ment without distorting the search sequence while the Needlemann-Wunsch
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technique distorts the search sequence. After the optimal alignment has been
produced by the LB-Global Alignment algorithm, the final alignment score is
determined.
[YKUM05] used the notion of the degree of corruption and presented a
formula to compute the support of a location sequence. We adopt the latter
formula in this work, since it effectively reflects the similarity and dissimi-
larity of location sequences. We compute the Sequence Support (Supportseq)
using Equation 6.1,
Supportseq =
1
1 + 1
Scorealign
(6.1)
where Scorealign is the optimal alignment score. After sequence align-
ment, the support of each search sequence is computed using Equation 6.1,
and if the sequence support is equal to or greater than the minimum se-
quence support (Supportmin−seq), the candidate NN is noted and further ana-
lyzed. Its not logical to consider an object a nearest neighbor simply because
it possesses a similar location sequence as the search sequence, since the for-
mer location sequence might occur just once (by chance) or very rarely. In
addition, as previously mentioned, one important search criteria is that the
candidate sequence has to be frequent. Hence, it is important to ensure that
the search sequence also occurs frequently (i.e, it is supported internally) in
that specific neighboring object’s trajectory history.
To accomplish this, we introduce a new support called Internal Support
(Supportint). Intuitively, since our overall goal of considering Nearest Neigh-
bors (NN) is to learn if or how often they accompany the objects whose
location has to be predicted, we make the internal support to be dependable
on the latter object as given by Equation 6.2.
Supportint =
Count of Search Sequence Result in NN
Count of Search Sequence Result in Object
(6.2)
A nearest neighbor is termed frequent if the internal support (Supportint)
is greater than or equals a minimum internal support (Supportmin−int). Any
nearest neighbor whose location sequence is similar to the search sequence
and has enough internal support is considered a frequent NN and would be
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used during prediction. Furthermore, the total support (Supporttot) is given
by Equation 6.3 and will be used for weighing in the next section.
Supporttot = Supportseq + Supportint (6.3)
6.2.2 Constructing TMC-Footprint Tree
The TMC-Footprint tree is a tree that is built by representing the regions
visited by an object as nodes while its edges depict the transition from one
region to another. As illustrated in Figure 6.4, the nodes of a TMC-footprint
tree are tagged with TMC-feature information. Formally,
Definition 6.3 (TMC-FOOTPRINT TREE): is a weighted tree that stores the
overall TMC-pattern of an object’s trajectory history. Its nodes correspond to
the regions of a TMC-pattern while it’s edges represent the transition from one
region to another.
Figure 6.4: TMC-Footprint Tree.
The weight of the edges (Wedge) of a TMC-Footprint tree is derived from
the total support (Supporttot) garnered during frequent NN search and the
weight resulting from the TMC-feature (Wtmc) of a given node. This is given
by:
Wedge = Wtmc + Supporttot (6.4)
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where Supporttot is computed using Equation 6.3. Next, we describe the
computation of Wtmc.
Weight Determination from TMC-Feature: As a recap, the TMC-Feature in-
corporates detail temporal mobility information (i.e., time period for a given
residence mode), takes into consideration important infrastructural and net-
work properties of a region (e.g., node frequency or betweenness); and based
on human and social factors, it captures the interaction between each unique
user and these infrastructural or network properties. The above mentioned
factors are strongly considered during the distribution of weights to edges.
The edge weight resulting from a TMC-feature is determined by the addi-
tion of a User Centric (Wuc) and Network Centric (Wnc) weight. This is given
by:
Wtmc = Wuc +Wnc
Network Centric Weight: is derived from the Betweenness and Node Fre-
quency of a TMC-feature. We utilized the user’s frequency information in a
region (which is acquired from a TMC-Feature) to infer with high certainty
if the user is well acquainted to a region or not. Users that do not know a
region well turn to follow popular routes stemming from navigation systems,
or maps provided to them by authorities. In this case, the Betweenness and
Node Frequency of a network play a very important role, since they measure
and reflect the popularity of the node (region). Thus, we allocate them a
higher weight which is given by:
Wtmc = Wuc +Wnc
In contrast, we degrade the importance of the Betweenness and Node
Frequency, if we infer that the user knows a certain location well. This is
because, based on abundant local background knowledge, there is a high
probability that the user will take a local unpopular route or short cuts or
avoid a shorter road at night because of crime rate or may take a road be-
cause a frequent NN takes it (i.e., Surprise Path). Thus, in this scenario, our
model will not over depend on the global network measures. Hence, we
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award a lower weight which is given by:
Wtmc = Wuc +
1
3
·Wnc
User Centric Weight: The residence modes of a TMC-feature are weighted
for our prediction purpose as follows. Stay Mode is assigned a weight of
κ−2/κwhile Brief Stop Mode and Pass Mode are awarded a weight of κ−7/κ
and κ − 9/κ, respectively; where ρ, κ ∈ N , 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.7 and 10 ≤ κ ≤ 19.
These are the weights we used in our experiments. Different approaches can
choose the residence mode to suit their purposes.
6.2.3 Merging TMC-Footprint Tree
Surprise Path Detection: The main goal of Surprise Path detection is to find
a list of likely hidden next locations that a user can abruptly take. Abrupt
in the sense that such a next location has never been previously used by the
user; meaning it is absent from the user’s location history. Such scenario
degrades the prediction accuracy as also mentioned by [AS03]. Inferring
and incorporating such surprise paths will immensely improve prediction
success rate, and will warrant even shorter training time if sufficient amount
of frequent NN are present. Formally,
Definition 6.4 (SURPRISE PATH): is an edge E(Vc, Vn) between a node Vc that
represents the current position of an object to any node Vn that is not found in
the objects’s trajectory history.
The intuition of surprise path is that objects that frequently ply the same route
or region have high chances of utilizing common resources (e.g., grocery
stores, mall etc.) along or around the latter route or region.
Merging TMC-Footprint Tree: There are two rationals for merging TMC-
footprint trees. First, to assemble all information acquired from an object’s
TMC-footprint tree and all frequent NN TMC-Footprint tree in one net TMC-
footprint tree, which is needed for location prediction. Secondly, to detect
surprise paths from the net TMC-footprint tree.
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Figure 6.5: Merging TMC-Footprint trees.
The merging of TMC-footprint trees occurs in two stages. The first stage
involves the merging (and determination of the weight) of all frequent NN.
At the second stage, the TMC-footprint tree resulting from stage one is finally
merged with the TMC-footprint tree of the object whose next location has to
be predicted.
Figure 6.5 illustrates the merging of the TMC-Footprint tree of all fre-
quent NN. The last n nodes from the objects’s current node (region) are uti-
lized in the merging process. During merging, an n-node TMC-footprint tree
of the object is combined with the TMC-footprint tree of all frequent NN to
form a super TMC-footprint tree. The number of nodes of the TMC-footprint
tree utilized during merging must not exceed n. Next, we prune the super
TMC-footprint tree. Pruning involves the discarding of some nodes that do
not belong to the object’s TMC-footprint tree. Specifically, all nodes in the su-
per tree which do not belong to the object’s TMC-footprint tree are discarded
with one very important exception. If a node on the TMC-footprint tree do
not belong to the TMC-footprint tree of the object but is adjacent (i.e., con-
nected) to the current position of the object, such a node is not discarded.
In fact, such a node arises from the trajectory history of a frequent NN and
is not present in the trajectory history of the object. Intuitively, they depict
optional next regions or nodes that can be abruptly taken by an object even
though such regions are not yet on the object trajectory history.
In this study, a path or edge between such region or node and the cur-
rent region or current node is the Surprise path. Thus, merging the TMC-
Footprint tree of all frequent NN unveils important correlation that exposes
hidden nodes.
114 Location Prediction using Frequent Neighbors and Markov Model
Example: In Figure 6.5, with n = 3, the TMC-footprint tree of the object
to be predicted about the current region E consists of a set of nodes
U = {a, b, e, g,m, n, o}. After merging, a super TMC-footprint tree consisting
of a set of nodes S = {a, b, c, e, g, i, j, k,m, n, o, v} is built. Nodes c, i, v, k are
discarded because they are not elements of the TMC-footprint tree of the
object. However, although node j does not belong to the TMC-footprint tree
( j /∈ S) , it is not discarded because node j is linked to the current nodes e.
Edge j → e is termed a surprise path.
TMC-Footprint Tree Weight: We assign higher weights to the object whose
next location is to be predicted. This is accomplished by boosting the original
weights of each edge of the latter object by factor η, where η ≥ 1. On
the other hand, we carefully subdue the weights of frequent NN. The net
weight from frequent NN is determined by computing the average weight
of all edges stemming from the frequent NN. The final weight of the edges
(Wtmc−tot) of the pruned super TMC-Footprint tree is determined by adding
the boosted weight of the object to the average weight of all frequent NN.
That is,
Wtmc−tot = η ·Wo +Wnn
where Wo is the weight of the object whose next location is to be computed,
Wnn is the average weight of all frequent NN, which is given by Wnn =
1
m
∑m
i=1W
i
nn; and W
i
nn is the weight of the i
th frequent NN.
Edges actually represent the transition of an object from one region to
another. Hence, the final edge weight (Wtmc−tot) of each edge in the super
TMC-footprint tree of an object plays a crucial role in the determination of
an objects next location or transition.
6.2.4 Prediction using TMC-Footprint Tree and Markov Chain
Markov Chains and TMC-Pattern: We employs a second order discrete time
Markov chain. To model a user’s movement (e.g., in Figure 6.6(a)), we
utilize the Markov chain as depicted in Figure 6.6(b). Each TMC-region in
Figure 6.6(a) corresponds to a state in the Markov chain and the transition
from one region to another is used to compute the transition probability. To
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((a)) Subspace Clustered TMC Re-
gions
((b)) Markov Chain
Figure 6.6: Probabilistic Model from TMC-Pattern
predict the next location, we add the transition probabilities resulting from
the second order Markov chain to the weights of the merged TMC-Footprint
tree weight for the corresponding regions. Then, the transition with the
highest probability is taken as the next location.
Algorithm 6.1 provides a brief overview of our prediction technique. Line
1 searches frequent NN which are utilized to create their TMC-footprint trees
(Line 2). Line 4 merges the user’s TMC-footprint tree with those of its fre-
quent NN. In Line 5, the user’s transition probabilities are computed as de-
scribed in this section and are combined with the scores of a merged TMC-
footprint tree (in Line 6) to determine the next location of the user.
Algorithm 6.1: Predictor(Utmc, Chis,MSL, Supseq, Supint)
Input: User TMC-Pattern Utmc, Trajectory History Chis, Max Sequence
Length, MSL, Sequence Support Supseq, Internal Support
Supint
Output: Next Location nextLoc
1 Fnn ← getFrequentNN(Chis,MSL, Supseq, Supint) ;
2 Fnn−tree ← createTmcTree(Fnn) ;
3 Utree ← createTmcTree(Utmc) ;
4 mergedTmcTree ← mergeFootprintTree(Utree, Fnn−tree) ;
5 Uprob ← getTransitionProbability(Utmc) ;
6 nextLoc ← predict(Uprob,mergedTmcTree) ;
7 return: nextLoc
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6.3 Experiments
We conduct numerous experiments on a real dataset to evaluate the accuracy
and strength of our prediction algorithm, and compare our results with some
state-of-the-art techniques. The latter techniques include the Where Next
[MPTG09] algorithm and the technique proposed by Ashbrook et. al.[AS03].
Throughout this section, we will refer to these previous works as WhereNext
and SIGLOC, respectively. We carried out our experiments on an Intel 8GB
RAM PC and the implementations were done in Java.
Experimental Dataset
The GeoLife [ZZXM09] Microsoft Asia real dataset was utilized during
our experimental analysis. This dataset consists of the mobility history of 165
users mostly around Beijing and China for over a period of two years. We
utilized the mobility history of 73 users, which comprises of 514011 traces.
6.3.1 Location Prediction
We utilize multi user trajectory histories from the Geolife dataset to evaluate
our prediction technique. We commence by evaluating the effects of frequent
NN on the prediction accuracy of our technique. Specifically, we utilize the
accuracy and coverage metrics used in Section 5.4 of the previous chapter
and given by Equation 5.2.
Figure 6.7(a) illustrates the prediction accuracy of the next location of
a user based on the following scenarios. First, when using only the TMC-
Footprint tree weights of the user; secondly when the TMC-Footprint tree
weights of the user and a Markov chain are used; and lastly when the user’s
TMC-Footprint tree is coupled with both the frequent NN TMC-Footprint
trees and a second order Markov chain. When comparing the last and first
scenarios, Figure 6.7(a) shows a 37% elevation of prediction accuracy due
to the utilization frequent NN and Markov chain for a coverage of 40%. In
addition, the utilization of frequent NN leads to a 23.2% increase in accuracy
for the latter coverage when comparing scenario 3 and scenario 2.
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Figure 6.7: Next location predictor evaluation.
Section 6.2.1 explained the usage of two supports, namely sequence sup-
port and internal support to determine the total support which is utilized
to weigh a TMC-Footprint tree of a frequent NN. Besides, we mentioned
the use of MSL to search frequent NN. We analyze the influence of MSL
and total support of a frequent NN on the accuracy of our next location
predictor and the outcome is depicted in Figure 6.7(b). For a coverage of
50%, we observe an erosion of perdition accuracy for low (Supporttot < 0.4)
and high (Supporttot > 0.7) total supports. Conversely, a total support of
0.4 < Supporttot < 0.7 yields better accuracy. This can be interpreted by the
fact that when the support is very low, there are many neighbors which are
considered as frequent NN and many act as noise which depletes the pre-
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diction accuracy. Likewise, the utilization of very high total support leads to
scarcity in frequent NN. Furthermore, the experiments reveal that the shorter
the MSL, the higher the accuracy. This is because the utilization of longer
MSL during frequent NN search makes it less likely to find a sub-location
sequence that matches the current location sequence that is being searched.
Again, this translates into the discovery of fewer frequent NN. Figure 6.7(b)
illustrates that for MSL= 15 the support plays little or no role.
In addition, we compare our technique with the WhereNext [MPTG09]
technique which utilizes an opposite hypothesis to our technique, as well
as to the SIGLOC [AS03] technique. The results of these comparisons are
shown in Figure 6.7(c). They illustrate that our technique delivers enhance
and superior prediction results when compared to the WhereNext predictor
and SIGLOC approach. Our technique yields a 14.3% increase in prediction
accuracy for a coverage of 40% when compared to the WhereNext technique.
This result can be explained as follows. Multiple users trajectories contain
users whose sub-trajectory sequences might be similar and not similar to the
users whose next location is to be predicted. Similar sub-trajectory sequences
help to improve the accuracy, while non-similar sequences act as noise, and
hence degrade prediction accuracy. WhereNext uses the global trend, while
our technique reduces the noise by finding and utilizing only frequent NN,
this thus leads to an increase in the prediction accuracy. In addition, Figure
6.7(c) shows that our technique yields a 34% jump in accuracy for a cover-
age of 40% when compared to SIGLOC. Furthermore, we depict the latter
comparison in terms of the prediction error rate measure. The error rate
is given by Equation 6.5. Among others, Figure 6.7(d) shows that as the
coverage increases, the prediction error rate increases.
Erate = 1− A (6.5)
If the predictor makes a false prediction, it is important to learn how far
the predicted position x′j is from the true position xj. As a result of this, we
evaluate the magnitude of error made using the mean absolute error (MAE)
metric given by Equation 6.6.
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MAE =
∑t
j=1
∣∣xj − x′j∣∣
t
(6.6)
where t is the number of predictions. The MAE metric reveals how close the
predicted result is from the true result. Remember that in Section 6.2.4 and
Figure 6.6(a), we mentioned that each candidate next location is a TMC-
Region. Hence the predicted position x′j corresponds to the chosen candi-
date TMC-Region while the true position xj is the TMC-Region the user truly
takes. The difference in distance between these regions is used to calculate
MAE as given in Equation 6.6.
Figure 6.7(e) illustrates the cumulative probability of different MAE vary-
ing from 0 to 10km. Lower mean absolute error suggests better accuracy.
The figure shows that the probability of our predictor to make an error of
5km when a user’s TMC-Footprint tree is used together with frequent NN
TMC-Footprint trees and Markov chain (scenario 3) is much lower (around
37%). In contrast, the usage of TMC-Footprint weights and Markov chain
(scenario 2) leads to a higher probability of error of 58%, while using only
TMC-Footprint tree for prediction (scenario 1) leads to a much higher pre-
diction error probability. We also observe that the cumulative probability of
the MAE between scenario 2 and scenario 3 are wider. This disparity is not
revealed when assessing the accuracy in Figure 6.7(a).
Our location predictor utilizes the TMC-Pattern trajectory model that
keeps track of so many raw GPS points in order to capture even a flash of
movement. We investigate if this results in a lot of outliers in the dataset
which may hamper the predictability. Our empirical results shown in Figure
6.7(f) reveals that for an MSE = 150 km, the probability of our technique
to make prediction errors lies around 29%, which is quite good. This shows
that our predictive model has less outliers.
Surprise Path Prediction: We propose the surprise path detection tech-
nique to address situations whereby a location predictor is challenged to pre-
dict the next location of an object, despite the fact that the candidate next
locations are absent in the object’s location history. Figure 6.7(g) and Fig-
ure 6.7(h) demonstrate the accuracy and the error rate of the surprise path
experiments. Our technique achieves an accuracy of 69,3% for a coverage
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of 50% when predicting the next location of a user (with no past history).
We compare the results of this experiment with that of the WhereNext and
SIGLOC techniques. The WhereNext techniques is ideologically positioned
to perform better when predicting the next location of an object if the candi-
date next location are absent from the trajectory history, because it does not
solely rely on the users trajectory history.
For a coverage of 20 %, the WhereNext technique outperforms all other
techniques, however as the coverage approaches 40%, the accuracy of our
technique increases while the accuracies of WhereNext and SIGLOC falls
slightly. In all other experiments, the accuracy of our technique plummets
when the coverage increased. However, for surprise paths, this rises be-
cause the more the data, the greater the amount of frequent NN, which will
increase the probability of extrapolating surprise paths. For a coverage of
70%, our technique produces superior prediction result when compare to
WhereNext with an increase of accuracy of 24%.
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a novel next location prediction technique that
utilizes frequent NN and the TMC-Pattern. We introduce a location search
driven sequence alignment technique that is employed to extract frequent
NN and illustrate how TMC-Footprint trees can be couple with a Markov
chain to institute an enhanced location predictor. We empirically show that
our predictive model yields superior and higher prediction accuracy than
state-of-the-art predictors. Furthermore, we introduce the novel notion of
Surprise Path, and empirically demonstrate how it correctly predicts next
locations with elevated accuracies when the latter locations are absent from
an object’s mobility history.
Part III
Predictive Analytics on Sensor
Data
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Chapter 7
Activity Recognition from
Accelerometer Sensors with HMM
Advances in ubiquitous technologies coupled with the decline in prices and
sizes of sensors have spurred an era of pervasive computing. Nowadays,
most pervasive devices such as smart phones, tablets and wearables consist
of sensors. Inferring high level activity or context from low level sensor sig-
nals has caught the attention of many organizations. Some of these sensors
include accelerometer sensors, GPS sensors, skin temperature and heart rate
sensors. Activity recognition focuses on extracting, exploring and unlocking
raw sensor data signals into meaningful higher level activities. As a result,
activity recognition has led to the emergence of a broad spectrum of applica-
tions, which can be employed for daily human activity recognition, patient
monitoring, location-based advertisement, human behavioral analysis, body
network analysis and trend analysis. In this part, we provide new activity
recognition solutions for two application domains, namely human physio-
logical data analysis and medicine. In particular, we present three novel
activity prediction techniques that demonstrate how activity recognition can
be beneficial to society.
This chapter focuses on activity prediction using human physiological
data gathered from accelerometer sensors. In particular, we propose a novel
predictive model that utilizes dyadic wavelet transform, vector quantization
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and HMM to predict a high level activity from low level accelerometer sen-
sor signals. Specifically, we analyze and extract important spectral features of
the sensor signal by performing multi-resolution wavelet transform. These
features are utilized to institute a codebook through the process of vector
quantization. An enhanced HMM predictive model for activity recognition is
then built using the codebook and some wavelet feature vectors.
7.1 Motivation
The quick evolution of sensors and the broad scale utilization of smart phones
have awashed ubiquitous systems with an unprecedented amount of sensor
data. In addition, as we move to the wearable era, major pervasive device
providers are underpinning and instituting new robust platforms to orga-
nize, store and manage the staggering amount of location, health and phys-
iological sensor data that is generated from wearable devices. Motion data
recorded by accelerometer sensors is of profound importance, since it cap-
tures and encapsulates the activities of an object. A myriad of activity recog-
nition techniques have been proposed [BH13], [AS14a], [AS14d], [He10],
[TTH09], [CPR11] and [CLK06]. One major challenge associated with ac-
tivity recognition is the ability to detect the dissimilarity between signals of
two different activities.
During activity recognition, some techniques utilize the time-domain sen-
sor signals to perform similarity search, whereas other approaches turn to
the frequency-domain for sensor signal analysis. The frequency-domain is
known for its ability to uncover unique characteristics of a signal that cannot
be detected in the time domain. At such, activity recognition techniques
whose signal comparisons are conducted in the frequency-domain inher-
ently perform better than their time-domain counterparts, as also alluded
in [He10]. In addition, techniques that explore the spectral of signals utilize
either Fourier transform or wavelet transform to discriminate between non
similar activities. In this work, to extract vital features vectors of a given
activity, we utilize wavelet transform instead of Fourier transform.
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Succinctly, our contributions in this chapter can be articulated as follows.
A challenging problem in activity recognition is to determine the signature or
defining feature vectors of a signal that correspond to a given activity, and to
properly craft a probabilistic model that captures and recognizes an observed
lower level activity signal. While some existing works (e.g., [He10]) employ
wavelets for activity recognition, in this chapter, we propose a technique that
utilizes a novel combination of dyadic wavelet sub-band energies of a multi-
scale decomposed tri-axial accelerometer signal. In particular, during feature
extraction, we analyze the spectral of a decomposed accelerometer signal at
different frequency resolutions, and observe that for a given activity, there
exist a strong correlation of spectral sub-band energies across the different
dimensions. In addition, during analysis of the detail wavelet coefficients of
signals, we identified that the detail sub-band energies are strikingly similar
for activities of the same type. As a result, we utilize these unique charac-
teristics that are exhibited or encoded in the detail wavelet coefficients as
effective signature feature vectors of a specific activity.
After feature extraction, we utilize the features to construct an HMM
model for a given activity. Each dedicated HMM model is then employed
for the recognition of the corresponding activity.
The rest of this chapter is chronologically divided as follows. Subsec-
tion 7.1.1 discusses related works whereas Section 7.2.1 describes the ac-
celerometer sensor dataset and provides an overview of our activity recogni-
tion framework. In Section 7.3, we explain our feature extraction approach
using dyadic wavelet transform, while in Section 7.4, we present the HMM-
based predictive model. Section 7.5 of this chapter provides results of the
conducted experiments, and lastly, we conclude in Section 7.6.
7.1.1 Related work
[He10] propose an activity recognition technique that utilizes wavelets and
autoregressive model to extract features. The extracted features are passed
through a Support Vector Machine classifier for activity recognition. Unlike
[He10], the technique we present in this chapter solely uses wavelets. Also,
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prediction is accomplished using HMM. [TTH09] investigates the optimal
feature vectors that can be utilized for activity recognition. Specifically, they
utilize the Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients to extract features and then
exploit different combinations of the features. Our technique is similar to
[TTH09], since we both use HMM. However, we model our HMM differently
by employing vector quantization.
[HLT07] introduce an HMM based activity recognition technique, which
utilizes a window-based preprocessing algorithm. The latter algorithm en-
sures low frequency data transmission, which translates into low memory
usage. This enables their technique to be used for real time activity recog-
nition. [LC11] is another technique that is tailored for real-time activity
recognition. Their approach, which is based on hierarchical based HMM,
also saves memory and reduces the computational power of a phone.
[CPR11] present a technique that uses Random Forest and Ada Boost
to extract features from a wearable accelerometer and web-camera. They
then classify the activities using different classifiers. [KWM11] extract fea-
tures such as average acceleration, standard deviation and average resultant
acceleration, and then utilize three classification algorithms to classify activ-
ities based on the extracted features. The classification algorithms include,
decision tree, logistic regression and multi-layer neutral networks. The dif-
ference between our work and [CPR11], [KWM11] is that we model our
activity recognition algorithm using wavelets, vector quantization and HMM.
[LC14] propose a technique that predicts activity from incomplete sen-
sor data using Mixture-of-Expert model. Other activity recognition works
include, [BH13], [AAB+12] and [CLK06]. [BH13] evaluate walk recognition
and step counting algorithms, whereas [AAB+12] propose a framework that
monitors and recognizes the fall activity. Moreover, [CLK06] employs linear
CRF and mixture CRF for activity recognition. Their mixture CRF accom-
plishes transfer learning between the behavioral model of different users.
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7.2 Problem Formulation
7.2.1 Data Acquisition
This chapter utilizes tri-axial accelerometer sensor data that stems from An-
driod smart phones. The dataset is publicly available and was made public
by [KWM11]. The data was collected by 29 participants. Each participant
placed the smart phone in his/her front pocket to gather low level signals
of their daily activities. Six different activities were carried out by each sub-
ject. These include, Jogging, Walking, Sitting, Standing, Ascending Stairs
and Descending Stairs. The participants helped in the labeling of each activ-
ity immediately after it was performed. The accelerometer sensor readings
were taken after every 50 ms (i.e., with a sampling frequency of 20Hz). An
accelerometer measures the acceleration and orientation of the participants’
movements on three axes or dimensions. Namely, the X, Y and Z axis. The X-
axis collects readings about the horizontal motion of a subject’s leg, whereas
the upward and downward movements are captured by the Y-axis. In con-
trast, the Z-axis records the movement of the leg in the forward direction.
7.2.2 Problem Definition
Prior to describing the approach we employed to build a predictive model for
an activity recognizer, we would first formally articulate the problem we as-
pire to handle in this chapter. Using the accelerometer sensor data described
in Section 7.2.1, the prime rational is to correctly predict an activity from a
set of six activities when provided with the accelerometer sensor reading of
that activity. Definition 7.1 formalizes the problem we intend to address in
this chapter.
Definition 7.1 (PROBLEM DEFINITION): Let A = {a1, a2, a3, · · · , an} be a fi-
nite set of labeled activities. Given A and an ordered observation sequence of
accelerometer signal time series O = {o1, o2, · · · , on}, where each oi ∈ O de-
notes a tri-axial accelerometer point p(xi, yi, zi) at time ti, and t1 < t2 < ti,
predict the activity of the observation sequence O.
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Figure 7.1 depicts an overview of our proposed framework to solve the prob-
lem in Definition 7.1. At a higher level, we analyze and extract important
spectral features from the accelerometer sensor signals by performing multi-
resolution wavelet transform. We utilize these features to derive a codebook
through vector quantization with the use of Linde-Buzo-Gray (LBG) algo-
rithm [LBG80]. We then craft an enhanced HMM based predictive model
using this codebook for activity recognition. Finally, given the observation
sequence of a sensor signal O, we determine the model with the maximum
likelihood from which the observation sequence O might stem from.
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Figure 7.1: Activity recognition using Wavelets, Codebook and HMM.
In the next section, we present an approach to extract and select vital fea-
ture vectors using wavelets, as well as the generation of a codebook through
vector quantization.
7.3 Feature Extraction and Quantization
7.3.1 Feature Extraction
In this work, we utilize dyadic wavelets to extract feature vectors for activity
recognition. Dyadic wavelets are also known as MODWT or Undecimated
Wavelet Transform, which was described in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2.
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To extract features, we first separate the 3D accelerometer sensor reading
(i.e., the signals of the x, y, z-axis) into 1D signals and analyze them sepa-
rately. We depict each 1D signal as a collection of data points in the time
domain. In digital signal processing, it is known that the most important
characteristics of a signal lie in the frequency domain. Towards this end, we
perform multi-scale wavelet transform decomposition of each of the 1D time
domain accelerometer reading. Specifically, we commence the decomposi-
tion of the 1D accelerometer signal at a scale of j = 4 using the Daubechies
4 mother wavelet. At each scale j, the MODWT generates an the approxi-
mation coefficient aj which corresponds to the low pass filter h and a detail
coefficient dj that corresponds to the high pass filter g. We record all the
approximation and detail wavelet coefficients produced at each scale until
the iteration stops at scale j = 0. After the complete decomposition of the
1D signal which is associated with the production of wavelet coefficients, we
extract and utilize a unique combination of the produced wavelet coefficients
as feature vectors of our novel activity recognition technique.
We repeat the same MODWT decomposition for the y and z dimensions of
the time-domain accelerometer signals, and extract signature feature vectors
that can be utilized to effectively differentiate one activity from another, as
articulated in the next section.
7.3.2 Feature Vector Selection
Approximation Coefficients: We observe that at the highest scale j = 4, the
approximation coefficients of a 1D accelerometer signal spectral looks strik-
ingly similar to the original time domain signal. But as the scale reduces,
the shape of the spectral becomes gradually distorted (i.e., in comparison
to the time domain signal), and rapidly depreciates when j < 2. Since our
prime rational is to extract feature vectors that capture similar parts of the
time domain signal - yet discriminating non-similar sections, we select the
approximation coefficient of scale j = 4 because its spectrum is a good ap-
proximation of the original time domain 1D signal. We compute the approx-
imation sub-band energy for j = 4 using the latter wavelet coefficient. This
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approximation sub-band energy is extracted and utilized as a feature vector.
Detail Coefficients: [SH93] observed that the main energy band that char-
acterizes daily human activities resides at the low frequency regions. Specif-
ically, the frequency band ranges from 0.3 to 3.5 Hz. This corresponds to the
detail wavelet coefficients, whose frequencies or amplitudes are inherently
low. Besides, the detail coefficients comprise of salient regions that hold
unique characteristics of the signal and can be utilized to effectively discrim-
inate activities (e.g., jogging and walking). Hence, to capture and segregate
non-similar activities, we select detail wavelet coefficients from scale j = 4
to j = 1 (i.e., dj = {d4, d3, d2, d1}), compute their detail sub-band energies,
and utilize them as feature vectors.
In summary, for each 1D decomposed accelerometer signal, we select
its approximation wavelet coefficients at scale j = 4 and its detail wavelet
coefficients at scales j = 4 to j = 1. The approximation and detail sub-band
energies are then computed from the selected coefficients and utilized as
feature vectors for our activity recognition technique. Hence, five features
are extracted for each dimension. Since the accelerometer sensor provides
3D signal readings, the total amount of feature vectors used are 15. In the
next sections, we will describe how these feature vectors are employed for
activity recognition.
7.3.3 Vector Quantization of Wavelet Feature Vectors
The wavelet feature vectors collected in the previous section consist of con-
tinuous feature vector values of the signal. Most of these values are unique.
We utilize vector quantization to eliminate redundancy and study the linear
and non-linear relationships between these feature vectors, as well as their
probability density functions. Specifically, we employ vector quantization to
approximate these continuous feature vector values before they are used to
model an HMM.
Given that x = {x1, x2, · · · , xd} is our d−dimensional real-valued wavelet
feature vector where d = 15, vector quantization is the processes of mapping
the wavelet feature vectors x to another d−dimensional real-valued vector y.
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At such, we say x is quantized by y. y is called a codeword and a finite set of
codewords is called a codebook C = {yi : i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , L}. The size of the
codebook is denoted by L and it corresponds to the number of codewords in
a codebook C. Each codeword yi corresponds to the centroid of a region or
cell called the voronoi region.
To build a codebook for our wavelet feature vectors, we choose a code-
book size of L = 16, or L = 32 or L = 64, and employ the Linde-Buzo-Gray
(LBG)[LBG80] vector quantization algorithm to partition the vector space
Rd into L regions or cells. This leads to the creation of several voronoi re-
gions and their corresponding codewords, which represent the centroid of
the voronoi region. For each region Ci, we quantize any wavelet feature vec-
tors in that region as codeword of yi of Ci. That is, we represent all feature
vectors within a region with the codeword of the region. In the next section,
during the construction of an HMM for each activity, each wavelet feature
vector will be represented by its nearest neighboring codeword.
7.4 Predictive Model for Activity Recognition
7.4.1 Modeling Activity HMM
To model activities, we utilize a Left-to-Right HMM. The problem of activity
prediction can be formulated as a sequential labeling task. Given an activity
observation sequence O, the objective is to find the most probable sequence
of hidden states S, which could have generated the observation sequence O.
Observation: As a recap, an accelerometer measures the 3D motions of the
subjects (i.e., at the x, y and z axis). The observation of our HMM is derived
from the resultant time-domain motion signal M̂i of a tri-axial accelerometer
reading at a given time i. Formally, M̂i is given by Equation 7.1.
M̂i =
√
(xi)2 + (yi)2 + (zi)2 (7.1)
Specifically, the observation sequence is derived from M̂i by first perform-
ing dyadic wavelet transform of M̂i and extracting its feature vector. Then, to
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generate an observation sequence for our HMM, we use the codebook to re-
place the latter continuous value feature vectors with their nearest centroids.
The sequence of the corresponding centroids are used as the observation se-
quence of the HMM.
Hidden States: We experimented with hidden states ranging from 4 to 8.
We build an HMM for each activity by using a training set of observation
sequences. We utilize the Baum-Welch algorithm to train each HMM. The
Baum-Welch algorithm iteratively performs Expectation-Maximization (EM)
to estimate the parameters of each activity’s HMM (i.e., the initial distribu-
tion, the transition probability and the emission probability). To recognize
an activity from its observation sequence O, we utilize each model to com-
pute the likelihood probability of the observation O over all models. The
model with the maximum likelihood probability is the model from which the
activity originates from.
7.5 Experiments
To evaluate the accuracy and strength of our activity recognition algorithm,
we conduct numerous experiments with the accelerometer dataset described
in Section 7.2.1. We carried out our experiments on an Intel 8GB RAM PC
and the implementations were done in Java.
7.5.1 Dataset Partitioning
Prior to training and testing, for each of the six activities, we combine the 3D
accelerometer readings of all users in the same file for the given activity. That
is, each file consists of the accelerometer readings of a unique activity from
all users. We divide the accelerometer sensor data for each activity into two
separate sets. Namely, the training set and test set. We utilize the training
set of each activity to model the given activity and evaluate the quality of our
predictive model on the test sets.
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7.5.2 Activity Prediction
To evaluate the effectiveness of our technique to predict activities, we con-
duct several experiments with different experimental settings. We observe
that the prediction accuracy is influenced by three parameters. Namely, 1)
Segmentation Window Size 2) Axis Type and 3) Sub-band Energy feature
vectors
The Segmentation Window Size (w) refers to the length of the sensor sig-
nal that has to be segmented before wavelet transform. Specifically, to ex-
tract feature vectors using wavelet transform, we first segment raw signals of
a given activity into window sizes of 150, 512 and 1024. When we attempted
to predict activities using a window size of w = 150 and codebook sizes of
L = 16 or L = 32 or L = 64, we observe that our HMM could not properly
model the different activities. This led to poor prediction results. This is
because, performing wavelet transform on a signal with a small window size
of 150 samples cannot effectively capture differences between two activity
signals. On the other hand, segmentations with signal lengths of w = 512
and w = 1024 yield good prediction results. We observe that as the signal
length increases, the prediction accuracy increases. In this section, we will
present only the results of experiments with w = 1024.
The Axis Type refers to any of the 3D signal axis (i.e., the x−, y− or
z−axis) used for prediction. While we utilize the resultant axis given in
Equation 7.1, we notice that using only the vertical axis (i.e., y-axis) yields
good prediction results. Furthermore, the combination of sub-band energy
features vectors plays a profound role in prediction accuracy. We experi-
mented using detail sub-band energies (i.e., d4 · · · d1), as well as utilizing
both approximation and detail energies (i.e., a4, d4 · · · d1). Due to the afore-
mentioned factors that influence prediction accuracy, we perform several ex-
periments to determine which experimental setting yields optimal recogni-
tion result.
In our first experiment, we consider only the vertical dimension (i.e., the
y-axis) of the 3D accelerometer signal for activity prediction. We segment
the 1D y−axis signal into several windows of 1024 samples per window.
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Jogging Walking Upstairs Downstairs Sitting Standing
Accuracy 100 100 73.54 78.45 91.08 93.10
Table 7.1: Activity Recognition using only vertical y−axis, L = 32, N = 4.
We then perform dyadic wavelet transform on each window. We utilize the
approximation sub-band energy at level 4 and all detail sub-band energies
from level 4 to level 1 as feature vectors (i.e., a4, d4, d3, d2, d1). We input the
extracted features into the LBG algorithm and set the codebook size L = 32.
Also, we use an HMM with four hidden states (i.e., N = 4).
Table 7.1 illustrates the results of our first set of experiments. It shows
that using only the vertical movement leads to perfect prediction results for
the Jogging and Walking activities (i.e., prediction accuracies of 100% ), and
good results for the Sitting and Standing activities. However, using only the
vertical axis also leads to unimpressive prediction results for the Upstairs
and Downstairs activities. Intuitively, the vertical axis movement should be
well positioned to capture activities such as Upstairs and Downstairs. In
order to understand why these activities could not be properly handled by
our model, we examine the confusion matrix of the Upstairs and Downstairs
activities as depicted in Table 7.2. From the latter table, we observe that the
lower accuracies are due to the fact that most of the Upstairs and Downstairs
activities were falsely recognized as Walking. We increased the codebook
Jogging Walking Upstairs Downstairs Sitting Standing Accuracy
Jogging 703 0 0 0 0 0 100
Walking 0 976 0 0 0 0 100
Upstairs 9 43 164 7 0 0 73.54
Downstairs 4 24 11 142 0 0 78.45
Sitting 2 5 2 0 92 0 91.08
Standing 1 4 0 0 1 81 93,10
Average 89,36
Table 7.2: Confusion Matrix using only vertical y−axis, L = 32, N = 4.
size, as well as varying the number of hidden states between N = 4 to N = 8
but there was no significant change in the prediction accuracies.
We perform the next batch of experiments using the same setting as above
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except that 1) we used the resultant 3D signal M̂i given in Equation 7.1,
2) we use only the detail sub-band energies (i.e., d4 · · · d1). We anticipate
that incorporating the resultant motion of the 3D signal will capture the
orientation. Also, using only detail energies will lead to a tighter clustering
and discretization of feature vectors in each voronoi region.
The results of the experiments are presented in Table 7.3, which shows a
significant increase in the prediction accuracies of activities such as Upstairs,
Downstairs, Sitting and Standing. However, it also leads to a 6.34 % and 8.54
% erosion of the accuracies of Jogging and Walking activities, respectively.
This demonstrates that using the resultant motion provides a better result
Jogging Walking Upstairs Downstairs Sitting Standing
Accuracy 93.66 91,46 88.19 91.08 94.24 95.31
Table 7.3: Recognition using motion M̂i and no approximation energies.
than using only the y−axis. Also, the remarkable increase in the accuracy of
Upstairs and Downstairs is partly because the detail sub-band energies are
small and are effectively using their small energy boundaries to discriminate
between two different activities. Thus, using only the detail energies during
vector quantization produces better cluster centroids. To improve the accu-
racies of Jogging and Walking, we carried out the same experiments with a
codebook size of L = 64 and N = 6, but there were only slight improvements
in the prediction accuracies of Jogging and Walking.
When the approximation sub-band energy feature was ignored during
feature vector selection, we saw improved prediction accuracies for the Up-
stairs and other activities. However, it led to a drop in the prediction accu-
racies of Walking and Jogging. To achieve higher prediction accuracies for
Jogging and Walking, we perform another set of experiments that employ
the resultant signal M̂i to generate feature vectors through dyadic wavelet
transform. We selected both the approximation and detail energies as fea-
ture vectors (i.e., a4, d4 · · · d1). Setting L = 32 and N = 4, we instituted a
codebook and an HMM for each activity. We test the model using new ob-
servation sequences from the test sets and the results are depicted in Table
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7.4. Table 7.4 shows enhanced Jogging and Walking accuracies, as well as
good prediction accuracies for Upstairs, Downstairs, Sitting and Standing ac-
tivities. The overall average accuracy using this experimental setting ( i.e.,
w = 1024, L = 32, N = 4 and features vectors of a4, d4 · · · d1) is 96.15 %.
Thus, our predictive model recognizes six activities with a prediction ac-
curacy of 96.15 %. We should note that while our approach utilizes the same
Jogging Walking Upstairs Downstairs Sitting Standing Accuracy
Jogging 692 2 6 3 0 0 98.43
Walking 0 936 27 12 1 0 95.90
Upstairs 1 13 207 2 0 0 92.83
Downstairs 0 7 2 172 0 0 95.02
Sitting 0 2 0 0 98 1 97,03
Standing 0 1 1 0 0 85 97,70
Average 96,15
Table 7.4: Confusion Matrix using resultant motion, features vectors of
a4, d4 · · · d1, L = 32, N = 4.
dataset as [KWM11], we cannot directly compare our prediction results with
theirs because they preprocessed their data differently by considering 200
points per segment. We considered a window of 1024 points per segment as
an activity observation. However, our technique achieved a higher prediction
accuracy than the approaches proposed by [KWM11].
7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a novel activity recognition technique that uti-
lizes wavelets and HMM. We introduce an approach to select spectral feature
vectors using wavelets, which effectively discriminates low level sensor sig-
nal of different activities. We build a codebook using vector quantization to
cluster and discretize the feature vectors. The codebook is then utilized by
our predictor to model the HMM of each activity. We demonstrate through
numerous experiments the effectiveness of our approach. Our experiments
reveal that our technique has a high prediction accuracy.
Chapter 8
Near-Optimal Activity Prediction
by Modulus Maxima Clustering
Despite the profusion of proposed activity recognition techniques [He10,
TTH09, CLK06, BH13, CPR11], many of the existing techniques yield recog-
nition accuracies fluctuating from 74 % to 90 % [PGKH09]. With the growing
interest in wearables, particularly the sudden rise in appetite to utilize body
sensors for fitness and health tracking in many health-related applications -
as users go about their normal daily lives; the stakes have automatically be-
come higher and the reliability of activity prediction results is under higher
scrutiny. Arguably, activity prediction accuracy under 87 % will be less wel-
come. Robust, reliable and enhanced activity predictors are thus required to
meet the expectations of state-of-the-art activity predictors of sensor data.
While the HMM activity prediction technique [AS14a] presented in the
previous chapter achieves a high activity recognition accuracy of up to 96.15
%, we observe that the vector quantization approach could be performed
more efficiently. In addition, since CRF, which is a discriminative probabilis-
tic graphical model is known to be stronger in statistical inference than the
generative HMM, exploring CRF for activity recognition may lead to better
results.
As a result of these, our impetus is to propose an activity prediction tech-
nique with elevated prediction performance, which utilizes an optimized vec-
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tor quantization and CRF. Towards this end, in this chapter, we propose a
novel predictive model that utilizes wavelets, voronoi regions and CRF to
predict activities from accelerometer sensor data.
8.1 Motivation
Human sensors are rapidly becoming the most embedded components in
pervasive devices (e.g., in wearables and smart phones). One common trait
of most sensor data is that they comprise of low level signals that encapsu-
late high level activities. While the staggering volume of sensor data might
stretch existing storage infrastructures, another challenge that needs to be
addressed is the analytics of how this low level sensor data can be translated
into high level human activities. The effective recognition of the physical
activity or a specified context of a user from sensor data can reveal vital
physiological behaviors or health context information about the user.
A survey of wavelet-based activity recognition results assembled and re-
ported by [PGKH09] could not overstate the challenges encountered to ob-
tain high activity recognition results of over 90 %. Our contribution in this
chapter involves the diligent and rigorous investigation of how the predic-
tion accuracy can be significantly increased. Although several existing works
[PGKH09] have explored the usage of wavelets to improve activity recog-
nition, most of these works over rely on the feature selections of wavelet
coefficients to garner better prediction results. While some wavelet feature
selections led to some slight increases in prediction accuracies, during our
in-depth prediction optimization study, we found that the efficient clustering
or partitioning of wavelet feature vectors during vector quantization prompts
jumps in prediction accuracies. To optimize activity recognition results, we
tackle the optimization task from a different angle. We devise an approach to
effectively cluster feature vectors, which helps in the discrimination of strik-
ingly similar low level activities, especially those along activities bounds.
Simply put, in this chapter, we employ a combination of optimized vec-
tor quantization and CRF to craft a robust activity predictor, which delivers
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human activity recognition results with high veracities.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Subsection 8.1.1
focuses on relevant related works. In Section 8.3, we describe our wavelet-
based feature extraction approach and propose a new optimization technique
to design a codebook. In Section 8.4, we present our human activity predic-
tive model that uses CRF. Section 8.5 provides detail results of the conducted
experiments. The chapter ends with a conclusion in Section 8.6.
8.1.1 Related work
In Section 7.1.1 of the previous chapter, we provided several related works
for activity prediction. Those works are relevant related works for the activity
prediction technique presented in this chapter also. In addition to those
works, other activity recognition works include, [PGKH09] and [AAB+12].
[PGKH09] compare 14 methods of feature extraction from accelerometer
signals and discuss how they can be used to optimally classify activities. In
addition, they provide detail results of the techniques. The optimization
approach we employ in this work differs from the approaches discussed in
[PGKH09]. Moreover, [KWM11] propose an activity recognition technique
that uses decision tree, logistic regression and multi-layer neural networks.
The difference between our work and these works is that, we model our
activity recognition algorithm using wavelets, vector quantization and CRF.
8.2 Problem Statement
This work utilizes the same (Andriod smart phones) tri-axial accelerometer
sensor data that was described in Section 7.2.1 of Chapter 7.
8.2.1 Problem Definition
Before the detail presentation of our technique, we commence with the for-
mal articulation of the problem we aspire to address. Given a set of six activ-
ities that emanate from the accelerometer sensor data described in Section
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7.2.1, the main objective of this work is to craft a holistic predictive model
that accurately predicts a given activity from the accelerometer sensor time
series of that activity. Formally,
Definition 8.1 (PROBLEM DEFINITION): Suppose A = {a1, a2, a3, · · · , an} is
a finite set of labeled activities. Given A and an ordered observation sequence
of accelerometer signal time series O = {o1, o2, · · · , on}, where each oi ∈ O
denotes a tri-axial accelerometer point p(xi, yi, zi) at time ti, and t1 < t2 < ti,
predict the activity that corresponds to the observation sequence O.
We propose a novel predictive model that solves the activity recognition
problem stipulated in Definition 11.1 by predicting activities with a high
veracity. A succinct description of our activity prediction technique is as fol-
lows. First, we perform multi-resolution wavelet decomposition of each time
domain activity signal to obtain a series of wavelet spectral coefficients at
different resolutions. We diligently analyze the spectral of different activi-
ties to determine unique signature features of each low level activity. We
then extract the signature features which are imperative in the capturing
and discrimination of two activities of different types. Subsequently, due to
the continuous nature of the feature vectors, we provide a new approach to
efficiently perform vector quantization and design an optimized codebook.
Each wavelet feature vector is represented by the nearest centroid in the
codebook. We then craft a CRF-based predictive model that uses this code-
book to predict the most likely activity.
8.3 Feature Selection and Codebook Design
8.3.1 Feature Extraction
Similarly to the previous chapter, to extract features in this chapter, we first
separate the 3D accelerometer sensor readings into 1D signals and analyze
them separately. We utilize dyadic wavelets (i.e, MODWT) to extract feature
vectors for activity recognition. We depict each 1D signal as a collection of
data points in the time domain and perform multi-scale wavelet transform
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decomposition of each of the 1D time domain accelerometer reading. Specif-
ically, we commence the decomposition of the 1D accelerometer signal at a
scale of j = 7 using the Daubechies 4 mother wavelet. Figure 8.1 depicts the
spectral of the jogging and upstairs activities at different resolutions after
dyadic wavelet transform.
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((a)) Approximation (aj=7): Jogging Spec-
tral.
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((b)) Approximation (aj=4): Upstairs Spec-
tral.
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((c)) Detail (dj=7): Jogging Spectral.
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((d)) Detail (dj=4): Upstairs Spectral.
Figure 8.1: Accelerometer Sensor Time Series Spectral Analysis.
We repeat the same MODWT decomposition for the y and z dimensions
on the time-domain accelerometer time series, and extract signature feature
vectors that can be utilized to effectively differentiate one activity from an-
other, as explained in the next section.
8.3.2 Feature Vector Selection
The dataset used here is similar to that in the previous chapter. Also, in Sec-
tion 7.3.2 of the previous chapter, we articulated our observations about the
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characteristics of the approximation and detail wavelet coefficients during
our MRA analysis. Hence, in this section, we focus only on the chosen fea-
ture vectors.
Approximation Coefficients: We select the approximation coefficient of
scale j = 4 because its spectrum for each activity strongly distinguishes that
activity from other activities. And as a result, we consider it as a unique sig-
nature of a given activity. We compute the approximation sub-band energy
for j = 4 using the latter wavelet coefficient and utilize it as a feature vector.
Detail Coefficients: To capture and segregate non-similar activities, we
select detail wavelet coefficients from scale j = 4 to j = 1 (i.e., dj =
{d4, d3, d2, d1}), compute their detail sub-band energies, and utilize them as
feature vectors.
In summary, for each 1D decomposed accelerometer signal, we select
its approximation wavelet coefficients at scale j = 4 and its detail wavelet
coefficients at scales j = 4 to j = 1. The approximation and detail sub-band
energies are then computed from the selected coefficients and utilized as
feature vectors for our activity recognition technique. During prediction, to
create an observation for our CRF, we compute the resultant spectral from
each 3D signal using Equation 8.4 as elaborately discussed in Section 8.4.3.
As a result, five spectral feature vectors are selected to represent each signal
during prediction.
8.3.3 Efficient Codebook Optimization
A codebook is constructed during the process of vector quantization. Vector
quantization was introduced in Section 7.3.3 of the previous chapter. In this
chapter, we intend to propose an optimized codebook design. Since the opti-
mize codebook is derived during vector quantization, we will revisit some im-
portant aspects of vector quantization before presenting the new approach to
optimize a codebook. Given that x = {x1, x2, · · · , xd} is our d−dimensional
real-valued wavelet feature vector where d = 5, vector quantization maps
the wavelet feature vectors x to another d−dimensional real-valued vector
y. y is termed a codeword and a finite set of codewords is called a codebook
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C = {yi : i = 1, 2, 3 · · ·L}. The size of the codebook is denoted by L and it
corresponds to the number of codewords in a codebook C. A given codeword
yi represents the centroid of a region or cell called the voronoi region.
The core intuition of our optimization approach is that centroids of two
dissimilar activities should be far from each other while centroids corre-
sponding to the same activities have to be closer to each other. We realize
this by crafting a codebook that adheres to two stringent rules. First, the
mean square error (MSE) distortion in all the L-voronoi regions should be
minimum. Secondly, the selected centroids must have the minimum average
distortion within their respective cells.
[KS09] indicated that the heuristics of the LBG algorithm leads to the
construction of elongated clusters during vector quantization. This results
in the inefficient clustering of wavelet feature vectors, causing some feature
vectors of different activities to be located in the same voronoi cell. This
certainly has an adverse impact on the prediction of such activities. While the
problem of crafting a codebook that optimally represents the input feature
vectors is NP-Hard [LBG80], we devise a refinement algorithm that performs
re-quantification to enhance the partitioning of wavelet feature vectors in the
codebook. Prior to describing our vector re-quantization approach, we derive
a new distortion measure called the weighted Mean Square Error distortion,
which plays an instrumental role during refinement. Given a voronoi cell
c, the Quantization Error Distortion (QED(Xi)) between a d−dimensional
feature point Xi in the cell c and the cell’s centroid yc is computed using
QED(Xi) = dist(Xi − yc) (8.1)
where dist(..) is the Euclidean distance. Given an ordered sequence
Q = {QED(X1), QED(X2), · · · , QED(Xn)} of quantization error distances
of all wavelet feature vectors (i.e., X1, X2, · · ·XN) in cell c, the Median Quan-
tization Error distortion MQE(c) of cell c is determined by selecting the
quantization error distance at the middle of Q. Also, the Mean Square Error
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(MSE) distortion is given by
MSE(X, yc) =
1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
(Xi − yc)2 (8.2)
where Nc is the number of points in cell c.
Suppose Λ(Xi, c) = |QED(Xi)−MQE(c)|, then the weighted quantiza-
tion error distortion of a feature vector Ω(Xi) is given by
Ω(Xi) =
{
QED(Xi) if Λ(Xi, c) < MSE(X, yc)
αQED(Xi) otherwise
where α is a non negative constant. α penalizes points that are further from
the centroids by increasing their distance, thereby increasing the likelihood
of them being swapped into different regions. We use α = 2.
The weighted MSE distortion is then determined using the weighted quan-
tization error distortion as given in Equation 8.3.
M̂SE(Xi, yc) =
1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
(Ω(Xi))
2 (8.3)
The heuristic of our refinement algorithm is as follows. After wavelet fea-
ture vectors have been partitioned in their respective cells using the LBG
algorithm, we accomplish re-quantization by performing K-Means clustering
using our newly introduced weighted MSE distortion measure. We use all the
centroids from the LBG algorithm as the initial point of the K-Means cluster-
ing. Then, during the first iteration, for each cell, we compute the weighted
MSE distortion between each point xi in the cell and its cell’s centroid yc
using Equation 8.3. Near optimal codebook can be instituted if the average
distortion in each cell is minimum. Points which are furthest away from their
centroids prevent this from happening. The weighted MSE distortion mea-
sure identifies and penalizes such points, so that during K-Means clustering
these points have a very high likelihood to be swapped and associated with
different centroids. This swapping results in the improvement in the purity
of the cluster of each voronoi region by ensuring that each cell entails mostly
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wavelet features of a given activity, whereas feature vectors of dissimilar ac-
tivities are swapped to different cells. After the first iteration, the points are
then processed and clustered using normal K-Means clustering by updating
the centroids until they converge. This refinement leads to the production
of an enhanced codebook where each cell comprises of wavelet feature vec-
tors from the the same activity. We show in Section 8.5 that the efficient
partitioning of the wavelet features results in an elevation of the prediction
performance.
8.4 Activity Recognition using CRF
8.4.1 CRF Activity Modeling and Prediction
In our activity recognition settings, we model our CRF as follows. Given a
dataset D of all activities, after wavelet feature extraction and vector quan-
tization of D, we replace each wavelet feature value with its corresponding
centroid, such that each activity observation sequence is represented as an
ordered observation sequence of centroids X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}, where each
xi denotes a centroid. Also, we represent the six different high level activ-
ities as a set of candidate labels Y = {y1, y2, · · · , ym}, where each yi ∈ Y
corresponds to a candidate activity. We then employ CRF to determine the
conditional probability of Y given a sequence X (i.e., P (Y |X) ).
In this work, we utilize a linear chain CRF for activity recognition. As
described in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, CRF utilizes feature function f to
learn from the training data. In the next section, we describe how f is used
for activity recognition.
8.4.2 Embedding Activities Characteristics in CRF
Provided with the 3D accelerometer dataset, after spectral centroids have
been determined from the wavelet feature vectors, our CRF learns the prop-
erties of each activity from the centroid sequences by finding important re-
occurring patterns for each activity. Specifically, it searches for latent patterns
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from each sequence of centroids by analyzing the Markov property between
two random centroid variables. If a sequence occurs frequently and always
result to the same output yi, the behavior is stored using the feature function
f and the behavior is further analyzed in other centroid sequences. At the
end of the learning process by our CRF, numerous properties of each of the
activities are discovered by different feature functions. We should note that
if a feature occurs, we infuse the feature to our CRF by allocating a real value
number of 1. Otherwise, we assign a value of zero.
8.4.3 CRF Observation Sequence
The observation of our CRF is derived from the resultant time-domain motion
signal M̂i of a tri-axial accelerometer reading at a given time i. Formally, M̂i
is given by Equation 8.4.
M̂i =
√
x2i + y
2
i + z
2
i (8.4)
We derive the CRF observation sequence by performing wavelet transform
of M̂i and extracting its feature vectors. The latter feature vectors are repre-
sented by their nearest centroids. The sequence of centroids from a sensor
reading are used as an observation sequence of our CRF.
8.5 Experiments
We conduct our experiments on an Intel 8GB RAM PC and the implementa-
tions were done in Java. We carry out many experiments with the accelerom-
eter dataset described in Section 7.2.1. We divide the accelerometer sensor
data for each activity into two separate sets. Namely, the training set and test
set. We use standard data mining evaluation measures like precision, recall
and F1-Measure to evaluate the effectiveness of our technique. Besides, the
overall performance of our predictor is given by
Overall =
correct
correct+ incorrect
(8.5)
8.5. Experiments 147
where correct denotes the total number of correctly predicted labels and
incorrect refers to the total number of incorrectly predicted labels.
8.5.1 Activity Prediction
We investigate our prediction performance using three parameters that hugely
influence prediction results. They include, the CRF observation sequence
length (S), the codebook size L and the Window Size w. The window size
refers to the length of the sensor signal that is decomposed during wavelet
transform.
LBG Codebook Labels Precision Recall F1
w=256
Jogging 87.5 87.5 87.5
Walking 66.666 60.0 63.158
Upstairs 0.0 0.0 -
Downstairs 25.0 100.0 40.0
Sitting 50.0 100.0 66.667
Standing 0.0 0.0 -
Overall 62.5
w=512
Jogging 85.269 91.212 88.140
Walking 65.302 81.707 72.589
Upstairs 46.666 11.666 18.666
Downstairs 14.285 3.333 5.405
Sitting 57.894 55.0 56.41
Standing 34.21 65.0 44.827
Overall 67.809
Table 8.1: LGB Codebook: L=64, S=10.
We commence our experimental evaluation by investigating the effects of
the optimized codebook on the performance of our predictive model. Table
8.1 illustrates our evaluation results when the LGB codebook is used for L =
64, and window sizes of w = 256 and w = 512. On the other hand, Table 8.2
shows the prediction results for the optimized codebook with L = 64.
As shown in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2, the optimized codebook delivers
better results than the LGB codebook. Specifically, for w = 256, while the
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Figure 8.2: Effects of CRF Observation Length on Optimized LBG Codebook
for L=64, w=1024.
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overall prediction performance for the LGB codebook is 62.5%, the optimized
codebook yields an overall prediction performance of 74.825%.
Optimized Labels Precision Recall F1
w=256
Jogging 90.909 90.909 90.909
Walking 69.387 82.926 75.555
Upstairs 66.666 50.0 57.143
Downstairs 0.0 0.0 -
Sitting 75.0 100.0 85.714
Standing 66.666 50.0 57.143
Overall 74.285
w=512
Jogging 78.947 88.235 83.333
Walking 88.235 71.428 78.947
Upstairs 60.0 50.0 54.545
Downstairs 33.333 50.0 40.0
Sitting 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standing 66.666 100.0 80.0
Overall 75.0
w=1024
Jogging 83.695 96.25 89.535
Walking 80.0 88.0 83.81
Upstairs 83.333 33.333 47.619
Downstairs 100.0 20.0 33.333
Sitting 41.666 50.0 45.454
Standing 41.666 50.0 45.454
Overall 77.916
Table 8.2: Optimized LBG Codebook: L=64, S=10.
In addition, we notice increases in the precisions, recalls and F1-Measures
of most activities when using the optimized codebook. We also investigate
the prediction results for a window size of w = 512. The results show a sim-
ilar trend to that of w = 256. In particular, while the overall performance
of the LGB codebook is 67.809%, we notice a jump of the overall perfor-
mance of 7.2% when using the optimized codebook. For w = 1024, we also
observe an increase in performance. The results in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2
demonstrate that the efficient partitioning of codebook prompts a surge in
the prediction performance.
Performance based on CRF Observation Length: The sequence length
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of a CRF observation (S) influences prediction performance. We experi-
mented with observation lengths of 10, 30 and 50. Figure 8.2 shows the
results of our experiments for an optimized codebook for L = 64. From the
figure, we observe that an increase in the observation length leads to an in-
crease in prediction performance. Specifically, an observation length of 10
produces an overall performance of 77.916%, whereas overall performances
of 78.571% and 82% are delivered by observation lengths of 30 and 50, re-
spectively. Morever, for the observation length of 30, the F1-Measures of the
jogging and walking activities are 100%. Also, we notice that for the ob-
servation length of 50, the precisions and recalls of the sitting and standing
activities fall to 0%. We should note that, this is not caused by our predictor
but by the lack of test data when long observation lengths are used; since
the amount of sitting and standing activity data in the dataset provided by
[KWM11] is quite small when compared to that of the jogging and walking
activities.
Window Sizes and Overlaps: We investigate which configurations for
the optimized codebook produce the best activity recognition result. We ac-
complish this by analyzing how the prediction performance of the optimized
codebook fluctuates with the different window sizes, as well as the overlap-
ping of signals in a given window. Figure 8.3 depicts our empirical prediction
results when using an observation length of 30 for different optimized code-
book sizes of L = 16, L = 32 and L = 64. It also depicts the results when
no window overlapping is used, as well as the results of a 20% and 40 %
overlap.
No Window Overlap: The optimized codebook size of L = 16 produces
the worst result. Apart from the good F1- Measures of 78.9% and 73.1%
for the jogging and walking activities respectively, the prediction results for
downstairs, sitting and standing are 0%. When L = 32 is used, we observe an
excellent prediction result. Apart from the standing activity, the precisions,
recalls and F1-Measures of the jogging, walking, upstairs and downstairs ac-
tivities are 100%. We observe a lower F1-Measure of 87.8% for the sitting
activity. For this optimized codebook setting (i.e., L = 32, w = 1024 and
S = 30), we observe the best overall prediction performance of 96.428 %. In
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Overlap Activities L=16 L=32 L=64
Prec. Recall F1 Prec. Recall F1 Prec. Recall F1
No Overlap
Jogging 100.0 65.217 78.947 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Walking 65.217 83.333 73.170 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Upstairs 42.857 100.0 60.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.333 66.666 44.444
Downstairs 0.0 0.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 -
Sitting 0.0 0.0 - 78.26 100.0 87.804 78.26 100.0 87.804
Standing 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 -
Overall 53.571 96.428 78.571
20%
Jogging 100.0 95.238 97.561 100.0 95.238 97.561 100.0 95.238 97.561
Walking 95.89 100.0 97.902 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.89 100.0 97.902
Upstairs 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 - 17.391 100.0 29.629
Downstairs 0.0 0.0 - 72.727 100.0 84.210 0.0 0.0 -
Sitting 61.538 100.0 76.190 0.0 0.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standing 0.0 0.0 - 28.205 100.0 44.0 0.0 0.0 -
Overall 85.555 82.777 87.777
40%
Jogging 100.0 86.956 93.023 100.0 86.956 93.0229 100.0 86.956 93.023
Walking 89.655 100.0 94.545 89.655 100.0 94.545 82.978 100.0 90.697
Upstairs 66.666 100.0 80.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 -
Downstairs 0.0 0.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 -
Sitting 0.0 0.0 - 32.258 100.0 48.780 32.258 100.0 48.780
Standing 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 -
Overall 76.381 84.924 74.371
Figure 8.3: Prediction Performance Analysis on Optimized LBG Codebook.
contrast, for L = 64, while the F1-Measures for the jogging and walking ac-
tivities are 100 %, we notice a sharp drop in the F1-Measures of the upstairs
and downstairs activities.
Window Ovelap: We evaluate the prediction results when using window
overlaps of 20% and 40% for L = 16, 32, 64. We were anticipating that using
overlapping will produce a better prediction result, which might surpass the
best prediction performance of 96.428 %. On the contrary, the results from
these overlaps did not exceed it. Specifically, for a 20% window overlap,
the overall prediction performances of 85.555%, 82.777% and 87.777% are
delivered for L = 16, 32, 64 respectively. When using an overlap of 40%, a
prediction result of 76.381% is achieved for L = 16, whereas we obtain the
overall prediction performances of 84.924% and 74.371% for L = 32 and
L = 64, respectively.
Discussions: We observe that an optimized codebook size of L = 32 with
no overlap produces the best result, followed by that of L = 64 with a 20%
overlap. Also, as the CRF observation sequence length increases, the predic-
tion performance increases. In addition, we found that window overlapping
leads to a significant increase in the prediction performance for a small code-
book size of L = 16. However, the influence of window overlapping drops for
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codebook sizes of L = 32 and L = 64. In general, we obtain the best overall
prediction performance when using an optimized codebook size of L = 32,
a window length of w = 1024 and a CRF observation sequence length of 30.
This setting yields an overall performance of 96.428%. These results demon-
strate that our technique effectively predicts high level activities from low
level accelerometer signals.
8.6 Conclusions
We proposed a novel activity recognition technique that utilizes wavelets, an
optimized codebook and CRF. We introduced an optimization technique to
craft a codebook during vector quantization that efficiently clusters wavelet
feature vectors. The codebook is then leveraged by our CRF-based predictive
model to predict activities. Our empirical evaluations show that our tech-
nique achieves a high overall prediction performance.
Chapter 9
Parkinson’s Disease Gait
Prediction from Sensor Timeseries
The last two chapters of this part focused on human physiological activity
prediction using sensor data. In this chapter, we shift our emphasis to the
medical domain and present a technique to predict the activity of an abnor-
mal medical condition caused by some neurological disorders in certain brain
centers. That is, we propose a Freezing of Gait (FOG) predictive model for
Parkinson’s Disease patients. Specifically, FOG in Parkinson’s Disease (PD)
is a brief episodic impedance of movement that is mostly manifested at the
late stages of the PD. Accelerometer sensors are widely utilized to collect
dysfunctional movement time series data stemming from patients with PD.
In order to derive and extract unique signature features of FOG time series,
we utilize wavelets to perform in-depth analysis of PD movement spectral at
multiple resolutions. We design a CRF that leverages the extracted signature
feature vectors to diligently learn the underlying characteristics of FOG time
series and to effectively predict FOG episodes at their onsets. Our empiri-
cal evaluations on a real PD dataset demonstrate that our technique delivers
enhanced prediction accuracies.
153
154 Parkinson’s Disease Gait Prediction from Sensor Timeseries
9.1 Motivation
Parkinson Disease (PD) is a neurological disorder that was discovered in
1817 by James Parkinson. It is caused by the deficiency of striatal dopamine
because of the loss of nigrostriatal neurons [Fah03]. The degeneration of the
latter neurons disrupts the limbic, visceromotor and sematormotor systems
of the brain, causing the limbic and other brain centers to relinquish influ-
ence and control of motor neurons. This translates into the dysfunction of
the body’s motor systems, which is manifested by involuntary trembling of
the head, arms and legs. It also causes Bradykinesa (slowness) and "freezing"
as the disease evolves.
The aforementioned freezing is mostly experienced at the late stages of
the Parkinson’s disease [BHVG04], and it is coined Freezing of Gait (FOG).
FOG is a brief episodic impedance of movement, which is characterized by
the inability of a person (at rest) to commence movement. For a moving
person, FOG is governed by the abrupt halt in her motion, despite efforts to
resume movement. Another hallmark of FOG is the involuntary trembling
of the knees. [BHVG04] mentioned that FOG episodes are mostly observed
when a patient starts moving or during turning movement. They also alluded
that FOG episodes occur briefly for up to 10 seconds in most cases but may
extend above 30 seconds in a few occasions.
Despite these short durations, FOG takes a PD patient by surprise, thus
it requires patient monitoring. Besides, FOG episodes can be accompanied
by falls, which might lead to body injuries. Patient monitoring or injuries
stemming from falls after FOG episodes might prompt an elevation of the
health care cost. The freezes and falls also cause patients to become de-
pendent on others and even discourages them to move, thus depreciating
their quality of life. Dopamine-related medications have also not been suc-
cessful in overcoming FOG [MMO08, BHVG04]. Since PD is associated with
trembling, the movement patterns of such trembles, as well as FOG can be
captured by wearable sensors. One approach that has garnered broad scale
support to collect and analyze Parkinson disease movement data is the use
of accelerometer sensors. The accelerometer sensor data entails elusive FOG
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movement patterns that can be uncovered using proper data mining tech-
niques. This can be eventually utilized to identify, detect or predict FOG in
PD. For instance, [BPR+10] propose an algorithm that can detect FOG in
real-time.
While other works [MMO08, HSN+12, BPR+10] have proposed tech-
niques to detect FOG in PD from sensors, in this chapter, we propose a novel
FOG prediction technique that utilizes a combination of wavelets and CRF
to predict high level FOG events from low level accelerometer time series.
A FOG predictor can be used in a broad spectrum of health applications for
patient monitoring and to enhance the quality of life for PD patients.
Distinguishing low level FOG time series (at its onset) in the midst of
normal movement time series is an insidious and challenging problem. We
make two main contributions in this chapter. First, we devise a new feature
selection approach for PD time series data, which extracts unique signature
feature vectors from a FOG time series. The extracted features are employed
to effectively discriminate FOG time series from the normal movement time
series of PD patients. Our second contribution involves the proposal of a ro-
bust FOG predictive model, which utilizes the aforementioned wavelet fea-
ture vectors, a codebook, and CRF to predict an FOG episode at its onset
with a high veracity of more than 90% depending on the window size.
The next section discuses relevant related works while Section 9.2 de-
scribes the PD accelerometer sensor dataset and formally defines the prob-
lem of FOG prediction. In Section 9.3 of this chapter, we introduce a feature
extraction approach for PD time series, whereas in Section 9.4, we present
our FOG predictive model. Section 9.5 provides the empirical results of our
conducted experiments. We conclude in Section 9.6.
9.1.1 Related work
[HSN+12] propose a technique that employs wavelet to extract feature vec-
tors from EEG signals. They then use Back Propagation Neural Network
classifier and the extracted features to classify FOG from the EEG signals.
Our approach differs from this work because we utilize CRF. Also, the study
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performed by [HSN+12] is based on EEG signal while our work explores ac-
celerometer signals. [BPR+10] propose a technique that detects FOG episodes
from accelerometer data in real time. If their technique identifies a FOG
episode, it sends a message to an RAS (Rhythmic Auditory Simulation),
which triggers the patient to continue moving. [MMO08] introduce a FOG
detection technique that is based on a freeze threshold termed the Freeze
Index. They derive the latter index by examining the power spectra of verti-
cal linear acceleration. Our technique differs from this approach in that we
utilize wavelet and CRF to identify and predict FOG episode.
9.2 Data Acquisition and Problem Definition
9.2.1 Data Acquisition
We utilize the Daphnet Freezing of Gait dataset which was collected and
made public by [BPR+10]. The data was gathered from 10 PD patients, 7
males and 3 females ranging from the age of 59 to 75 years with different
stages of PD. Three 3D-accelerometer sensors were used to record the move-
ments of each patient at a sampling rate of 64 Hz. One sensor was attached
around the ankle, the other above the knee, and the third accelerometer
sensor was placed on a belt and wrapped around the hip of a patient. The
ground truth class labels for each 3D-accelerometer sensor reading is either
"freezing" or "no freezing". Throughout this work, we refer to the "freezing"
class as the FOG label, whereas the "no freezing" class is called the normal la-
bel. [BPR+10] reported that 8 out of the 10 patients experienced FOG during
the data gathering process.
9.2.2 Problem Definition
The main objective is to craft a predictive model that predicts a FOG episode
from the sensor time series data at the onset of the FOG episode. We should
note that it is important to predict FOG immediately as it starts, so that the
predicted results can be used by other systems (e.g., RAS) to alert the patient.
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Definition 9.1 (PROBLEM DEFINITION): Consider a finite set E = {e1, e2}
of movement classes, where e1 denotes the normal movement and e2 represents
the FOG episode. Given E and an ordered observation sequence of accelerometer
sensor movement time seriesO = {o1, o2, · · · , on}, where each oi ∈ O represents
three tri-axial accelerometer points from three different sensors, and each tri-
axial point ps(xi, yi, zi) denotes a point from sensor s at time ti, and t1 < t2 < ti,
predict the Parkinson’s disease movement label ej ∈ E that corresponds to the
observation sequence O within a threshold time τ .
To solve the problem in Definition 9.1, we propose a robust FOG predic-
tor that employs a novel combination of dyadic wavelet transform, vector
quantization and CRF to identify and predict FOG episodes time series that
are sandwiched within normal movement time series of PD patients.
9.3 Movement Time Series Analysis
We utilize dyadic wavelets to extract feature vectors for FOG prediction. For
each of the three sensors, we first determine a resultant 1D signal from the
3D accelerometer sensor reading and analyze it separately. The formula for
the resultant signal is provided and discussed in Section 9.4.3. We depict
each 1D resultant signal as a collection of data points in the time domain. We
start the decomposition of the 1D accelerometer signal using the Daubechies
4 mother wavelet. At each scale j, the MODWT generates an approximation
coefficient aj and a detail coefficient dj. For instance, Figure 9.1 illustrates
the spectral of a decomposed resultant FOG time series and a normal move-
ment time series of a PD patient for the ankle sensor. For each sensor type,
we perform pairwise analysis of each FOG time series with its corresponding
normal movement time series at a given scale j to determine and extract
important feature vectors.
9.3.1 Feature Vector Selection
Approximation Coefficients: During our rigorous analysis of PD movement
time series to find unique features that can distinguish an FOG episode time
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((f)) Detail Sub-band energies.
Figure 9.1: Ankle Sensor: Parkinson’s Disease Movement Spectral Analysis.
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series from a "no freeze" (i.e., normal) time series, we observe that the FOG
sub-band energies of the approximation and detail wavelet coefficients were
significantly higher than that of the normal movement time series as shown
in Figure 9.1(e) and Figure 9.1(f). For the approximation coefficients, we
investigated the decay of the sub-band energies across scales to avoid select-
ing sub-band energies that are corrupted by noise. While the approximation
sub-band energies at scale j = 7, j = 6 and j = 5 could be used as good
feature vectors, (since their sub-band energies can be employed to differen-
tiate FOG from normal time series,) we choose the approximation sub-band
energy at scale j = 4 as our approximation feature vector for two reasons.
First, they are less susceptible to be corrupted by random noise. Secondly, we
aspire to detect FOG at its onset, this means, we anticipate to encounter sce-
narios where the sample sizes of the time domain signals to be decomposed
can be as small as 170 points, hence the maximum j will be less than 7.
For all sensors, we compute the approximation sub-band energies for j = 4.
These approximation sub-band energies are extracted and utilized as feature
vectors.
Detail Coefficients: During our analysis of the detail wavelet coefficients,
we observe that they comprise of peak regions that hold unique characteris-
tics of the signal and can be utilized to effectively discriminate normal move-
ments from FOG episodes. For instance, Figure 9.1(f) shows the energy dis-
tribution from the detail wavelet coefficients.
As can be seen in Figure 9.1(f), the sub-band energies from scale j = 4
to j = 1 of an FOG time series (green) are profoundly higher than that of a
normal time series (red). In fact, their relative differences are higher than
those manifested by the approximations wavelet coefficients. As a result,
to capture and segregate FOG point sequences from normal movements,
we select the detail wavelet coefficients from scale j = 4 to j = 1 (i.e.,
dj = {d4, d3, d2, d1}), compute their detail sub-band energies, and utilize
them as feature vectors. In summary, for each 1D decomposed accelerometer
signal, we select its approximation wavelet coefficient at scale j = 4 and its
detail wavelet coefficients at scales j = 4 to j = 1. The approximation and
detail sub-band energies are then computed from the selected coefficients
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and utilized as feature vectors for our FOG prediction technique. Hence, five
features are extracted from each sensor. Since there are three accelerometer
sensors, the total amount of feature vectors used is 15. In the next sections,
we will describe how these feature vectors are employed for FOG prediction.
9.4 FOG Predictive Model
Vector quantization was described in Section 7.3.3. To build a codebook for
our wavelet feature vectors, we explore a codebook size of L = 32 and L =
64, and utilize the Linde-Buzo-Gray [LBG80] vector quantization algorithm
to partition the vector space d into L regions or cells. For the FOG settings,
d = 15, where d denotes the dimension of the selected real-valued wavelet
feature vector. During codebook generation, we represent all selected feature
vectors within a region with the codeword of the region. Later in this chapter,
during the prediction of the onset of an FOG episode, all wavelet feature
vectors will be represented by their nearest neighboring codewords.
9.4.1 CRF Introduction and FOG Modeling
CRF performs inference by mapping an observation sequence X to a se-
quence of labels Y . For the FOG prediction problem, we model our CRF
as follows. Given a dataset D consisting of all low level Parkinson’s disease
accelerometer sensor readings, after extracting signature spectral features
through dyadic wavelet transform and the vector quantization of the ex-
tracted spectral feature vectors has been performed, we replace each wavelet
feature value with its corresponding centroid. Then, we align the feature
vectors from each reading of all the three accelerometer sensors as an or-
dered observation sequence of centroids X = {x1, x2, · · · , xT}, where each
xi denotes a centroid. Also, we create a set of candidate labels Y = {y1, y2}
, where y1 refers to "no freezing" (i.e., normal movement) and y2 denotes
freezing (i.e., an FOG episode). Then the CRF is used to compute the con-
ditional probability of Y given an observation sequence X (i.e., P (Y |X) ).
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This can be accomplished with the use of feature functions f . In the next
section, we elaborate how f is used for FOG prediction.
9.4.2 FOG Characteristics as CRF Features
Given a training dataset consisting of multiple sequence of spectral centroids
that originate from 3 accelerometer sensors, our CRF learns the character-
istics of the underlying data by searching hidden patterns. If a sequence
occurs frequently and always result to the same output yi, the behavior is
stored using the feature function f and the behavior is investigated in other
centroid sequences. At the end of the learning process by our CRF, numerous
characteristics detected by different feature functions are found.
9.4.3 Modeling FOG Sequences
To model our predictor, we formulate the problem of FOG prediction as a
sequential labeling task. Given an observation sequence O of centroids that
represent vital signature feature vectors of an FOG or normal time series,
the objective is to find the most probable movement class, which could have
generated the observation sequence O.
Observation: The observation of our CRF is derived from the resultant
time-domain motion signal M̂i of a tri-axial accelerometer reading at a given
time i. Formally, M̂i is given by Equation 9.1.
M̂i =
√
(xi)2 + (yi)2 + (zi)2 (9.1)
Specifically, the observation sequence is derived from M̂i by first perform-
ing dyadic wavelet transform of M̂i and extracting its feature vector. Then,
to generate an observation sequence for our CRF, we use the codebook to re-
place the latter continuous value feature vectors with their nearest centroids.
The sequence of the corresponding centroids from the three sensors are used
as the observation sequence of our CRF.
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9.5 Experiments
In this section, we present the results of the empirical evaluation of our FOG
predictor. We conduct our experiments on an Intel PC with 8GB RAM. Our
FOG prediction framework is implemented in Java. As previously alluded,
we utilize the Parkinson’s disease accelerometer dataset described in Section
9.2.1 to perform our experiments. As a recap, the dataset has two output
classes. Namely, the normal and the FOG class. During our experimental
evaluations, to investigate the performance of our technique, we emphasize
on the ability of our framework to detect FOG after τ seconds from its onset,
where τ ranges from 2 to 6 seconds. In addition, we employ standard data
mining evaluation metrics like precision, recall and F1-measure to evaluate
the effectiveness of our technique.
9.5.1 Dataset Organization
The PD accelerometer dataset was extracted from 10 PD patients. [BPR+10]
mentioned that Patient 4 and Patient 10 did not experience any FOG episode
during the 8.5 hours period when the data was collected. As a result, we
exclude the multi sensor accelerometer data from Patient 4 and Patient 10,
and conduct our experiments using data from 8 PD patients. We train and
test our FOG predictor for a given patient by using only the accelerometer
data collected from the patient.
9.5.2 FOG Prediction
We perform our experiments using the approximation and detail wavelet
sub-band energies (i.e., a4, d4 · · · d1) as wavelet feature vectors. We observe
that the performance of our predictor depends on several parametric settings
such as the Window Size (w) and the Codebook Size L. We experimented with
codebook sizes of L = 32 and L = 64. The Window Size (w) refers to the
length of the multi sensor accelerometer time series that has to be segmented
before wavelet transform.
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We select several window sizes depending on τ . Our aim is to predict
FOG, τ seconds after its onset. The PD accelerometer dataset has a sampling
rate of 64Hz. From the dataset, we observe that the timestamps after every
four accelerometer readings is 47 milliseconds. This means 170 points corre-
spond to accelerometer readings of τ = 2 seconds. A window size of w = 170
is therefore used to measure our prediction performance within 2 seconds.
We also perform experiments with w = 256 and w = 512 which correspond to
our prediction performances within approximately 3 seconds and 6 seconds,
respectively.
Towards this end, throughout this section, we investigate our prediction
based on the window sizes of w = 170, 256, 512. For each window size, we
analyze how the codebook sizes of L = 32 and L = 64 affect the prediction
performance. In addition, [BPR+10] indicated that their technique had a
lower performance on FOG detection for Patient 1 and Patient 8, because Pa-
tient 1 has a different walking style that made it difficult for their technique
to recognize walking from very short FOG episode, whereas Patient 8 is a
patient with the most advanced stage of Parkinson’s Disease and faces the
greatest challenge during walking. As a result of these, we elaborately eval-
uate our FOG predictor on PD patients based on the H&Y ratings of theirs PD
stages. Patient 9 has stage 2 PD, while Patient 1 and Patient 8 are at stage
3 and 4, respectively. The severity of the PD increases with an increase in
the H&Y rating. Hence, we report our empirical evaluation for Patient 1 and
Patient 8 to demonstrate the effectiveness of our predictive model on Parkin-
son’s disease patients with advanced movement disorder. Also, we present
our result for Patient 9, who has an earlier stage Parkinson’s Disease.
In addition, as previously mentioned, we report the precision, recall; F1-
Measure and the overall performance (i.e., Equation 8.5 in Section 8.5) of
our prediction results. For our FOG prediction settings, because the vast
majority of the PD accelerometer time series comprises of normal movement
time series, while FOG time series appears rarely, it is essential to verify
the percentage of positive rarely occurring FOG episodes that are correctly
detected by the predictor. This can be captured by investigating the recall of
the FOG label.
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Patient 1 (H&Y Stage 3) Codebook Size = 32 Codebook Size = 64
Precision Recall F1-Measure Precision Recall F1-Measure
Normal 100 95.52 97.71 100 95.52 97.71
FOG 50 100 66.67 50 100 66.67
Overall 95.71 95.71
Patient 8 (H&Y Stage 4) Codebook Size = 32 Codebook Size = 64
Precision Recall F1-Measure Precision Recall F1-Measure
Normal 86.36 90.48 88.37 85.71 85.71 85.71
FOG 66.67 57.14 61.54 57.14 57.14 57.14
Overall 82.14 78.57
Patient 9 (H&Y Stage 2) Codebook Size = 32 Codebook Size = 64
Precision Recall F1-Measure Precision Recall F1-Measure
Normal 92.53 96.88 94.66 94.55 96.3 95.41
FOG 71.42 50.0 58.82 75.0 66.67 70.59
Overall 90.54 92.06
Figure 9.2: Window Size = 512 : FOG Evaluation for Patient 1, Patient 8,
Patient 9.
9.5.3 Prediction with Window Size of 512
Figure 9.2 depicts our prediction results of Patient 1 for a window size of
w = 512, when using different codebook sizes. For L = 32, we observe that
our technique delivers an optimal recall of 100 % for the FOG label. The
normal label attains a 95.52 % recall.
For the normal label, our approach achieves a precision of 100% and an
F1-Measure of 97.71 %. The FOG label has a 50 % precision and a 66.67
% F1-Measure. We increased the codebook size to L = 64 and the result
does not change (i.e., exactly similar to that of L = 32) as can be seen in
Figure 9.2. A similar experiment with the same experimental settings was
conducted on Patient 8, who has the most advanced stage of Parkinson’s
disease. We notice a 90.48 % recall for the normal label and a lowered recall
of 57.14 % for the FOG label. On the other hand, an elevated precision and
F1-Measure of 86.36 % and 88.37 % are achieved for the normal label. In
comparison to Patient 1, the FOG label has a 16 % increase of precision.
The recall and F1-Measure of the FOG label of Patient 8 are 57.14 % and
61.54 %, respectively. Figure 9.2 shows the results when the codebook size
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Patient 1 (H&Y Stage 3) Codebook Size = 32 Codebook Size = 64
Precision Recall F1-Measure Precision Recall F1-Measure
Normal 97.69 94.78 96.21 95.49 94.78 95.13
FOG 36.36 57.14 44.44 12.5 14.29 13.33
Overall 92.91 90.78
Patient 8 (H&Y Stage 4) Codebook Size = 32 Codebook Size = 64
Precision Recall F1-Measure Precision Recall F1-Measure
Normal 83.33 95.24 88.89 87.5 83.33 85.37
FOG 77.78 46.67 58.33 58.82 66.67 62.5
Overall 82.46 78.95
Patient 9 (H&Y Stage 2) Codebook Size = 32 Codebook Size = 64
Precision Recall F1-Measure Precision Recall F1-Measure
Normal 91.89 92.73 92.31 93.58 92.73 93.15
FOG 57.89 55.0 56.41 61.9 65.0 63.41
Overall 86.92 88.46
Figure 9.3: Window Size = 256 : FOG Evaluation for Patient 1, Patient 8,
Patient 9.
is increased to L = 64. Increasing the codebook size leads to a 3.57 %
decrease in the overall prediction performance.
The detail prediction results of Patient 9 are illustrated in Figure 9.2 also.
For a codebook size of L = 32, our technique delivers a recall of 96.88 %
and a precision of 92.53 % for the normal label. The FOG label yields a 50
% recall and a precision of 71.42 %.
9.5.4 Prediction with Window Size of 256
We use a window size of 256 samples during wavelet transform to test FOG
predictions within 3 seconds from an FOG episode’s onset. Figure 9.3 illus-
trates the prediction results. First, we notice that a decrease in window size
from w = 512 to w = 256 leads to an erosion in prediction performance.
Specifically, for L = 32, our predictive model produces an overall prediction
performance of 92.91% for Patient 1. This is lower than that of w = 512 for
the same patient. From the prediction confusion matrix, the normal label
produces precision, recall and F1 measure of 97.69 %, 94.78% and 96.21 %,
respectively. On the other hand, the FOG label outputs a recall of 57.14%.
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Its corresponding precision and F1-measure are 36.36% and 44.44 %, re-
spectively. The figure also illustrates the prediction results for the codebook
size of L = 64. We observe an approximately 2% decrease of the overall
prediction performance to 90.78 %.
For Patient 8, our technique achieves an overall performance of 82.46 %
for L = 32, while for L = 64, it yields an overall prediction performance of
78.95 %. Also, for this settings, the FOG label shows a precision of 77.78 %
for a codebook size of L = 32, but when we increased the codebook size to
64, we noticed a drop in precision to 58.823 %. This shows that a codebook
size of L = 32 performs better. In contrast, for Patient 9, an increase in
the codebook size from L = 32 to L = 64 improves the overall prediction
performance from 86.92% to 88.46%. In particular, for L = 32, the normal
and FOG labels deliver a precision of 91.89 % and 57.89 %, respectively.
Also, the increase in codebook size prompts the precision to increase to 93.58
% and 61.9%, respectively.
9.5.5 Prediction with Window Size of 170
A short window size of 170 samples corresponds to the accelerometer time
series for 2 seconds. Figure 9.4 shows the empirical prediction results for
Patient 1, Patient 8 and Patient 9 using a window size of 170 and codebook
sizes of L = 32 and L = 64. Patient 1 attains an overall performance of
90.61%. The best overall prediction performances of our technique on Pa-
tient 8 and Patient 9 are 73.26% and 82.05% respectively. Despite the good
overall prediction performances for such a short window size of w = 170,
a detail look at the FOG label recalls for both L = 32 and L = 64 shows a
drop in the recalls. Specifically, a maximum FOG label recall of 63.64 % is
obtained for Patient 1, while a minimum recall of 31.82 % is recorded for
Patient 8. The latter is a sharp drop when compared to the 100% recall for
w = 512. The main reason for this decrease in the FOG recall is caused by
the decrease in window size. Using fewer samples decreases the frequency
resolution at which we can examine the signal during wavelet transform. Be-
sides, it also leads to the production of lesser salient regions in the wavelet
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Patient 1 (H&Y Stage 3) Codebook Size = 32 Codebook Size = 64
Precision Recall F1-Measure Precision Recall F1-Measure
Normal 97.89 92.08 94.9 97.42 93.56 95.45
FOG 30.43 63.64 41.18 31.58 54.55 40.0
Overall 90.61 91.55
Patient 8 (H&Y Stage 4) Codebook Size = 32 Codebook Size = 64
Precision Recall F1-Measure Precision Recall F1-Measure
Normal 77.61 81.25 79.39 80.6 84.38 82.44
FOG 36.84 31.82 34.15 47.37 40.91 43.90
Overall 68.60 73.26
Patient 9 (H&Y Stage 2) Codebook Size = 32 Codebook Size = 64
Precision Recall F1-Measure Precision Recall F1-Measure
Normal 88.13 85.45 86.77 88.69 90.30 89.49
FOG 31.43 36.67 33.85 40.74 36.67 38.6
Overall 77.95 82.05
Figure 9.4: Window Size = 170 : FOG Evaluation for Patient 1, Patient 8,
Patient 9.
modulus maxima, which is pivotal in providing unique signature features,
that can be utilized to distinguish FOG signals from normal movement sig-
nals.
9.5.6 Discussions
Our major take aways from the experiments reported in Figure 9.2 - Figure
9.4 are as follows. For a short window size of w = 170, a large codebook
size of L = 64 yields the best overall prediction result for PD patients at all
stages. For longer window sizes (i.e., w = 256 and w = 256 ), we observe that
the choice of the codebook size strongly depends on the patients PD stages.
Specifically, a codebook size of L = 64 works better for PD patients at stage
1, whereas a codebook size of L = 32 performs better for advanced stage PD
patients (i.e., stage 3 and 4) as shown in Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.3.
For all window sizes, we observe that our FOG predictor delivers the low-
est results for the patient with the most severe stage of PD (i.e., Patient 8). In
addition, we notice that as the window size increases, our predictive model
performs better. Also, for a short window size of 170, our F1-Measures range
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from 38% to 43%. Based on wavelet theory, if the accelerometer sensors
sampling rate is increased such that at least 512 samples can be taken within
2 seconds, we believe our framework, which employs wavelet can produce
near optimal FOG prediction results. Finally, we show that our framework
predicts FOG by yielding the best overall performances of 95.71%, 92.91%
and 91.55% for w = 512, w = 256 and w = 170, respectively.
9.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present a novel predictive model for FOG prediction that
employs wavelets and CRF. We devise a new effective approach to select
unique signature wavelet feature vectors, which are capable of distinguishing
FOG time series from normal movement time series. We craft a CRF-based
FOG predictive model that taps these signature feature vectors to learn the
underlying characteristic of FOG and normal movement time series of Parkin-
son’s disease patients. We demonstrate through numerous experiments using
time series sensor data from Parkinson’s Disease patients that our technique
predicts FOG with an overall performance of over 90%.
Part IV
Privacy Preserving Data Mining
169

Chapter 10
Structural Anonymization of
Massive Networks
In this part, we present several privacy solutions to protect data ranging from
network protection to route privacy. Networks entail vulnerable and sensitive
information that pose serious privacy threats. In this chapter, we introduce
the k-core attack and propose a novel structural anonymization technique
called (k, δ)-Core Anonymity, which harnesses the k-core attack and struc-
turally anonymizes small and large networks. In addition, although real-
world social networks are massive in nature, most existing works focus on
the anonymization of networks with less than one hundred thousand nodes.
(k, δ)-Core Anonymity is tailored for massive networks. Using three real and
two synthetic datasets, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique
on small and large networks with up to 1.7 million nodes and 17.8 million
edges.
10.1 Motivation
The extensive utilization of networks such as social networks has rekin-
dled research interest in network analysis. Social networks contain an over-
whelming volume of personalized user data, which is generated from a mul-
titude of platforms. While social networks enable the collaboration of a stag-
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gering amount of people, they entail sensitive data, which can unveil the
behaviors, health conditions or affiliations of an individual, thus infringing
the individual’s privacy. Anonymized networks can be utilized in a wide va-
riety of fields for trend analysis, marketing, security and research purposes.
Numerous structural anonymization techniques have been proposed to
prevent identity disclosure [LT08], [ZCO09], [TYYC11a] , [CFL10]. K-core
decomposition [AHDBV05], [CKCÖ11], [Sei83], which was mentioned in
Chapter 4 is a technique that is employed to study the properties of a net-
work or graph. K-core decomposition reveals the structural characteristics
and fingerprint of a network by disintegrating the network into different hi-
erarchical structures.
Looking at the anonymized networks of existing works [LT08], [ZP08]
from the k-core decomposition perspective, we observe that they provide
additional insights about the structure of a network, which can be abused by
an adversary. Towards this end, we derive and formalize a new attack model
coined k-core Attack, which undermines the privacy of an individual. In this
chapter, we propose a novel structural anonymization technique called (k,
δ)-core Anonymity, which is tailored for massive network anonymization. (k,
δ)-core Anonymity addresses the k-core attack and structurally anonymizes
small and huge networks.
Although real-world social networks are massive in nature, surprisingly,
no empirical structural network anonymization study has been conducted
for massive networks. We envisage a scenario where a huge portion of an
anonymized network with more than one million nodes is obtained by an
adversary, or shared with an untrusted third party. The empirical studies of
existing works are limited to the anonymization of networks with less than
100K nodes as depicted in Table 10.1, where Node Pr., Edge Pr., and Struc.
Pr. denote vertex protection, edge protection, and structural preservation
respectively.
We highlight our contribution in this chapter as follows. While existing
works [CFL10], [TYYC11a], [LT08] utilize the degree property of a graph’s
vertex to enforce anonymity, we introduce a novel approach which utilizes
the k-core property of a graph to guarantee anonymity.
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Techniques Node Pr. Edge Pr. Struc. Pr. Node Size
(k,δ)-core Anonymity + + + ≤ 1.7 × 106
k-Isomorphism [CFL10] + + − ≤ 20000
Friendship
Anon.[TYYC11a]
+ + + ≤ 100000
k-Degree Anon. [LT08] + − + ≤ 1000
1-Neighborhood [ZP08] + − + ≤ 25000
k-Automorphism[ZCO09] + + + ≤ 1000
Table 10.1: Network anonymization techniques.
We present an attack model called k-core Attack that can compromise
the privacy of state-of-the-art techniques [LT08], [ZP08] or increases the
probability of inferring a vertex or an edge depending on the background
knowledge of an adversary. We then propose a novel structural network
anonymization technique termed (k, δ)-core Anonymity, which is resistant
to the k-core attack and anonymizes vertices and edges of a published net-
work. In addition, while the empirical studies of most existing works focus
only on small networks, we rigorously study and report the challenges asso-
ciated with the anonymization of massive networks. These challenges range
from runtime efficiency to anonymization quality. We provide an efficient
algorithm which is suitable for small and massive network anonymization.
We perform optimization by implementing a customized k-core decomposi-
tion based on [CKCÖ11] and by introducing efficient heuristics to reduce the
runtime.
In what follows, Subsection 10.1.1 focuses on relevant related works
while Section 10.2 introduces the k-core decomposition, k-core Attack and
defines the problem. In Section 10.3, we present the (k,δ)-core Anonymity
technique. Section 10.4 provides detailed results of the conducted experi-
ments. We conclude this chapter in Section 10.5.
10.1.1 Related work
Backstrom et. al. [BDK07] stipulate that a naive approach that simply
discards identifiers cannot prevent re-identification of nodes in a published
graph. Our work is similar to theirs from the scalability point of view. Sim-
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ilar to [BDK07], we experiment with a huge dataset. However, while they
focus on investigating the probability to successfully attack networks and
do not anonymize a network, our work provides a network anonymization
technique for massive networks. Hay et. al. [HMJ+08] propose a structural
anonymization technique termed k-candidate anonymization, which uses the
automorphic equivalence between nodes to ensure that a node is structurally
indistinguishable. They focus only on the theoretical aspects of network
anonymization while our work proposes and implements an anonymization
technique. Zhou and Pei [ZP08] propose the k-Anonymous graph technique
which reduces the probability of an adversary to re-identify a node with high
confidence. Liu and Terzi [LT08] propose an anonymization technique called
k-degree anonymity that prevents vertex identity disclosure. Chester et. al.
[CKR+11] also propose a technique that anonymizes the vertex of a pub-
lished network through the addition of nodes and edges. Zou et. al.[ZCO09]
introduce an anonymization technique that prevents re-identification by uti-
lizing the notion of k-automorphism. Furthermore, Tai et. al. [TYYC11b]
propose a technique which is tailored for protecting a vertex and its commu-
nity in a social network. [LT08], [TYYC11b] focus solely on vertex anonymity
while our work addresses both vertex and edge anonymization.
K-isomorphism is an anonymization technique proposed by Cheng et.
al. [CFL10] that guarantees edge and vertex anonymity by releasing k-
isomorphic graphs. A k-isomorphic graph is a graph which entails k disjoint
subgraphs and each pair of the subgraphs is isomorphic. While [CFL10] out-
puts anonymized disintegrated subgraphs, our technique publishes compact
anonymized graphs. Moreover, [TYYC11a] introduce the friendship attack
and propose the k2 degree anonymity technique. While [TYYC11a], [CFL10],
[CKR+11] and most related works mentioned in this section utilize the de-
gree property of a graph to achieve anonymity, our technique employs the
k-core property of graphs to ensure network anonymity.
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10.2 Preliminaries and Problem Definition
In this chapter, we represent a network as a simple graph G = (V,E), where
V corresponds to a set of vertices v ∈ V and E ⊆ V × V refers to the set
of edges linking the vertices. The k-core attack can be best articulated by
first defining and understanding the k-core decomposition and some notions
such as k-core, coreness and shells.
10.2.1 K-core Decomposition
K-core decomposition was first proposed by [Sei83]. K-core decomposition
is employed to study the topology of massive networks. As a result, it is
utilized to analyze the structure of the Internet, for graph clustering, and
to build visualization tools for network analysis [AHDBV05]. Formally, the
k-core decomposition is defined as follows.
Definition 10.1 (K-CORE [SEI83]): A subgraph H = (C,E|C) induced by the
set C ⊆ V is a k-core or a core of order k iff ∀v ∈ C : degH(v) ≥ k, and H is the
maximum subgraph with this property.
Simply put, the k-core of a graph G is the largest subgraph such that every
node in the subgraph has at least k degrees.
Definition 10.2 (CORENESS [AHDBV05]): A vertex v has a coreness c if it
belongs to the c-core but not to the (c+ 1)-core. We represent cv as the coreness
of vertex v.
Definition 10.3 (SHELL (Sc) [AHDBV05]): A shell Sc consists of all the ver-
tices whose coreness is c. The maximum value c such that Sc is not empty is
denoted by cmax. The k-core is thus the union of all shells Sc with c ≥ k.
10.2.2 Target Protection and K-core Attack
First, we clearly outline what our privacy technique aims to protect.
Protection Types: (k, δ)-Core Anonymity provides two forms of network
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protection. These include 1) Vertex Re-identification and 2) Edge Linkage for
a graph using an adversary’s background knowledge.
Adversary Background Knowledge: We assume that a combination of the
degree and coreness information of a given vertex, as well as its edges that
connect two shells can be utilized as background knowledge by an adversary
to infer a node or edge in a published graph. In addition, we assume that
the adversary’s background knowledge can be the coreness, the degree, the
structure of a subgraph, as well as information on how some edges in the
subgraph link different shells. This background knowledge can be employed
to perform a k-core attack as formalized in Definition 10.4.
Definition 10.4 (K-CORE ATTACK): Given a simple graph G = (V,E), the k-
core Attack is an attack model that can uniquely re-identify vertices or infer
the linkage of edges in an anonymized graph G′ of G by exploiting any of the
following properties of G,
1. the degrees and coreness of a vertex in G, as well as its edges
2. the structure of a subgraph Gs ⊆ G together with the degree and coreness
of the vertices of Gs, and their corresponding edges that link different
shells
Example 10.1 Theoretically, the higher the coreness of a vertex, the more con-
nected it is in the network. Figure 10.1 depicts a 2-degree anonymous graph
based on [LT08] and its corresponding k-core decomposition. Let’s assume that
an adversary targeting vertex i is aware that i has four friends. In addition,
we assume that the adversary has background knowledge that i has a coreness
of 1. From the k-core representation of the anonymized graph, the adversary
will observe that, although there are four vertices with a degree of 4, only one
vertex has a degree of 4 and a coreness of 1, which matches his background
knowledge of i. Thus, the adversary can uniquely re-identify and breach the
privacy of vertex i from the 2-degree anonymous graph. Furthermore, even
without knowing the exact coreness of vertex i, simply knowing that i is not
well connected provides the adversary enough information to infer vertex i with
high confidence using Figure 10.1 (Left).
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In most cases, a rough estimation of the connectedness of a vertex provides
sufficient background information to infer a vertex or edge with high confi-
dence. Thus, k-core attack is easy to perform.
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Figure 10.1: Left: A 2-Degree anonymous graph. Right: K-core decomposi-
tion of the graph.
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Figure 10.2: Left: Attack graph of target vertex c. Right: naïvely
anonymized graph G′.
Example 10.2 Let’s assume that an adversary intends to target vertex c in
Figure 10.1 (Left). He implants two nodes g and h, and attaches them to the
targeted node c. The attack graph is shown in Figure 10.2 (Left). Based on
the k-core decomposition principle, irrespective of how the targeted node c is
connected to the network, the coreness of vertices g and h will always be 2,
provided that nodes g and h remain connected and are not linked to any other
node. We assume that the adversary is clinical and aware of this principle.
Hence, the adversary will not intentionally link nodes g and h to other
nodes, so that he can easily re-identify his attack subgraph in the published
graph. After a naïve anonymization of the network in Figure 10.2 (Right) has
been published, the adversary uses the k-core decomposition of the anonymized
graph (i.e., Figure 10.1 (Right)) and tries to relocate his implanted attack graph
by searching for two nodes with a coreness of 2 that are connected to each other.
This only occurs once in Figure 10.1 (Right). Hence, using this criteria, the
adversary uniquely relocates node c.
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We should note that the k-core attack in Example 10.2 utilizes and relies
only on the background knowledge of the nodes implanted by the adversary and
not on the coreness of the target node.
Furthermore, in [ZP08], while the 1-neighborhood subgraph of a vertex
has at least k isomorphic 1-neighborhood subgraphs, the coreness of the ver-
tex together with its 1-neighborhood vertices can be unique. This can be
utilized by an attacker to infer a vertex in the published graph. These ex-
amples show that while graphs are anonymous from the nodes degree per-
spective, they are in most cases not anonymous in the k-core graph context.
In this chapter, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first network
anonymization technique, which is based on the k-core property of graphs
rather than the degree. We should note that k-core is a widely used graph
property as indicated by [CKCÖ11].
10.2.3 Problem Formulation
The k-core Attack highlights and exposes some shortcomings of utilizing the
degree property of graphs to achieve network anonymity. In this section, we
formulate the problem of anonymizing networks using the core property of
graphs. Prior to the definition of (k, δ)-core Anonymity, some important new
notions such as k-Shell Security and δ-Inter-Shell Edge Security are provided.
Definition 10.5 (k-SHELL SECURITY) Given a simple graph G = (V,E) and a
positive integer k. Let S =
⋃
c
Sc be the set of shells of a core decomposition of G
with 1 ≤ c ≤ cmax. An anonymized graph G′ of G satisfies k-shell security if for
every shell Sc of G′, there exist at least k vertices with coreness c.
For example, assume that the core decomposition ofG′ produces three shells,
namely, S1, S2, S3 with coreness 1, 2, and 3 respectively. If the vertices
V ′ = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h} in G′ are distributed on the set of shells S (i.e.,
S = {S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3}) such that S1 = {a, b, c}, S2 = {d, e} S3 = {f, g, h},
then because each shell has at least 2 vertices, it means G′ satisfies 2-Shell
Security.
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Ensuring k-shell security prevents an adversary from identifying a node
due to its coreness. If a shell has at least k nodes, the attacker is not able to
determine a node’s identity with a probability higher than 1
k
.
Theorem 10.1 (SOUNDNESS) Given that a shell Sc with coreness c consists
of a set of vertices vi ∈ Vsc and d = degSc,min(Vsc) denotes the minimum degree
from all vertices on Sc, if shell Sc fulfills k-shell security, then it also satisfies
d-degree anonymity and d ≥ c.
Proof 10.1 Given that Sc denotes a shell with coreness c in a simple graph G
and Vsc is a set of vertices vi ∈ Vsc found on shell Sc, from Definition 10.3, all
vertices vi ∈ Vsc on Sc have the same coreness value of c. Besides, from the
allocation of node coreness using Definition 10.1 and Definition 10.2, ⇒ ∀vi ∈
Vsc, degree(vi) ≥ c. Hence, degSc,min(Vsc) = d ≥ c. This means, all vertices on
shell Sc have a degree of at least c. If degSc,min(Vsc) = d, then all vertices on
shell Sc have a degree of at least d. This is equivalent to the k-degree anonymity
that warrants a defined amount of vertices to have at least k degree. Thus, shell
Sc is d-degree anonymous.
Simply put, Theorem 10.1 states that at the shell level, k-shell security en-
sures both core anonymity and degree anonymity. We should note that at the
graph level, theoretically, k-shell security might not always guarantee com-
plete degree anonymity. However, in addition to core anonymity, it ensures
some level of degree anonymity depending on the structure of the graph.
Mathematically, given a k-shell secure graph G with n shells, if m shells
are d-degree anonymous where m ≤ n, then in addition to the coreness
anonymity, an adversary cannot re-identify a node through its degree prop-
erty with a probability higher than 1
m
. Thus, the usage of coreness to ensure
network anonymity is sound. Also, theoretically, degree is a prerequisite for
coreness and the reverse is not true.
Another objective of our technique is to prevent link disclosure. From the
graph core context, there are situations whereby two shells can be uniquely
linked by an edge. The relationship between shells can be utilized by an ad-
versary as a structural network fingerprint to re-identify edges. In this work,
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in order to identify all attacks on edges, we introduce the notions of inter-
shell edge and unique inter-shell edge. An inter-shell edge is an edge which
is simply viewed and represented with respect to the coreness of its nodes
rather than its nodes’ labels. The inter-shell edge representation of edge(u, v)
is given by S(cu, cv) where S(cu, cv) is termed a shell pair, and u and v are
referred to as the source and destination nodes respectively. For example,
consider edge(u, v) whose vertices with labels u and v have a coreness of 2
and 3 respectively. The inter-shell edge representation of edge(u, v) is a shell
pair S(2, 3). Furthermore, the source node u and destination node v of an
inter-shell edge store the direction of the inter-shell edge. This direction can
be employed to find how many edges originate from a given source node,
as described in Section 10.3. The term unique inter-shell edge of a shell pair
refers to the number of inter-shell edges that stems from the source node
of that shell pair. For example, the shell pair S(3, 2) in Figure 10.3 (Left)
occurs twice. Hence, the number of inter-shell edges is 2. However, when
considering the unique inter-shell edges of the shell pair S(3, 2), we observe
that although there are two inter-shell edges, both originate from the same
source node c. To determine unique inter-shell edges, duplicate edges that
stem from the same source node are not counted. Thus, the number of
unique inter-shell edges is 1. Formally,
Definition 10.6 (UNIQUE INTER-SHELL EDGE) Given a simple graph G =
(V,E), let edge (v, w) ∈ Si × Sj be an edge linking a shell pair S(Si, Sj) where
i and j are the coreness of Si and Sj respectively. Given that yj ∈ Sj denotes
any vertex on Shell Sj, an edge (v, w) is a unique inter-shell edge if for all
edges(v, yj) in G containing vertex v, v is linked only once to any vertex yj in
shell Sj, such that only one unique edge(v, yj) links shell Si and Sj, and w = yj.
For clarity, we will provide an example of how unique inter-shell edge is used
after the next definition.
Definition 10.7 (δ-INTER-SHELL EDGE SECURITY) Given a simple graph G =
(V,E) and a positive integer δ. Let S =
⋃
c
Sc be the set of shells of a core
decomposition of G with 1 ≤ c ≤ cmax. An anonymized graph G′ of G satisfies
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δ-inter-shell edge security if for every unique inter-shell edge which links a shell
pair (Si, Sj), there exist at least (δ − 1) other unique inter-shell edges that link
the same shell pair.
Ensuring δ-inter-shell edge security prevents an adversary from re-identi-
fying an edge. If there exist at least δ unique edges between all shell-pairs,
the attacker is unable to distinguish an edge with a probability higher than 1
δ
.
For example, consider shell 3 and shell 2 of Figure 10.3 (Left) and assume
that δ = 2. We should stress that the graphs depicted in Figure 10.3 are undi-
rected graphs as stated in Definition 10.6 and Definition 10.7. The arrows
used in both figures are simply for illustrative purposes. If unique inter-shell
edges are not considered, because the shell pair S(3, 3) occurs more than two
times, while the shell pair S(3, 2) occurs twice, Figure 10.3 (Left) is 2-Inter-
Shell indistinguishable. The problem is that the links from shell 3 to shell 2
all originate from node c. Thus, there is no edge diversity. This is reminiscent
of the l-diversity [MKGV07] scenario in databases whereby all sensitive at-
tributes are the same. (l-diversity is a privacy technique that addresses homo-
geneity and background knowledge attacks by providing “well represented”
sensitive attributes.) Hence, the attacker can still infer the inter-shell edge.
As a result, we utilize the notion of unique inter-shell edge (Definition 10.6),
which ensures that if there exist more than one identical shell pairs that em-
anate from a given source node, only one inter-shell edge is considered. In
Figure 10.3(Left), in terms of unique inter-shell edges, only one of the two
shell pairs S(3, 2) is considered. This makes the graph in Figure 10.3(Left) 1-
Inter-Shell indistinguishable and prompts the need for anonymization since
δ = 2. In Figure 10.3 (Right), shell pair S(2, 3) occurs twice and are both
considered because they stem from two different nodes.
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Figure 10.3: Unique inter-shell edge.
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Throughout this chapter, we utilize the term core disruption to refer to a
situation whereby the original coreness of one or more vertices are changed
after the structural anonymization of G to G′. The higher the number of
vertices with changed coreness, the higher the core disruption of G′.
In this study, a graph G is transformed to G′ through minimal vertex and
edge modification. Modification can result in the disruption of the original
vertex coreness in G′, which will lead to poor data utility. As a result, we
devise a minimal anonymization cost function which is based on core dis-
ruption.
Definition 10.8 (ANONYMIZATION COST) An anonymization from G to G′
has minimal anonymization cost, if the core disruption cost is minimal, and
if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. ‖V ′(G) |−|V (G)‖ is minimized
2. ‖E ′(G′) |−|E(G)‖ is minimized
Simply put, there are two prerequisites to ensure minimal anonymiza-
tion cost. First, the construction of G′ from G must guarantee minimal core
disruption cost. The second requirement focuses on vertex and edge min-
imizations. Specifically, it should ensure that the difference in the number
of vertices per shell w.r.t. G′ and G is minimal. Also, the difference in the
number of edges linking all shell pairs should be minimal. The L1 distance
function is employed to compute these differences.
Definition 10.9 ((k, δ)-CORE ANONYMITY) Given a simple graph G = (V,E)
and positive integers k and δ. Let G′ be the anonymized graph of G. G′ satisfies
(k, δ)-Core Anonymity with respect to G if the following conditions hold:
1. G′ satisfies k-Shell Security and an adversary cannot identify a vertex v ∈
Si from a shell Si with a probability of more than 1k , where 1 ≤ i ≤ cmax.
2. G′ satisfies δ-Inter-Shell Edge Security and the adversary cannot deter-
mine an edge (v, w) with a probability of more than 1
δ
, where edge (v, w)
is an edge linking shell Si and Sj through vertex v ∈ Si and vertex w ∈ Sj,
and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ cmax.
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We now formulate the graph core anonymization problem considered in this
chapter.
Problem 10.1 ((k, δ)-CORE ANONYMIZATION) Given a simple graphG = (V,E)
and positive integers k and δ, derive an anonymized graph G′ = (V ′, E ′) from
G, such that G′ satisfies (k, δ)-Core Anonymity and the construction of G′ from
G incurs minimal anonymization cost.
Our prime rational is to craft efficient heuristics that are tailored for massive
and small networks. In the next section, we propose a solution of Problem
10.1, which uses the notion of preferential attachment and other measures
to reconstruct G′ from G with minimal anonymization cost and an efficient
runtime.
10.3 (k, δ)-core Anonymity
In this section, we present the (k,δ)-core Anonymity technique that struc-
turally anonymizes vertices and edges of a network. Here is a higher level
overview of our approach.
Overview: Provided with two user defined parameters k and δ that signify
the strength of vertex and edge re-identification privacies respectively, our
approach, shown in Algorithm 10.1, anonymizes a graph G to G′ as follows:
1. It starts by performing our optimized k-core decomposition (Line 1)
based on [CKCÖ11] with runtime O(m) where m denotes the number
of edges, and outputs all vertices and their respective coreness.
2. A preprocessing step (Line 3) is required to determine vulnerable shell
pairs. Vulnerable shell pairs are needed to identify all unique inter-shell
edges that have to be anonymized based on δ.
3. Vulnerable unique inter-shell edges are anonymized
(Line 4 - 8) by 3 algorithms provided in Section 10.3.2.
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4. After edge anonymization, all nodes with coreness less than k are de-
termined and anonymized as described in Section 10.3.3.
5. Steps 3 and 4 ensure δ unique inter-shell security and k-shell security
respectively while preserving the original coreness of all vertices of G
in G′. In addition, G′ is constructed (Line 12) such that it adheres to
the power law distribution.
Algorithm 10.1: (k, δ)-Core Anonymity
Input: Graph G = (V,E), k, δ
Output: Anonymized Graph G′
1 Compute k-Core Decomposition of G
2 Determine all shells Si with less than k nodes
3 Determine all vulnerable inter-shell-buckets
4 for (vulnerable inter-shell-buckets vS(Si, Sj)) do
5 while |vS(Si, Sj)| < δ do
6 Add unique inter-shell edges to vS(Si, Sj)
7 endwhile
8 end for
9 if (∃Si with |Si| < k) then
10 Add k − |Si| noisy nodes of coreness ci to Si
11 end if
12 return anonymized graph G′
10.3.1 Data Utility and Massive Network Structure
Preservation of Coreness: [CKCÖ11], [AHDBV05] could not overstate the
benefits of the coreness of a graph during knowledge discovery. In this study,
to ensure good data utility, we set an optimistic goal to preserve the original
coreness of all vertices of G in G′. To achieve this goal, we utilize Theorem
10.2 during the transformation of G to G′.
Theorem 10.2 ( CORENESS PRESERVATION ) Let G = (V,E) be a graph,
where v ∈ V is a vertex with coreness cv. Let G′ = (V ′, E ′) be another graph,
where w /∈ V denotes a vertex with coreness cw and (v, w) /∈ E. In graph G′
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with V ′ = V ∪ {w} and E ′ = E ∪ {(v, w)}, the coreness cv of v in G′ will be the
same as in G, if cw < cv.
Proof 10.2 Let G = (V,E) be a given graph and v ∈ V a node of G with
coreness cv. Let H = (C,E|C) be the remaining subgraph induced by the set
C ⊆ V in the cv-th iteration of a core decomposition of G. If v has coreness cv,
it is part of the cv-core. That is v ∈ C : degH(v) ≥ cv. Let G′ = (V ′, E ′), w /∈ V
with coreness cw, (v, w) /∈ E, V ′ = V ∪ {w} and E ′ = E ∪ {(v, w)}. Let H ′ =
(C ′, E ′|C ′) be the remaining subgraph induced by the set C ′ ⊆ V ′ in iteration
l = cv. All nodes with degree d < cv have been removed from G′, i.e., the degree
of v is the minimum degree of G′. As cw < cv, the node w and all incident edges
of w are removed from G′ before v. Thus, w /∈ C ′ and H = H ′. That means,
the cv-core in G is the same as in G′, thus v preserves its coreness in G′.
Theorem 10.2 simply states that based on the k-core decomposition theory,
to introduce an edge to a vertex u without changing u’s original coreness, the
other end of the edge has to be linked to a vertex whose coreness is lower
than the coreness of u. Linking u to a vertex with higher coreness can change
the coreness of u.
Preferential Attachment: Massive networks obey the power law distri-
bution. In order to ensure that the evolution of G′ follows the power law
distribution, we craft an attachment cost function which employs the no-
tion of preferential attachment [AB02]. Specifically, during edge addition,
given a set of candidate nodes v ∈ V, we utilize the preferential attachment
probability (π(v)) given in Equation 10.1
π(v) =
deg(v)∑
w∈V degree(w)
(10.1)
to determine the likelihood of connecting two nodes. Generally, the higher
the degree of a candidate node w.r.t. other candidate nodes, the higher the
π(v) of attaching the new node to it.
Anonymization Approach: From the graph core settings, edge addition
causes profound disruption in the coreness of vertices. In fact, far more
disruption than vertex addition. We observe that a mixture of more edge
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addition and a very small amount of vertex addition, while preserving the
original coreness of all vertices of G in G′ is better than a heuristic that
performs anonymization only through edge modification. In addition, in
contrast to [CFL10] that discourages vertex addition, we demonstrate em-
pirically in Section 10.4 that our approach produces better results. Hence,
in this study, we primarily utilize edge addition and a small amount of ver-
tex addition to achieve (k, δ)-core Anonymity, yet preserving the original
coreness of all vertices.
Throughout this chapter, we utilize the term free node to refer to any
node that a new edge can be attached to. A free node can be an existing
node (existing free node) v ∈ V or a dummy node (noisy free nodes) v /∈ V .
Edge and Vertex Attachment Cost: Given a vertex v ∈ V, attaching an
edge to v is associated with an attachment cost given in Equation 10.2.
Costattach(u) =
(1− π(v)) + wv
2
(10.2)
wv =
{
0.25 if v ∈ G
0.75 otherwise
Basically, the attachment cost comprises of two parts. Part one corresponds
to the cost incurred due to preferential attachment and the intuition is to
prompt G′ to follows the power law distribution. Part two is a penalty levied
based on the vertex type. Our objective is to discourage the usage of dummy
nodes. Hence, if the vertex is an existing free node, a lesser penalty is in-
flicted to increase the chances of choosing it over a noisy node.
10.3.2 Edge Anonymization
The number of unique inter-shell edges that needs to be anonymized to fulfill
δ unique inter-shell security has to be known prior to edge anonymization.
Vulnerable shell pairs reveal vulnerable unique inter-shell edges which need
to be anonymized based on δ.
Preprocessing and Determination of Vulnerable Edges: The purpose
of the preprocessing phase is to collect all necessary information about the
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given graph G = (V,E) which represents a network. The goal of (k, δ)-Core
Anonymity is to limit the information gain of an adversary when analyzing
the k-core decomposition of a network. Therefore, the first step of the pre-
processing phase is to determine the structural characteristics of a graph G
by computing its k-Core Decomposition. After that vulnerable edges are de-
termined. We introduce an algorithm in the preprocessing step that scans
through G to determine vulnerable unique inter-shell edges from all com-
binations of shell pairs. The shell pairs of all inter-shell edges are stored
in a container called shell pair bucket. The algorithm is provided in Algo-
rithm 10.2. Algorithm 10.2 is employed for the determination of vulnerable
Algorithm 10.2: VULNERABLE INTER-SHELL-BUCKETS
Input: δ, Inter-Shell-Buckets b(i, j) of Graph G
Output: Vulnerable Inter-Shell-Buckets vb(i, j) with less than δ unique
inter-shell edges
1 for (inter-shell-buckets b(i, j)) do
2 U ← ∅
3 while (|U | < δ) do
4 for (edges l = (vi, vj) ∈ b(i, j)) do
5 for (edges u = (wi, wj) ∈ U) do
6 if (vi = wi) then
7 U ← U ∪ {l}
8 end if
9 end for
10 end for
11 endwhile
12 end for
13 return all vulnerable inter-shell-buckets vb(i, j)
shell pairs. A unique inter-shell edge linking a shell pair S(i, j) is said to be
anonymous if there exist other inter-shell edges that link the same shell pair.
In order to efficiently anonymize inter-shell edges, we introduce Algorithm
10.2 in the pre-processing step, which scans through G to determine vulner-
able unique inter-shell edges from all combinations of shell pairs as follows.
The k-core decomposition outputs the coreness of all nodes and segments
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nodes into different shells. Using the list of all edges, as well as the core-
ness information of each node produced by the k-core decomposition, the
corresponding inter-shell edges are determined.
The shell pair of all inter-shell edges are stored in a container called shell
pair bucket denoted by Su,v(cu, cv) where u is the source node and v is the
destination node. In order to identify duplicate inter-shell edges that origi-
nate from the same node as previously discussed and shown in Figure 10.3,
the inter-shell bucket takes into consideration the order of shell pairs. Specif-
ically, it monitors all source nodes of a shell pair. For example, in Figure 10.3
(Left), the inter-shell budget entry Sc,g(3, 2), Sc,h(3, 2) is a duplicate while in
Figure 10.3 (Right), Sg,c(2, 3), Sh,c(2, 3) is not. The inter-shell bucket takes
into consideration the order of the shell pair when searching for vulnerable
nodes.
Edge Anonymization: Anonymizing edges is very insidious. Edge anony-
mization is accomplished using a top-down algorithm depicted in Algorithm
10.3. As stipulated in Theorem 10.2, to preserve the core structure of a
higher order node during anonymization, the introduced edge should be at-
tached to a node with lower coreness. However, most often, the coreness of
two nodes of a shell pairs are not the same. We observe that three scenarios
can be encountered during the anonymization of preprocessed shell pairs.
These scenarios are given as follows. First, nodes u and v can be on the high-
est core (i.e., cu = cv = cmax). Secondly, the coreness of u and v are equal but
they are not on the highest core (i.e., cu = cv < cmax). Thirdly, the coreness
of u and v are not equal (i.e. cu = cv). We propose three algorithms that ef-
ficiently anonymize shell pairs. These algorithms are triggered by Algorithm
10.3 at Line 5, 7 and 10. Furthermore, each of these algorithms ensure that
the coreness is preserved, nodes are reused and edges are introduced with
minimal attachment cost. In the next section, we discuss these scenarios and
how their edges are anonymized.
Anonymizing Shell Pair of Highest Cores: In order to anonymize a shell pair
that resides at the highest core (e.g., S(3, 3)), δ indistinguishable shell pairs
(e.g., with S(3, 3)) are required. Attaching a new edge to existing free nodes
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Algorithm 10.3: ANONYMIZEEDGE
Input: vulnerable inter-shell-buckets vb(i, j)
Output: anonymized inter-shell-buckets b(i, j)
1 Sort all vulnerable inter-shell-buckets
2 for (vulnerable inter-shell-buckets vb(i, j)) do
3 if (i = cmax and j = cmax) then
4 if (i = j) then
5 Create (Min,Max)-Noise
6 else
7 Create Equal-Noise
8 end if
9 else
10 Create Maximum-Noise
11 end if
12 end for
13 return anonymized buckets b(i, j)
of lower shells will increase the coreness of the lower shell existing node.
As a result, noisy free nodes have to be introduced. This can be addressed
by adding a clique. If the highest coreness of the core decomposition of G
is cmax, then a cmax+1 clique is required for anonymization. Anonymization
using this approach is suitable when the highest core is not large. Another
approach is to use only two noisy nodes as follows. First, an edge is intro-
duced to link the noisy nodes. Secondly, one of the noisy nodes is connected
to all but one node at the highest core. This results in the efficient formation
of an S(cmax, cmax) shell pair with lesser nodes. For example, consider the
shell pair S(3,3) in Figure 10.4. Given that δ = 2, another shell pair S(3, 3)
is required to achieve edge anonymity. Two dummy nodes e and f are intro-
duced and attached to one another at one end. e is attached to all nodes in
the third shell except c. This creates another shell pair S(3, 3) and makes the
shell pair S(3, 3) more anonymous. This scenario is triggered by Algorithm
10.3 at Line 10.
Algorithm 10.4 is utilized to anonymize such shell pairs. The algorithm
takes at its input vulnerable inter-shell-bucket containing shell pairs with
maximum coreness, and the number of missing unique inter-shell edges. Di-
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Figure 10.4: Equal coreness at highest core.
rect edges between nodes at the highest shell cannot be established with-
out changing their coreness value. As no free nodes of higher coreness are
available, it is necessary to create maximum-noise cliques (Line 4). The
maximum-clique already contains unique inter-shell edges between its nodes.
These unique inter-shell edges can be added directly to the set of unique
inter-shell edges U (Line 5). Therefore, no additional noise for creating
unique inter-shell edges is needed. The created maximum-clique is an iso-
lated subgraph that has to be connected to the original graph. This is accom-
plished by creating noisy nodes of lower coreness that connect the maximum-
clique to the graph (Lines 6-8). Finally, the anonymized inter-shell-bucket
b(cmax, cmax) is returned (Line 10).
Algorithm 10.4: CREATE MAXIMUM-NOISE
Input: vulnerable inter-shell-bucket vb(cmax, cmax), number of missing
unique inter-shell edges m
Output: anonymized inter-shell-bucket b(cmax, cmax)
1 U ← unique inter-shell edges of vb(cmax, cmax)
2 m ← δ − |U |
3 while (|U | > 0) do
4 create a maximum-clique Mmax of size cmax + 1
5 U ← U ∪ {u}; u unique inter-shell edge of Mmax
6 create a noisy node v of coreness cv < cmax
7 create an edge c1 = (v, w) with w ∈ Mmax
8 create an edge c2 = (v, x) with x ∈ V
9 endwhile
10 return anonymized inter-shell-bucket b(cmax, cmax)
Anonymizing Shell Pair of Equal Cores but not Highest Shell: This case is
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called at Line 7 in Algorithm 10.3. To ensure anonymity, a shell pair S(i, i)
with a coreness of i is required. This is accomplished by utilizing some exist-
ing free nodes or some noisy free nodes that were generated in the previous
step. During the introduction of a unique inter-shell edge to create a shell
pair S(i, i), the attachment cost function (Costadd(u, v, Su, Sv)) is employed.
Costadd(u, v, Su, Sv) is given by
Costadd(u, v, Su, Sv) =
{
∞ if Su ≤ Sv
Costattach(u) otherwise
where Su is the shell number of a candidate vertex and Sv is shell num-
ber of the free node. The first part of the cost function Costadd(u, v, Su, Sv)
prohibits the attachment to higher core edges by assigning a cost of infin-
ity. The second part utilizes the cost function in Equation 10.2. For ex-
ample, consider the shell pair S(2, 2) in Figure 10.5 (Left) that exists only
once. Given that δ = 2, to anonymize S(2, 2), another shell pair S(2, 2) is
required. Any free node at a higher shell is a viable candidate node based
on Costadd(u, v, Su, Sv). Hence, nodes a, b, c, d which have a coreness of 3 are
candidate nodes. Since all are existing nodes and the preferential attachment
probabilities of a and c are greater (i.e., smallest costs), two noisy nodes are
attached to a and c to form another shell pair S(2, 2). This makes the shell
pair S(2, 2) 2-indistinguishable.
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Figure 10.5: Equal coreness but not at highest core.
The Create Equal-Noise algorithm is presented in Algorithm 10.5. The
set F of free nodes entails more free nodes in this scenario than in the case
of (min,max)-Noise creation. As two noisy nodes of coreness i have to be
added, |2 · (i− 1) ·m| free nodes are required. The two noisy nodes v and w
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with coreness i are created and connected to each other to establish a unique
inter-shell edge U (Line 6-7). Then, for each node (i.e., v and w), links to
|i−1| free nodes are created (Line 9-10). This guarantees that v and w reside
on shell Ci. This is repeated until m unique inter-shell edges are established.
The algorithm ends by returning the anonymized bucket b(i, i) (Line 13).
Anonymizing Shell Pair with Unequal coreness: This involves the anonymiza-
tion of shell pair S(cu, cv) where the coreness of u and v are not the same.
This is the most commonly encountered scenario. Let cbig and csmall denote
the nodes with the bigger and smaller coreness respectively. To anonymize
Algorithm 10.5: CREATE EQUAL-NOISE
Input: vulnerable inter-shell-bucket vb(i, i), number of missing unique
inter-shell edges m
Output: anonymized inter-shell-bucket b(i, i)
1 U ← unique inter-shell edges of vb(i, i)
2 m ← δ − |U |
3 F ← free PA-nodes with coreness > i
4 sort F in decreasing order with respect to preferential attachment
probability
5 while (m > 0) do
6 create noisy nodes v, w with coreness i
7 create an edge u = (v, w)
8 U ← U ∪ {u}
9 create |i− 1| edges from v to free PA-nodes from F with coreness
> i
10 create |i− 1| edges from w to free PA-nodes from F with coreness
> i
11 decrease m
12 endwhile
13 return anonymized inter-shell-bucket b(i, i)
such a shell pair, since anonymization is performed in a top-down manner,
there is a high probability that cbig has already been anonymized and the
goal is to anonymize the node with lower coreness. To make the shell pair
indistinguishable, (δ−1) nodes with csmall are required. The attachment cost
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function Costadd(u, v, Su, Sv) is utilized during the introduction of the new
edge. For example, consider the vulnerable shell pair S(2, 3) in Figure 10.6
(Left). Assume that δ = 2, another shell pair S(2, 3) has to be created. Since
in S(2, 3), csmall = 2 , a free node of coreness 2 is needed. In Figure 10.6
(Right), a, b, c, d are potential candidate free nodes, while i, j, h, f are ruled
out because they are allocated with a cost of infinity, since they are at a lower
shell. Among the potential free nodes, b and d have the lowest cost due to
their higher probabilities. Hence, g is attached to them to form another shell
pair S(2, 3). This situation is called at Line 5 in Algorithm 10.3. Algorithm
10.6 is utilized to anonymize such shell pairs. The first step is to find m free
nodes that have coreness j (Line 3). They are then sorted in a decreasing
order w.r.t their preferential attachment probabilities (Line 4). To create m
missing unique inter-shell edges, a noisy node v with coreness cv = i has
to be created (Line 6). Then, an edge from v to the node with the lowest
cost is established. This edge serves as the desired unique inter-shell edge u.
Hence, u is added to the set of unique inter-shell edges U . For v to reside
on shell Si, it is required that it has cv edges to free nodes. Therefore, v is
connected to |cv − 1| other free nodes with a coreness higher than j (Line
10). After m unique inter-shell edges have been created, the anonymized
shell pair bucket is returned (Line 13).
10.3.3 Node Anonymization
Node anonymization is accomplished in a straight forward manner by iterat-
ing over each shell and examining if there are at least k− 1 different vertices
with the same coreness. Like in Section 10.3.2, we utilized the attachment
cost to determine which candidate nodes have to be chosen. Then, the re-
quired amount of nodes are added to satisfy k-shell security.
10.4 Experiments
Experiments were conducted on a Microsoft HPC Cluster with 256GB RAM
and the algorithms were implemented in Java. To evaluate our (k,δ)-core
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Algorithm 10.6: CREATE (MIN,MAX)-NOISE
Input: vulnerable inter-shell-bucket vb(i, j), number of missing unique
inter-shell edges m
Output: anonymized inter-shell-bucket b(i, j)
1 U ← unique inter-shell edges of vb(i, j)
2 m ← δ − |U |
3 F ← free PA-nodes with coreness j
4 sort F in decreasing order with respect to preferential attachment
probability
5 while (m > 0) do
6 create noisy node v with coreness cv = i
7 create an edge u = (v, w) from v to the first free PA-node w ∈ F
8 U ← U ∪ {u}
9 remove w from F
10 create |cv − 1| edges to free PA-nodes with coreness > j
11 decrease m
12 endwhile
13 return output anonymized bucket b(i, j)
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Figure 10.6: Cores of different sizes.
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Figure 10.7: K-Core Decomposition of the DBLP network
Anonymity technique, we based our experimental analysis on four metrics:
(a) degree distribution; (b) clustering coefficient; (c) average shortest path
length and (d) percentage of added noise. In each of these measures, we
evaluate our technique on three real-world and two synthetic network datasets.
In addition, we compare our technique with a state-of-the-art work called k-
isomorphism [CFL10]. Throughout this section, we refer to the latter work
as K-Isomorphism.
Although the background knowledge of K-Isomorphism is based solely on
degree while ours uses both degree and coreness, we compare our technique
with K-Isomorphism because our work and K-Isomorphism aim at preventing
the inference of edges and nodes.
10.4.1 Experimental Datasets
We conducted our experiments with two types of synthetic datasets. These
include, the small-world network and scale-free network. Both synthetic
datasets were generated using the graphstream library. We generated a
small-world network that entails 100,000 nodes and 1.5 million edges. The
k-core decomposition of our synthetic small-world network comprises of 7
shells and has a highest coreness of 7. We created a scale-free network
with 100,002 nodes and 1,548,690 edges. The k-core decomposition of our
scale-free network consists of 22 shells and its maximum coreness is 22.
Furthermore, we evaluated our technique on the Live Journal, DBLP and
the Skitter real-world networks. All these real datasets are publicly avail-
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Parameters Nodes Edges Noise Nodes % Noise Edges % Runtime [sec]
Original 1696415 11095298 - - -
k = 5, δ = 5 1698938 11276687 0.148 % 1.608 % 122188
k = 10, δ = 10 1707218 11774248 0.632 % 5.766398 % 173914
k = 15, δ = 15 1718691 12400281 1.296 % 10.523 % 276216
k = 20, δ = 20 1731845 13096841 2.045 % 15.282 % 355140
Table 10.2: Anonymization of the AS-Skitter network.
able at the Stanford Large Network Dataset (SNAP) repository [sna13]. The
LiveJournal dataset consists of 4.8 million nodes and 69 million edges. We
utilized different subsets of the LiveJournal dataset to conduct specific ex-
periments. These subsets include, LiveJ-1 which has 100,000 nodes and
3,453,612 edges, LiveJ-2 consisting of 500,000 nodes and 10,311,517 edges,
and LiveJ-3 which comprises of 1 million nodes and 17.8 million edges. The
k-core decomposition of the LiveJ-1 dataset consists of 102 shell and has a
maximum coreness of 102.
DBLP is a computer science bibliography. We used all the 317,080 nodes
and 1,049,866 edges of the DBLP network. The number of shells and the
highest coreness of the decomposed DBLP network are 47 and 113 respec-
tively as illustrated in Figure 10.7 using the LaNet-vi tool [AHDBV05]. The
skitter network comprises of approximately 1.7 million nodes and 11 million
edges. Its k-core decomposition outputs 111 shells and the highest coreness
value is 111.
To evaluate the shortest path, we randomly choose 60,000 nodes for Live-
J3, 9512 for DBLP and 500 nodes for the others.
10.4.2 Evaluation on Datasets
Percentage of Noise: We evaluated the (k,δ)-core Anonymity algorithm on
the Skitter network with 1.7 million nodes for values of k and δ ranging from
5 to 20. The result which is illustrated in Table 10.2 demonstrates that less
than 2% of noisy nodes are injected. With regards to the synthetic datasets,
the percentage of nodes and edge added is far under 1%.
Generally, we observe that for higher k and δ, the amount of added
nodes and edges increases. This is because higher values of k and δ require
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((n)) Runtime Analysis.
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Figure 10.8: (k,δ)-core Anonymity Massive Network Anonymization Analy-
sis.
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Figure 10.9: (k,δ)-core Anonymity vs K-Isomorphism.
more nodes per shell and more unique inter-shell edges, hence more noise is
needed to ensure anonymity.
Degree Distribution (DD): Degree Distribution is the probability distribu-
tion of degrees over the whole network. Figures 10.8(a)-10.8(b) depict the
degree distribution after the anonymization of Live-J1 and Live-J3 for differ-
ent parametric settings. It can be seen that the degree distribution of each
anonymized data is similar to its corresponding original degree distribution.
The reason why our approach maintains the distribution of the original graph
can be credited to the use of preferential attachment during edge introduc-
tion. The DBLP, Skitter and scale-free networks follow the same pattern as
shown in Figure 10.8(c) - Figure 10.8(e). In general, (k,δ)-core Anonymity
preserves the degree distribution of networks.
Clustering Coefficient (CC): The clustering coefficient (Cv) of a vertex v
is the ratio between all possible edges kv to v and the actual number of
existing edges Ev. Specifically, Cv = 2Evkv(kv−1) . Figures 10.8(f) and 10.8(g)
show the clustering coefficient of LiveJ-2 and LiveJ-3 respectively. The fig-
ures show superior clustering coefficient results since the clustering coeffi-
cients of the anonymized networks are almost identical to those of the real
networks. This can be explained by the fact that the coreness of each node is
preserved during (k,δ)-core Anonymity - and as mentioned in [AHDBV05],
clustering is strongly correlated to coreness. We observe similar clustering
coefficient results for the Skitter, small-world and scale-free networks. With
regards to the clustering coefficient distribution for the DBLP, as depicted in
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Figure 10.8(h), we notice a higher node frequency for clustering coefficients
between 0.1 and 0.2, and between 0.4 and 0.6. However, these deviations
are small.
Shortest Path Length (SPL): The shortest path length between two
nodes is the minimal sum of the number of edges connecting the two nodes.
Figures 10.8(i) and 10.8(j) show the shortest path for LiveJ-1 and LiveJ-2
respectively. As k and δ increase, we observe a slight increase in the number
of shortest paths. This is because new nodes are introduced if k and δ in-
crease, prompting the creation of new paths which thus increase the number
of shortest paths.
The shortest path distribution for the Skitter network is depicted in Figure
10.8(k). For all parametric settings apart from k = δ = 20, the shortest path
lengths are similar to that of their corresponding original networks. How-
ever, for k = δ = 20, we observe a deviation from the original shortest path.
This is due to the fact that for k = δ = 20, shell pairs with very high core-
ness need to be anonymized. Anonymizing the highest shells creates noisy
nodes of high coreness that act as hubs. These hubs introduce new short-
cuts to the network, resulting in an increase in the number of shortest paths
between nodes. The shortest path length of the DBLP dataset also slightly
deviates from the shortest path length of its original network as δ increases,
as shown in Figure 10.8(l). Figure 10.8(m) shows that the shortest paths for
the small-world network matches that of its original network. In general, the
distribution of shortest path length is preserved.
Runtime on Massive Networks: Figure 10.8(n) shows the runtime of the
five datasets used. The Skitter network which consists of 1.7 million nodes
has the longest runtime, followed by LiveJ-3 with 1 million nodes. The run-
time of the other networks are also presented and it can be seen that (k,δ)-
core Anonymity has a good runtime on real and synthetic datasets.
Comparison with K-Isomorphism: We compare our technique with K-Iso-
morphism. We created two sub-networks called LiveJ-4 and LiveJ-5. LiveJ-4
consists of 5,000 nodes and 35694 edges while LiveJ-5 entails 20,000 nodes
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and 53,090 edges. K-Isomorphism could not run on a massive networks of
about 1 million nodes, hence we could not directly compare it with (k,δ)-core
Anonymity w.r.t network size. We experimented with k = 10 and δ = 10. K-
Isomorphism does not have the δ parameter. Our technique had a far better
runtime of 3 seconds while the runtime of K-Isomorphism is 7,205 seconds.
However, K-Isomorphism outperformed our technique w.r.t. percentage of
edges added for small networks. Figure 10.8(o) illustrates the degree distri-
bution of the anonymized LiveJ-5 network of both techniques. As shown in
Figure 10.8(o), our technique delivers better degree distribution results than
K-Isomorphism. Our experiments on LiveJ-4 reveal similar degree distribu-
tion results.
We also evaluated the clustering coefficient of both techniques and the
results are shown in Figure 10.9(a). Figure 10.9(a) shows that our tech-
nique performs better than K-Isomorphism. Figures 10.9(b) and 10.9(c) il-
lustrate the shortest path length. While our approach matches the original
distribution of both Live-J4 and Live-J5 networks, the shortest path length
of K-Isomorphism anoymized networks show a shift from that of the origi-
nal network. These figures demonstrate that our approach outperforms K-
Isormorphism in this measure also.
10.5 Conclusions
Most existing network anonymization techniques focus on the degree prop-
erty of graphs to ensure anonymity. In this chapter, we present, to the best of
our knowledge, the first network anonymization technique, which is based
on the k-core property of graphs rather than the degree. We introduce a
new attack model on degree anonymization and propose a novel resilient
network anonymization technique, which is geared for small and large net-
works. In addition, we demonstrated through rigorous experiments on five
datasets the effectiveness of our technique on small and massive networks
with millions of nodes and edges.
Chapter 11
Differential Private DBSCAN using
Binomial Distribution
The last chapter focused on ensuring privacy on small and massive networks.
Like network analysis, clustering is a tremendously important data mining
task that is widely leveraged in a broad variety of applications. DBSCAN
(Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Application with Noise) is a clustering
algorithm that is broadly used. Differential privacy is a privacy paradigm
that achieves privacy through data perturbation. In this chapter, we pro-
pose novel differential private DBSCAN algorithms that do not only privately
cluster data but also generate and publish differential private synthetic nu-
merical and categorical attributes values of the clustered points. We show
that the heuristic of private DBSCAN can be characterized as a binomial dis-
tribution process with a given probability to form new clusters. We utilize
this to craft two techniques that accomplish private clustering. They employ
the new notions of noisy density-reachability and noisy core points, respec-
tively. In addition, we propose a novel technique that utilizes an n-Order
Markov Chain to differential privately perturb categorical attributes, while
numerical attributes are distorted using a decomposed noisy covariance ma-
trix. We conduct numerous experiments on four real datasets and show that
our techniques produce superior clustering results with runtime complexities
similar to that of traditional DBSCAN.
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11.1 Motivation
A staggering amount of sensitive data is generated daily from a variety of
platforms. The publishing or sharing of sensitive data should ensure that the
privacy of an individual is not infringed. A wide range of privacy definitions
that are aimed at addressing this problem have been proposed. These include
differential privacy [Dwo06] and k-Anonymity [Swe02] . In this chapter,
we propose two novel differential private DBSCAN clustering algorithms, as
well as the first differential private numerical and categorical synthetic data
generation technique that is based on clustering.
Our differential private DBSCAN algorithms noisily group points by en-
suring that some points which do not truly belong to a cluster are noisily
inserted to the cluster and vice versa. Based on the resulting noisy clus-
ters, we then generate synthetic values of the clustered points to preserve
their confidentiality before publishing the noisily clustered data. Many large
database and data mining techniques internally use DBSCAN for class iden-
tification. Besides, there are situations whereby a person or an institution do
not have permission to view the original data but is required to perform a
database or data mining operation on the original data. Our technique can
be utilized to noisily cluster and release synthetic data for both scenarios.
Also, it can be employed for the clustering of medical records with sensitive
attribute(s). Furthermore, it will be beneficial to privately cluster and hide
the identity of the clustered data in a broad spectrum of domains ranging
from social media, location based services, telecommunication, national se-
curity to customer data analysis where DBSCAN is widely used.
Privacy Preserving Data Publishing: There are two ways to publish data
privately. These include the non-interactive approach and the interactive ap-
proach. During non-interactive data publishing, the data is first anonymized
and the anonymized data is then published, so that any data miner can have
a copy of the published anonymized data. Our differential private DBSCAN
clustering techniques release private data through the non-interactive data
publishing approach. Throughout this paper, unless specified otherwise, we
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refer to the existing non-private DBSCAN [EKSX96] as DBSCAN and our pro-
posed differential private DBSCAN as private DBSCAN.
11.1.1 Problem Definition
The output of a DBSCAN algorithm consists of a set C of one or more clusters
ci given by C = {c1, c2, · · · , ci} and sometimes, no cluster could be found.
Each cluster ci is a non-empty set that comprises of one or more points given
by ci = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} where n ≤ i. The main aim of this study is to
perform density-based clustering privately and release the synthetic values of
points in a manner that fulfills differential privacy as formalized in Definition
11.1.
Definition 11.1 (PROBLEM DEFINITION): Provide a non-interactive differen-
tial private data interface that releases private DBSCAN clustering results and
the synthetic values of points by ensuring that each ci ⊂ C which consists of syn-
thetic points ci = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} is built by a process that satisfies differential
privacy.
Our contributions can be divided into two main parts. First, the noisy group-
ing or clustering of points and secondly, the generation of synthetic data
of the clustered points. It is very challenging to infuse noise to a DBSCAN
clustering heuristic, whose primary goal is to discover clusters by separating
clusters from noise. Naively introducing noise to such a fragile density-based
clustering context will implode or destroy the arbitrary shapes of clusters.
To address this insidious problem, we show how the heuristic of DBSCAN
can be characterized as a binomial distribution process, and then link this
DBSCAN binomial probability to differential privacy to carefully craft two
private DBSCAN algorithms. Our first algorithm utilizes our novel notion
of noisy neighborhood distance, whereas for our second algorithm, we in-
troduce a new notion of noisy core points. Our second main contribution
focuses on private data publication. We propose a technique to generate nu-
meric data that utilizes points from a noisy cluster to derive a differential
private covariance output. The latter output is employed to build a covari-
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ance matrix which is decomposed by Singular Value Decomposition(SVD) to
produce an invertible matrix, which is used to create synthetic numeric data.
Moreover, to perturb categorical attributes, we propose a novel differential
private technique that utilizes an n-order Markov chain.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.1.2 focuses
on relevant related works while Section 11.2 briefly reviews DBSCAN. In
Section 11.3 and Section 11.4, we present the differential private clustering
techniques and the synthetic data generation techniques, respectively. Sec-
tion 11.5 discusses the results of the conducted experiments. We conclude
the chapter in Section 11.6.
11.1.2 Related Works
The foundation theories for differential privacy are provided in the following
works [Dwo06], [DMNS06], [NRS07] and [MT07]. Most of the research
works related to differential privacy are built on the these theories. Although
a bulk of recently mentioned studies focus on query output perturbation,
differential privacy is also utilized in other domains of data mining. For
instance, Mcsherry et al. [MM09] proposed a recommendation system that
satisfies differential privacy.
Some works that are similar to our work with respect to providing a pri-
vate data interface include PINQ [McS09]. PINQ is a robust interactive dif-
ferential private data interface that releases differential private outputs for
a wide variety of data mining tasks. [FS10] also proposed a private data
interface for the ID3 algorithm. [FFKN09] proposed a private coreset tech-
nique for k-median and k-mean queries that preserves differential privacy.
While private coresets can be utilized to create a differentially private clus-
tering algorithm, it can be utilized only for certain clustering heuristics such
as k-means clustering and k-median clustering. DBSCAN employs different
notions such as density-reachability and density-connectivity to cluster data.
A dedicated privacy scheme that adheres to the DBSCAN heuristic is required
to create differentially private DBSCAN clusters. Unlike [FFKN09], our work
focuses on such as DBSCAN driven privacy scheme.
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Other works that are related to this work in terms of clustering include
[BDN05] and [NRS07], which provide two differential private KMeans clus-
tering techniques. [AAYY04] proposed a technique to generate synthetic
data. Our work differs from theirs because ours is based on the differential
privacy paradigm. Some works that deals with the release of synthetic data
include [Jin11], [MCFY11]. [MCFY11] proposed a novel non-interactive
differential private publishing technique. While [MCFY11] focuses on data
publishing through classification, ours is based on data publishing through
clustering.
11.2 Preliminaries
We review some DBSCAN terminologies since it is utilized in this work.
11.2.1 DBSCAN Review
The DBSCAN[EKSX96] algorithm has the ability to discover arbitrary shaped
clusters. To perform DBSCAN clustering, the user is expected to input some
global parameters such as the radius about a point called the Eps-Radius and
the minimum number of points (denoted by MinPts) within the latter radius.
Definition 11.2 (EPS-NEIGHBORHOOD OF POINT p [EKSX96]): is the region
within an Eps-Radius of point p.
Definition 11.3 (CORE POINT [EKSX96]): is a point p whose number of
points within its Eps-Neighborhood is greater than or equal to the MinPts.
Definition 11.4 (BORDER POINT [EKSX96]): is a point that has fewer neigh-
boring points within its Eps-Neighborhood than the MinPts but is in the Eps-
Neighborhood of a Core Point.
Definition 11.5 (NOISE POINT [EKSX96]): is any point which is neither a
Core Point nor a Border Point.
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11.3 Private Clustering
The ability of DBSCAN to discover arbitrary shaped clusters in the midst of
noise is one of the most profound strength that makes DBSCAN superior to
other clustering algorithms. Like in the differentially private classification
[MCFY11], [FFKN09] and KMeans clustering [McS09] techniques, noise has
to be injected to guarantee differential privacy in DBSCAN. However, adding
Laplace noise is not as straight forward as one might think. In contrast, it
is quite challenging to add noise to a DBSCAN clustering heuristic. Naively
adding noise to a density-based clustering process will destroy the arbitrary
shaped clusters of DBSCAN, hence making most clustering results meaning-
less.
11.3.1 Data Utility and Private DBSCAN
Naive Private Clustering: A naive approach to perform private DBSCAN
will be to run the normal DBSCAN algorithm and then add Laplace noise to
the true count of the number of clusters produced. Based on our in-depth
study, unlike in other metric spaces, the sensitivity of DBSCAN Sdbs(f) cluster
count function is not 1. It is given by
Sdbs(f) =
{
N if MinPts = 0
N
MinPts
otherwise
despite of distribution of points in a dataset.
Proof 11.1 Let f(D) be the DBSCAN count function which represents the num-
ber of clusters generated when a dataset D is inputed into a DBSCAN algorithm
with minimum points MinPts. The minimum count of clusters min|f(D)| that
can possibly be produced is zero. On the other hand, the maximum count of
clusters max|f(D)| that can be produced is strongly influence by the distribu-
tion of points in the dataset. Irrespective of this distribution, the maximum
number of cluster is formed if each cluster accommodates exactly a threshold
number of points denoted by τ . This threshold number of points is related to
11.3. Private Clustering 207
MinPts. Only core points can form a new cluster. From DBSCAN theory, a
point q is a core point if i) NEps(p) > MinPts or ii) NEps(p) = MinPts.
Based on the DBSCAN definitions of MinPts and core point, the exact amount
of points required to form a new cluster is MinPts , hence τ = MinPts. Since
in order to create the maximum number of clusters, τ points are required per
cluster, thus, for a dataset with N points, the maximum number of clusters cre-
ated is N
τ
= N
MinPts
. In an exceptional case where MinPts = 0 and there are
N points in the dataset, it implies all points in the dataset are clusters since
NEps(p) > MinPts. Hence,
Sdbs(f) =
{
N if MinPts = 0
N
MinPts
otherwise
This completes the proof.
This is very high and leads to very high noise. Hence, we address the
private clustering problem at a granular level using an algorithm presented
in Section 11.3.2 and Section 11.3.4. At the granular level, we portray an
operation in the DBSCAN heuristic as a function and make the operation
probabilistic by releasing differential private outputs of the latter function.
We formalize the definition of 	-differential privacy for the DBSCAN set-
ting as follows.
Definition 11.6 (	-DIFFERENTIAL DBSCAN CLUSTER PRIVACY): Given that a
dataset consists of n points, a randomized clustering algorithm A provides 	-
differential privacy, if for every iteration over the points, and for any two input
sets of points D1 and D2 that differ on at most one single point due to the
removal or insertion of a point, and all possible output di of a function f which
crucially decides if a point should be assigned to a cluster ci,
Pr[A(f(D1)) ∈ di] ≤ exp(	) · Pr[A(f(D2)) ∈ di]
where the probability depends on the randomness of A.
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Simply put, Definition 11.6 states that given a dataset consisting of n
points, di is iteratively computed for each point and utilized to probabilisti-
cally determine which cluster ci from the set of clusters C to assign a point
to. For our first algorithm, the function f of the randomized mechanism A is
the neighborhood distance query function. f corresponds to the count query
function in our second algorithm. Also, each di corresponds to the differ-
entially private output of the neighborhood distance query function and the
count query function in both algorithms.
The rest of Section 11.3 is chronologically organized as follows. Prior to
the introduction of our proposed private DBSCAN algorithm, we first high-
light the relationship between DBSCAN, the binomial distribution and dif-
ferential privacy in Section 11.3.2. This relationship provides important in-
sights on how private DBSCAN fulfills differential privacy. Next, in Section
11.3.2 and Section 11.3.4, we present two novel differentially private DB-
SCAN techniques. Finally, in Section 11.3.5, we utilize the aforementioned
relationship between DBSCAN and the binomial distribution that was framed
in Section 11.3.2 to theoretically show that our private DBSCAN approach is
differentially private.
11.3.2 Private DBSCAN through Noisy Density-Reachability
In this study, we evaluate if private DBSCAN satisfies differential privacy from
two perspectives. We commence by introducing two terms that are utilized
in the remaining sections of this chapter to examine if differential privacy is
guaranteed from each of these perspectives. They include, Differential Pri-
vacy at a Granular Level and Differential Privacy at a Higher Level.
Differential Privacy at a Granular Level: refers to a scenario whereby prim-
itive neighborhood distance query or primitive count query perturbation is
employed during each private DBSCAN iteration for the determination of
core points, which play a pivotal role in the synthesis of clusters. We term
the privacy guarantee (when using the neighborhood distance or count oper-
ation) at this granular perspective as Differential Privacy at a Granular Level.
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Differential Privacy at a Higher Level: As alluded in Section 11.1, the final
output of a DBSCAN or private DBSCAN algorithm entails a set of clusters C
given by C = {c1, c2, · · · , ci} or C = ∅ where ci corresponds to cluster i and
i > 0. Assume that a private DBSCAN algorithm produces a set of cluster
given by C at its output. Then, the total number of clusters (or count of clus-
ters) generated at the output of the private DBSCAN algorithm is therefore
|C|. We refer to this final number of clusters |C| produced by the private
DBSCAN as the output at the Higher Level. We denote the term Differential
Privacy at a Higher Level to refer to a situation or perspective by which differ-
ential privacy is satisfied with respect to the final number of output clusters.
We should note that the number of private clusters |C| or members of pri-
vate cluster ci ∈ C strongly depends on the granular primitive neighborhood
distance or count query operations.
In this chapter, we propose a private DBSCAN algorithm, which focuses
at the granular level to ensure differential privacy using the primitive neigh-
borhood distance and count operations. However, one of our prime objective
is that this granular process should also satisfy differential privacy in terms
of the clustering output at the higher level. Towards this end, in this section,
we articulate the statistical relationship between DBSCAN and the binomial
distribution. In particular, we theoretically show that a randomized DBSCAN
is a binomial process. Armed with this knowledge, we will proof in the next
sections that our private DBSCAN algorithm is crafted such that the ratio of
the output (binomial) probabilities satisfy differential privacy at the granular
and higher level.
DBSCAN and its Binomial Probabilities: DBSCAN builds clusters by em-
ploying the notions of density-reachability. Our private DBSCAN algorithm
characterizes DBSCAN as a binomial distribution process. It couples these bi-
nomial probabilities with the DBSCAN notion of density-reachability to build
noisy clusters, which satisfy differential privacy at the granular and higher
level. Density-reachability can be best articulated by first defining the notion
of directly-density-reachable.
Definition 11.7 (DIRECT DENSITY-REACHABILITY [EKSX96]): A point p is
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said to be directly density reachable from a point q if p lies in the Eps-neighborhood
of q and q is a core point.
Definition 11.8 (NEIGHBORHOOD DISTANCE): is the Euclidean or Manhattan
distance between two neighboring points.
Definition 11.9 (DENSITY-REACHABILITY [EKSX96]): A point p is density
reachable from a point q if there exist a chain of points X = {p1, p2, · · · , pn}
where n, i ∈ N , p = pn, q = p1 , and every pi+1 is directly density reachable
from pi.
A binomial distribution fulfills the following criteria. First, there exist a
series of independent trials. Secondly, each trial can be a success or a failure,
and the probability of success is equal for each trial. Finally, the number
of trials is finite. A noisy DBSCAN heuristic iteratively moves from point
to point. During each independent iteration (trial), it assesses and decides
if a point can form a brand new cluster (success) or no new cluster is cre-
ated (failure) depending on its density-reachability and density-connectivity
[EKSX96].
We stress that, while the success probability of a point to form a brand
new cluster in traditional DBSCAN depends on the data distribution, MinPts
and Eps-Radius, in this work, to form private DBSCAN clusters, random noise
is introduced to the neighborhood distance and count queries to determine
if a point joins or forms a brand new cluster (as will be discussed in this
section and Section 11.3.4). Due to this randomness from noise, the exact
probability of a point to form a new cluster is indeterministic (like tossing
a coin) and it is independent to the data distribution and DBSCAN settings.
Thus, the success probability of a point to join or form a brand new cluster
is equal. For example, during each independent noisy DBSCAN iteration of a
point p, the algorithm decides:
1. if p starts a brand new cluster (success).
2. if p joins an existing cluster provided it is a core point or border point.
This means p grows existing cluster but no brand new cluster is created
(failure).
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3. if p is a noise point (failure).
These decisions or criteria are portrayed in Figure 11.1. Hence, each noisy
DBSCAN iteration (i.e., trial) can be a success or a failure and the probabil-
ity of success for each iteration is equal. In addition, the number of noisy
DBSCAN iterations is finite. Thus, given that a noisy DBSCAN heuristic un-
dergoes n iterations and the success probability to create a new cluster is
denoted as S, then the probability of the event that k new clusters are suc-
cessfully created is given by the binomial distribution in Equation 11.1.
P (Xcluster = k) =
(
n
k
)
· Sk · (1− S)n−k (11.1)
Thus, Xcluster ∼ B(n, S) where Xcluster is the number of successfully cre-
ated brand new cluster(s).
Figure 11.1: Privacy Setting: Randomized Mechanism iteratively and proba-
bilistically assign points to clusters.
Differential Private DBSCAN Heuristic: Our first differential private
DBSCAN algorithm utilizes the settings shown in Figure 11.1. When the
differential private DBSCAN randomized algorithm A independently iterates
from point to point, it probabilistically makes a decision if a point starts a
brand new cluster (success) or join a existing cluster (failure) or is consid-
ered a noise (failure). The DBSCAN binomial distribution in Equation 11.1
represents the output probability that a DBSCAN heuristic successfully out-
puts k clusters after n independent iterations. We extend Equation 11.1 to a
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conditional binomial distribution so that the input dataset is taken into con-
sideration. Equation 11.2 depicts the probability that k clusters are created
at the output if dataset D1 is utilized. This implies, if another dataset D2
which differs from D1 by a single record is used as the input of a DBSCAN
randomized algorithm A, then its conditional binomial distribution is given
by P (Xcluster = k|D=D2).
P (Xcluster = k|D=D1) =
(
n
k
)
· S (D1)k · (1− S (D1))n−k (11.2)
In terms of the number of clusters produced at the output after the granu-
lar processing using this algorithm, the ratio of these binomial probabilities
satisfy differential privacy if
P (Xcluster = k|D=D1)
P (Xcluster = k|D=D2)
≤ exp(	) (11.3)
We show in Section 11.3.5 that this condition is satisfied.
To ensure that the ratio of the binomial probabilities in Equation 11.3 are
unbounded, our first algorithm employs the two conditions of direct density-
reachability at the granular as described in Definition 11.7.
Explicitly put, during each independent iteration of private DBSCAN clus-
tering, the randomized algorithm A ensures differential privacy through the
perturbation of the neighborhood distances between a point and other points
with carefully calibrated Laplace noise to produce noisy neighborhood dis-
tances. These differential private neighborhood distances are compared to
the eps-radius to determine the number of Eps-neighbors of a point. If the
latter number is greater or equals to the MinPts, then the point is labeled
as a core point. Core points are assigned to clusters or can form brand new
clusters. A noisy neighborhood distance output will yield noisy values which
are higher or lower than the original neighborhood distance. This might
prompt a core point to become a non-core point and vice-versa. And this will
subsequently affect the clustering results.
In extreme scenario whereby the number of points N in the dataset is less
than MinPts, the algorithm becomes deterministic and can break differen-
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tial privacy at the higher level. In such a scenario, the noisy reachability dis-
tance computation is randomly performed an additional MinPts−N times,
and each additional noisy neighborhood distance is compared to the eps-
radius during core point determination. Since the number of noisy distance
versus eps-radius comparisons are equals to MinPts, there is a non-zero
probability that core points (i.e., clusters) could be formed. On the down-
side, this will increase the privacy budget cost.
11.3.3 Sensitivity of Neighborhood Distance Function
DBSCAN Global Sensitivity: Our query is the neighborhood distance func-
tion f . Given that D is the set of all databases, such that u ∈ D, the global
sensitivity of our neighborhood distance function Sdr(f) is
Sdr(f) = max‖u,u′‖1≤1
|f(u)− f(u′)| (11.4)
for all u, u′ that differ in at most one entry. Hence, the DBSCAN global
sensitivity corresponds to the maximum difference between the values that
the neighborhood distance function f may take on a pair of databases that
differ in one single entry.
DBSCAN Local Sensitivity: We noticed that for many neighboring adja-
cent databases u and u′, the neighborhood distance query function f is not
very sensitive (i.e., |f(u)− f(u′)| is quite small). We provide an optional ad-
ditional sensitivity called local sensitivity [NRS07], which can be employed
to reduce the amount of noise added. For a private DBSCAN settings, we
compute the local sensitivity at the Eps-Neighborhood of the processed points.
Specifically, unlike the DBSCAN global sensitivity that considers the worst
case over inputs from all combination of adjacent databases, the DBSCAN
local sensitivity considers the database instance u of an Eps-Neighborhood.
The local sensitivity LSf (u) of the neighborhood distance query function f
at an Eps-Neighborhood with database u is given by
LSf (u) = max u
′ |f(u)− f(u′)| (11.5)
Noisy Density-Reachability Algorithm: The noisy reachability algorithm
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(Algorithm 1) adopts the traditional DBSCAN heuristic but performs certain
primitive operations in a differential private manner. Line 5 determines the
global sensitivity using Equation 11.4. Optionally, the local sensitivity can
be used. In that case, the database instance has to be inputed to Equation
11.5. For brevity, the local sensitivity procedure was not shown in Algorithm
1, since we assume the description in Section 11.3.3 might suffice. Detailed
discussion on how the global and local sensitivities are derived are described
in Section 11.3.3. The algorithm continues by choosing an arbitrary point. It
then computes (Line 19 - 25) the differential private neighborhood distance
and utilizes it to probabilistically determine if a point is a core point, border
point or noise (Line 11 - 18). The resulting core points and border points
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build clusters like in the traditional DBSCAN heuristic. We should note that
mostly the privacy extensions of Algorithm 1 are highlighted.
Privacy Analysis: The recently described private DBSCAN technique is dif-
ferential private.
Theorem 11.1 Algorithm 1 is α-differential private.
Proof 11.2 Let N denote the number of points in the dataset. As the noisy
reachability algorithm iterates recursively, it performs range queries to deter-
mine the number of points located in a point’s Eps-neighborhood. In each
range query call, the algorithm performs N neighborhood distance computa-
tions. Each neighborhood distance query computation adds Laplace noise of
Lap (Sdr(f)/α). Based on the principle of sequential composition, the amount
of noise added for a single range query call is N ·Lap (Sdr(f)/α). In accordance
to Theorem 2.1, a total privacy of N · (Sdr(f)/α) is required for a single range
query call. Assuming the algorithm makes Ω range query calls after the private
DBSCAN completes, the total privacy cost is given by Ω ·N · (Sdr(f)/α). There-
fore if an overall privacy budget of β is provided, for α = Ω ·N · (Sdr(f)/β), the
private DBSCAN clustering algorithm given by Algorithm 1 is α-differentially
private.
11.3.4 Private DBSCAN by Noisy Eps-Neighbors
Noisy Core Points: We consider the binomial probabilities to form brand
new clusters in the noisy Eps-neighborhood algorithm also. DBSCAN deter-
mines core points by counting the number of points in the Eps-neighborhood
of a point. It then compares the count with the MinPts. If the count is greater
or equal to the MinPts, that point is considered as a core point and will be
part of a cluster. We refer to this count as the “real count”. Our second
algorithm taps into this count operation performed by DBSCAN during the
determination of core points. We provide a differential private variant of this
count operation called noisy eps-neighbor count, and employ it for the deter-
mination of differential private noisy core points. If a point which was not a
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Algorithm 2: Noisy Eps-Neighborhood DBSCAN
1 · · ·
2 procedure expandNoisyCoreCluster(p,  )
3 epsRadiusP ts ← regionQuery(p, Eps);
4 nEpsPoints ← noisyNeighbors(epsRadiusP ts, );
5 pointType ← getType(nEpsPoints, MinPts);
6 if( pointType is corePoint or borderPoint )
7 addToCluster(p) ;
8 else { p ← Noise; return: false; }
9 end procedure
10 procedure noisyNeighbors(EpsPts, )
11 Input: Set of Points EpsPts, 
12 Output: differential private eps-neighbor count
13 noisyNNCount ← 0 ;
14 realEpsNN ← getSizeOfNN(EpsPts) ;
15 S(fcount) ← 1 ;
16 noisyNNCount ← realEpsNN+ Lap( 1 );
17 return: noisyNNCount ;
18 end procedure
core point becomes a core point (i.e., noisy core point) due to the addition of
noise, then any point (whose Eps-neighborhood possesses lesser points than
MinPts) in the Eps-neighborhood of the noisy core point is called a noisy
border point. Noisy eps-neighbor counts are computed by adding calibrated
Laplace noise to the real count of points in an Eps-neighborhood.
Sensitivity of Count Function: Since we are involved in counting the num-
ber of points within an Eps-neighborhood, the sensitivity is 1.
Noisy Eps-Neighborhood Algorithm: This private DBSCAN algorithm also
preserves some parts of the DBSCAN heuristic. For brevity, Line 1 of Al-
gorithm 2 is exactly like Line 1 - 10 of Algorithm 1 but calls a different
procedure at Line 8. It starts by visiting an arbitrary point. It performs
a count query on the number of eps-neigbors located at the point’s Eps-
neighborhood. Laplace noise is then added to create a differential private
count query output (Line 10 - 18), which is used to determine noisy core
points or border points. The noisy core points and noisy border points be-
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come part of the cluster while noise points are labeled as noise (Line 6 - 8).
Privacy Analysis: The noisy count algorithm satisfies differential privacy.
Theorem 11.2 Algorithm 2 is β-differential private.
Proof 11.3 The procedure (Line 10-18) injects Laplace noise of Lap
(
1

)
to the
true count of the eps-neighbors. Each round of Laplace noise injection guaran-
tees 	-differential privacy. Assume the algorithm performs checks for core points
T times, it implies the total privacy cost of adding Laplace noise is T · 	. There-
fore if the overall privacy level is β, for 	 = T · β, Algorithm 2 is β-differentially
private.
11.3.5 Privacy Analysis of Output Number of Clusters
We presented two differential private algorithms at Section 11.3.2 and Sec-
tion 11.3.4. In each case, differential privacy was satisfied at a granular level
in terms of the output of the neighborhood distance function and the output
of the count function, respectively. A boon of these algorithms is that their
heuristics also ensure that the number of clusters k successfully created at the
output (Line 3 of Algorithm 1) after n iterations is also differential private.
We proof this by computing the bounds of the private DBSCAN binomial
probabilities.
Theorem 11.3 Given two datasets D1 and D2 that differ by one entry, assum-
ing that D1 requires n iterations while D2 needs m iterations to produce k
clusters at the output of Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2,∏w
i=0 (n− k + w − i)∏w
i=0 (n+ w − i)
·
(
n+ w
n
)k
·
(
1− k/n
1− k/n+ w
)n−k
· 1
(1− k/n+ w)w ≤ exp(	)
where w = m− n , {m,n} ∈ N , w ∈ Z and k ∈ Z≥0
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Proof 11.4 The addition or removal of a point to form D2 might lead to more
or less iterations. Also the success probability S = k/n. Hence, the number
of additional or reduced iteration w is given by w = m − n. ⇒ m = n + w.
Substituting m = n+ w in Equation 11.3,
P (X = k|D=D1)
P (X = k|D=D2)
=
n!
k!(n−k)! ·( kn)
k·(1− kn)
n−k
m!
k!(m−k)! ·( km)
k·(1− km)
m−k =
=
n!
k!(n−k)! · (k/n)k · (1− k/n)n−k
n+w!
k!(n+w−k)! · (k/n+ w)k · (1− k/n+ w)n+w−k
(11.6)
Note that Equation 11.3 is never unbounded because even if S is 0, then intu-
itively, k will be 0. Hence, (k/n)k = 00 = 1. Besides, private DBSCAN will never
have zero iteration. Hence m > 0 and n > 0. However, ∀k = 0, 0! = 1. Since
(1− k/n+ w)n+w−k = (1− k/n+ w)n−k (1− k/n+ w)w,
Substituting into Equation 11.6,
=
n!
k!(n−k)! ·(k/n)k·(1−k/n)n−k
n+w!
k!(n+w−k)! ·(k/n+w)k·(1−k/n+w)n−k·(1−k/n+w)w
=
( n!k!(n−k)!)
( (n+w)!k!(n+w−k)!)
(
( kn)
( kn+w)
)k (
( kn+w)
(1− kn+w)
)n−k
1
(1− kn+w)
w
=
( n!k!(n−k)!)
( (n+w)!k!(n+w−k)!)
(
n+w
n
)k ( 1− k
n
1− k
n+w
)n−k
1
(1− kn+w)
w
Let θ =
( n!k!(n−k)!)
( (n+w)!k!(n+w−k)!)
. Mathematically,
(n+ w)! =
w∏
i=0
(n+ w − i)n! (11.7)
Let x = n− k, using Equation 11.7,
(n+ w − k)! = (n− k + w)! = (x+ w)! =∏wi=0 (x+ w − i) x!
Hence,
(n+ w − k)! =
w∏
i=0
(n− k + w − i) (n− k)! (11.8)
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Substituting Equation 11.7 and Equation 11.8 in θ,
θ =
( n!k!(n−k)!)( ∏w
i=0
(n+w−i)n!
k!·∏w
i=0
(n−k+w−i)(n−k)!
)
=
(
n!
k!(n−k)!
)
·
∏w
i=0(n−k+w−i)(n−k)!k!∏w
i=0(n+w−i)n!
=
∏w
i=0(n−k+w−i)∏w
i=0(n+w−i)
Substituting θ,
P (X = k|D=D1)
P (X = k|D=D2)
=
∏w
i=0 (n− k + w − i)∏w
i=0 (n+ w − i)
·
(
n+ w
n
)k
·
(
1−k/n
1−k/n+w
)n−k
· 1
(1−k/n+w)w (11.9)
Let Ψ =
(
n+w
n
)k , Δ = ( 1−k/n
1−k/n+w
)n−k
, Σ = 1
(1−k/n+w)w . Ψ is a very small
fractional number since n + w − i > n − k + w − i. Because the number of
DBSCAN iterations n linearly increases with the data size, n > k and in most
cases far greater. Hence, Δ is also a very small fractional number. As shown, Σ
is also a fractional number that get even smaller as w increases while Δ might
be greater than 1. For the worst case scenario where k = n, the upper bound of
Equation 11.4 converges to 1. Thus, even for smallest 	,
⇒ P (X = k|D=D1)
P (X = k|D=D2)
= θ ·Ψ ·Δ · Σ ≤ exp(	)
Hence, ∏w
i=0 (n− k + w − i)∏w
i=0 (n+ w − i)
·
(
n+ w
n
)k
·
(
1− k/n
1− k/n+ w
)n−k
· 1
(1− k/n+ w)w ≤ exp(	)
This completes the proof.
Theorem 11.3 stipulates that the noisy number of clusters outputted (at
the higher level) by Algorithm 1 is differentially private.
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11.4 Synthetic Data Generation
Our objective is to protect the confidentiality of all clustered points before
data publication. We address this by distorting the original attribute values
of each point in such a way that their underlying statistical properties are
preserved. In addition, we ensure that the correlations between attributes
are maintained.
Differential Private Numeric Data Generation: To maintain the corre-
lations between attributes, we employ the covariance measure. Points from
each private DBSCAN clusters are utilized as input during the determination
of covariances. The covariance of two attributes x and y for a given cluster
is given by
Cov (x, y) = E [(x− μx) (y − μy)] = E (xy)− E (x)E (y) (11.10)
where μx and μy are the mean of x and y respectively.
Covariance Sensitivity: To produce differential private outputs of the
covariance function Cov (x, y), noise is added based on the sensitivity of the
covariance function. At times, the magnitude of the covariance may be quite
large leading to very high sensitivity. Hence, to keep the sensitivity low, we
bound the covariance based on the intuition of the covariance measure. In
statistics, the term x− μx in Equation 11.10 is known as the deviation score
of x. The sum of cross-products of the deviation scores reveals how two
attributes vary. For example, assume that x = age and y = salary, if the
sum of the cross-product of their deviation score is positive, it implies high
age is associated with high salary and vice-versa if it is negative. Intuitively,
since such information from the deviation scores is enough to understand
the dependency of two attributes, to reduce the sensitivity, we stabilize the
covariance through normalization. The normalization constant (ϑ) is given
by ϑ = Max|x ∪ y| where x = {x1, x2, · · · , xm} , y = {y1, y2, · · · , ym} and
xi and yi are the i-th attribute value of attribute x and y respectively. The
normalized covariance entry is given by
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Cov(x, y) = Cov(x, y)/ϑ
The usage of ϑ dilutes the effect of the highest attribute value while pre-
serving the association between two attributes. Besides, it lowers the sensi-
tivity bounds. The lowered sensitivity of the covariance is given by
Scov(f) = max‖D1,D2‖1≤1
|fCov(D1)− fCov(D2)| (11.11)
Laplace noise of Lap(Scov(f)

) is then added to the true covariance of each x,y
pair to create noisy differential private outputs. A noisy covariance matrix
M is created by populating each x,y attribute entry of the covariance matrix
with its corresponding differential private covariance value.
Numeric Data Generation: Given that a noisy cluster consists of a set of
points C = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} and each point Pi has m-attributes represented
by Pi = {p1i , p2i , · · · , pmi }. Let the value of attribute pji be denoted by vji and
the attribute values of a point Pi be given by Vi = {v1i , v2i , · · · , vmi }. Given
the original values Vi of point Pi and the noisy covariance matrix M , our
goal is to derive an invertible matrix B (since M = B · BT ) which can be
used with Vi and the mean values of each of the attributes to generate a
new synthetic numeric data. We derive this invertible matrix using the noisy
covariance matrix. All eigenvalues of the noisy covariance matrix are non-
negative, hence it is positive semidefinite. Since the noisy covariance matrix
is a real symmetric matrix, we perform Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
of the noisy covariance matrix
M = U ·D · UT (11.12)
where D is the diagonal matrix and its diagonals are the eigenvalues of the
noisy covariance matrix. Besides, all its diagonals are positive. Hence, Equa-
tion 11.12 can be represented as
M =
(
U ·D 12
)
·
(
D
1
2 · UT
)
= B · BT (11.13)
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This means B = U · D 12 . Finally, for each point Pi whose numeric original
attribute values is a set of values Vi, we generate its corresponding set of
synthetic values Vi by solving the linear algebra Vi = B · Vi + E, where
E = {μ1, μ2 · · ·μm} is a vector of the mean of each attribute.
Privacy Analysis: Laplace noise of Lap(Scov(f)

) is required to perturb a
single correlation between two numeric attributes. Given that there exist
Λ numeric attributes, the total amount of noise required to create a noisy
covariance matrix is given by
Bnum = Λ · Lap(Scov(f)
	
) (11.14)
We should note that numeric synthetic data could be generated using
the true covariance matrix. However, our approach which adds noise to the
covariances based on differential privacy introduces more uncertainty, which
makes it difficult for an adversary to infer the original attribute values.
Differential Private Categorical Data Generation: We address the prob-
lem of hiding the confidentiality of a categorical attribute value while main-
taining its correlation using an n-order Markov chain. For instance, assume
that a point consists of three attributes, namely, gender, occupation and coun-
try. Also, given that the occupation is secretary and the country is england,
to determine the synthetic value of the gender, such a problem can be con-
sidered as a prediction problem and the task is to predict the gender with an
accuracy which is influenced by perturbation as depicted in Figure 11.2.
Figure 11.2: Chain Probability.
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Given that each categorical attribute pji has a set of discrete values Vj ={
v1j , v
2
j , · · · , vhj
}
where h is finite and can be different for each categorical
attribute. The state of the Markov chain corresponds to the categorical at-
tribute value (vij) of the different attributes. Besides, the order of the Markov
chain is the number of categorical attributes (i.e., m).
Example: Given a point P1 with categorical attributes
pm1 = {gender, occupation, country}, then p11 is the gender and its discrete val-
ues V1 = {female,male}. Assuming that the attribute values of occupation
and country are V2 = {secretary, physicist, banker} and V3 = {usa, canada},
respectively, then the states of the Markov chain are given by
S = {female,male, secretary, physicist, banker, usa, canada} with order 3.
Transition Matrix: The relationship between two categorical attributes
is preserved by the transition matrix during categorical data generation. We
create an h × h transition matrix T using the categorical attribute values
(states) from all attributes. Each entry in the transition matrix is termed the
transition probability Tx,y, where x and y are states. We derive the transition
probability Tx,y by considering the transition of an attribute value x to all
other attribute values. Specifically, for each attribute value x, the frequency
of occurrence from x to all other attribute values are determined. Then the
transition probability of an attribute value x (state x) to another attribute
value y (state y) is given by
Tx,y =
Count (x ∗ y)∑h
i=0Count (x ∗ y)
(11.15)
where x ∗ y denotes the occurrence of x and y.
Noisy Transition Matrix: The count function is used to derive the transi-
tion probabilities of the transition matrix. We create a noisy transition matrix
by utilizing differential private outputs of the count function. The sensitivity
of the count function is 1. Laplace noise derived from the latter sensitivity
is added to the real count of the occurrence of the x ∗ y attribute values.
This differential private noisy count is used in Equation 11.15 to compute
the noisy transition probability. We should note that the resulting noisy tran-
sition matrix is also a stochastic matrix.
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Marginal Probability: Given that an attribute pji consists of a discrete set
of attribute values Vj =
{
v1j , v
2
j , · · · , vhj
}
, the marginal probability of attribute
value v1j is derived using its the frequency of occurrence and this is given by
Mv1j =
Count
(
v1j
)∑h
i=0Count
(
v1j
) (11.16)
Noisy Marginal Probability: The count function whose sensitivity is 1
is also utilized to derive the marginal probability of an attribute value. We
create a differential private output of the count function in Equation 11.16
to produce noisy marginal probabilities for each attribute and utilize them
during prediction.
Categorical Data Generation: To estimate the categorical attribute, we
utilize the noisy transition matrix and noisy marginal probability of the at-
tribute we intend to predict. All attribute values of the attribute to be pre-
dicted are considered a candidate states. To avoid predictor bias, we reduce
the influence of the noisy marginal probability through normalization. A nor-
malized noisy marginal probability τ (x) is given by τ (x) = Mx/h where h
is the number of states. Let TPy be the total transition probability from the
starting state of the Markov chain to a candidate state y and it is given by
TPy =
∑m
b=0 P (b, y) where b is a state in the path to y, P (b, y) is the tran-
sition probability from b to y, and m is the order of the Markov chain. We
utilize the noisy transition matrix to compute the total transition probability
to all candidate states. The total probability P ytotal to candidate state y (i.e.,
an attribute value y) is given by P ytotal = τ (y) + TPy . The predicted state
(attribute value) is the candidate state with the highest total probability .
Privacy Analysis: Noise of Lap(1

) is required to perturb each transition
probability entry. Given that there exist Φ states, Laplace noise of Φ · Lap(1

)
is needed to build a noisy transition matrix. Also, Laplace noise of Lap(1

) is
utilized to perturb the marginal probability of the attribute to be predicted.
Hence, the cost of privacy required to estimate one categorical attribute is
Lap(1

)+Φ·Lap(1

). We should note that the noisy transition matrix is created
only once and can then be used to predict different attribute values. Hence,
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assuming that a point consists of Γ attributes, the cost of privacy to perturb
all attributes of the point is Γ·Lap(1

)+Φ·Lap(1

). And if there areH clustered
points, the final total cost of privacy for perturbing the categorical attributes
of the points is given by:
Bcat = H · Γ · Lap(1
	
) + Φ · Lap(1
	
) (11.17)
Overall Privacy Analysis for Private DBSCAN: Using the sequential com-
position theory, the total privacy budget required to generate synthetic data
(Bsyn) by our technique is determined using Equation 11.14 and Equation
11.17.
Bsyn = Bnum +Bcat
Finally, the general overall cost of privacy to cluster and perturb data is the
sum of the total privacy budget of any of our proposed private clustering
algorithms and Bsyn.
11.5 Experiments
11.5.1 Experimental Evaluation
Our experiments were implemented in WEKA and performed on a Microsoft
HPC Cluster with 250GB RAM. To evaluate our differential private clustering
and synthetic data generation algorithms, we based our experimental anal-
ysis on three major aspects. 1) The cluster quality of our private clustering
algorithms 2) Data utility of the generated numeric synthetic data 3) Markov
chain prediction accuracy of the generated synthetic data.
In each of these aspects, we compare our technique with some state-
of-the-art works. They include, the differential private KMeans clustering
algorithm proposed by [McS09], and the condensation technique proposed
by [AAYY04]. Throughout this section, we will refer to these previous works
as PINQ and CONDENSE, respectively. Since there are no existing differential
private density-based clustering techniques, we cannot compare our results
with other works in this domain.
Datasets: We conducted our experiments on four real datasets. Namely,
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Figure 11.3: Evaluation of the differential private DBSCAN Cluster.
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the Adult dataset∗, Cleve heart disease dataset†, Credit Screening dataset ‡
and KDDCup network intrusion dataset §. We utilized all the 48842 records
and 14 attributes of the adult dataset whereas 16 attributes from the credit
screening dataset was used. Also, we used 6 attributes from the Cleve dataset
and 5 attributes from the network intrusion dataset.
11.5.2 Cluster Quality Analysis
Since the major goal of this study is to provide a private version of DBSCAN,
we focus more on the privacy settings of the privacy level 	. Specifically,
for all datasets, we conduct our experiments with 20 values of 	 ranging
from 0 < 	 ≤ 2.5. For the adult dataset, we experimented with a DBSCAN
settings of MinPt = 5 and Eps − Radius = 0.13, while MinPt = 5 and
Eps − Radius = 0.4 was used for the credit screening dataset. In contrast,
we used an Eps − Radius = 0.04 and MinPt = 5 for the network intru-
sion dataset, whereas a DBSCAN configuration of Eps − Radius = 0.13 and
MinPt = 5 was employed for the Cleve dataset. We evaluate the quality of
our private DBSCAN clustering results using standard clustering evaluation
metrics. These include the accuracy and the F1-measure. In particular, we
accomplish this by using a traditional DBSCAN algorithm as the ground truth
and then compare the results of the private clustering algorithms to it.
Accuracy: Figure 11.3(a) - Figure 11.3(c) depict the accuracies of our
algorithms and that of PINQ. We observe that the accuracies for the noisy
eps-neighborhood algorithm is extremely high for even low values of 	 for all
datasets. Specifically, the accuracy of adult, credit screening, cleve and net-
work intrusion datasets range between 0.995 and 1 as 	 increases. This high
values are caused by the fragile nature of the eps-neighborhood, since if one
core point becomes a non-core point due the addition of noise, this can have
a ripple effect that can lead to the implosion of a cluster. However, we notice
that the accuracies of our noisy algorithms slightly increases as 	 increases as
∗http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
†http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Heart+Disease
‡http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Japanese+Credit+Screening
§http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
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expected. In contrast, the accuracy of the noisy reachability algorithm with
local sensitivity increases steadily with increase in 	 as theoretically expected
for all datasets as depicted in Figure 11.3(a) - Figure 11.3(c). In addition,
for 	 > 1, the accuracy of the noisy reachability algorithm using global sen-
sitivity is similar to that of the local sensitivity, as well as that of the noisy
eps-neighborhood algorithm and PINQ.
F1-Measure: The F1-Measures for different datasets are depicted in Fig-
ure 11.3(d) - Figure 11.3(f). The F1-Measures of the noisy reachability (us-
ing local sensitivity) and noisy Eps-neighborhood algorithms are quite good
considering the fact that the density-based clustering metric space is very
fragile, and poorly adding noise can destroy the arbitrary shape of a cluster.
We observe that the F1-Measure of the noisy reachability algorithm with lo-
cal sensitivity algorithm is high while that of the noisy reachability algorithm
with global sensitivity is lower for all datasets.
Furthermore, we notice that when using global sensitivity with the noisy
reachability approach, the MinPts dilutes the high noise added and influ-
ences the private clustering. Hence, we analyze the impact of MinPts and 	
on private clusters when using global sensitivity. Figure 11.3(i) shows the
result when using Cleve dataset which has a global sensitivity of 2.24. There
are two takeaways from Figure 11.3(i). First, for smaller MinPts, the F1-
Measure is above zero for 0.03 < 	 ≤ 0.09 . Secondly, when 0.3 < 	 ≤ 1.3 for
a given Eps-Radius, the higher the MinPts, the higher the F1-Measure. This
is because, when the MinPts is small, the high noise from global sensitiv-
ity increases the likelihood of many points to join the cluster. Moreover, the
F1-Measure of PINQ behaves similar to the noisy Eps-neighborhood noisy
reachability (with local sensitivity) algorithms for different values of 	 as
shown in Figure 11.3(d) - Figure 11.3(f).
	 vs Number of Clusters: Figure 11.3(g) - Figure 11.3(h) show how
the privacy level affects the number of clusters formed. For the noisy eps-
neighborhood algorithm, as the privacy level increases (weaker privacy), the
number of clusters sharply decreases and then converges. Figure 11.3(g)
and Figure 11.3(h) show that the naive algorithm produces so many clusters.
Additional results in Figure 11.3(m) - Figure 11.3(o)) show similar trends.
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11.5.3 Numeric Synthetic Attribute Evaluation
Data Utility: We conduct several experiments to evaluate the data utility of
the perturbed data on a data mining KMeans task. First, we generate syn-
thetic data using our synthetic numeric data algorithm. Then we compute
the average number of points (Kavg) from the differential private DBSCAN
cluster. Kavg is used as the group size of the CONDENSE algorithm to gener-
ate synthetic numeric data. We perform normal KMeans on the two synthetic
datasets and the original dataset. The clustering result of the original dataset
is utilized as the ground truth. Figure 11.3(l) depicts the F1 Measure. Also,
our approach surpasses CONDENSE for cluster sizes between 9 and 47.
Covariance Compatibility Correlation (CC): As defined in CONDENSE,
the covariance compatibility correlation(CC) is determined by performing a
pairwise comparison between each covariance entry of the original data and
the perturbed data. A CC value that approaches 1 signifies (higher corre-
lation) higher preservation of the covariance matrix structure while values
drifting towards -1 mean less correlation. We used CONDENSE as our base-
line. Our technique yields CC values that approach 1 as shown in Figure
11.3(j). This demonstrates that it preserves the covariance matrix structure.
11.5.4 Categorical Attribute Estimation using Markov Chains
We evaluate our prediction results with the use of the accuracy metric as
shown in Figure 11.3(k) for the education attribute of the adult dataset. As
	 increases (weaker privacy) the prediction accuracy increases. Also, the
accuracy degrades as coverage increases. Our prediction results demonstrate
that our approach is formidable in categorical attribute estimation.
11.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented two novel private DBSCAN clustering algo-
rithms with complexity O(2n2) that enforce differential privacy. In addition,
we proposed two differential private synthetic data generation algorithms for
numeric and categorical attributes, both of which are based on clustering.

Chapter 12
Location Privacy of Moving
Objects using Differential Privacy
While many individuals or privacy advocates have been concerned about
(social) network privacy and the intrusive capabilities of data mining tasks
(e.g., clustering), which were handled in Chapter 10 and Chapter 11 re-
spectively; location privacy and security of spatio-temporal data have come
under high scrutiny in the past years. So far, most of the research studies
[ABN08],[KGMP07] that attempt to address location privacy are based on
the k-Anonymity privacy paradigm. In this chapter, we propose two novel
techniques to ensure location privacy in stream and non-stream mobility
data using differential privacy. We portray incoming stream or non-stream
mobility data emanating from GPS-enabled devices as a differential privacy
problem and rigorously define a spatio-temporal sensitivity function for a tra-
jectory metric space. Location privacy is achieved through path perturbation
and location obfuscation in both the space and time domains. In addition,
we introduce a new notion of Nearest Neighbor Anchor Resource (NNAR)
to add more contextual meaning to the perturbed trajectory path. Unlike
k-Anonymity techniques that require more mobile objects to achieve strong
anonymity; we show that our approach provides stronger privacy even for a
single moving mobile object, outliers or mobile objects in sparsely populated
regions.
231
232 Location Privacy of Moving Objects using Differential Privacy
12.1 Motivations
Although the mainstream adoption of GPS and RFID technologies is invalu-
able and indispensable in our day to day lives or businesses, the amount of
mobility pattern data collected, assembled and analyzed from such services
or technologies is eye-opening. The mass storage of mobility data into Mov-
ing Object Databases (MOD) or other systems has numerous uses in a broad
spectrum of industries. Yet this same data has the potentials to unlock human
mobility patterns, human behaviors and other sensitive information.
Context Aware computing is heralded as the future of computing. Some
novel existing privacy solutions [KGMP07], [ABN08] did not take into con-
sideration the context of locations when anonymizing or obfuscation data. In
fact, most of the existing research techniques are based on the k-Anonymity
[Swe02] and l-Diversity [MKGV07] privacy definitions. The aforementioned
privacy definitions require at least two mobile objects to achieve anonymity.
In addition, they are still prone or expose to background knowledge attacks,
compositional and other attacks. Privacy, especially in terms of location or
mobility can not afford to trail behind in context aware computing, which is
seen as the worst threat to privacy. As a result, we employ differential pri-
vacy to ensure location privacy and introduce a new notion of NNAR to add
more semantic location context to the differential private results. Providing
privacy with a strong privacy paradigm like differential privacy in context
aware applications will be beneficial to a broad spectrum of fields such as
mobile social networking, health service patients surveillance, trend analysis
and customer data mining.
Motivation Example: This study focuses only on location privacy of mov-
ing objects using GPS technology. Let’s assume Ann is at a location where
she is the only person sending a request to an MOD or Location Based Ser-
vices (LBS) at a given time. Although k-Anonymity has provided lots of
solutions to tackle location privacy, it will fail to protect Ann. How can one
protect the true location of an outlier request from Ann or any individual
in a sparsely populated area using a strong privacy definition? This is the
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first motivation of this study. However, if there are multiple users including
Ann that send requests to the LBS and MOD, k-Anonymity will successfully
protect her data. The second motivation is to use an alternative and far
stronger privacy paradigm (other than k-Anonymity and which is resistant to
background knowledge) called differential privacy to protect multiple users.
In both cases, differential privacy is achieved in a context and non-context
aware manner.
As a summary, this study has two main goals. These include the use of
differential privacy to ensure non-context aware privacy and secondly, the
utilization of differential private outputs to ensure context aware location
privacy for outliers or multiple moving objects. The main rational of the
second goal is to achieve very good data utility, thus ensuring a trade-off
between privacy and data utility.
Unlike previous works [ABN08],[Liu09], we use differential privacy in-
stead of k-Anonymity to guarantee the privacy of moving objects. Although
the theoretical strength of differential privacy has been highly praised, it is
quite difficult and challenging to practically apply it in different domains as
mentioned in [RN10], partly due to the problems that might be encountered
during the derivation of the sensitivity of a metric space. In this chapter, we
address these challenges, and provide differential private solutions for loca-
tion privacy using the Laplace noise and exponential mechanism. In addition,
we present a technique that accomplishes context aware location privacy by
using differential private outputs for moving objects.
12.1.1 System Setup
The setup consists of a single user or multiple users carrying a GPS-enabled
device. As the user(s) or object(s) move, their current spatio-temporal data
is obfuscated or perturbed, and sent to the MOD or LBS via a randomiza-
tion mechanism as depicted in Figure 12.1. The randomization mechanism,
which is governed by differential privacy injects a properly calibrated amount
of noise drawn from certain sensitivity functions (as described in Section
12.3.1 and Section 12.4.2) to create differentially private spatio-temporal
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data outputs. Perturbation of this data results in the sanitization of an entire
trajectory path, such that an attacker that looks at the perturbed trajectory
path in the MOB and LBS cannot determine the original trajectory path.
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Figure 12.1: Differential private data interface.
The other sections of this chapter are organized as follows. Section 12.1.2
focuses on relevant related works. Section 12.3 discusses how Laplace noise
is used in a trajectory metric space to guarantee differential privacy while
in Section 12.4, we present the exponential mechanism approach to attain
location privacy. In section 12.5, the notion of NNAR is introduced and uti-
lized to accomplish context aware location privacy. Section 12.6 discuses the
experimental results. In section 12.7, a final conclusion is made.
12.1.2 Related Works
Trajectory Anonymization and Location Privacy: Techniques such as
[KGMP07], [MCA06], [GL05] use the spatial k-Anonymity paradigm. The
topography of this paradigm typically comprises of users who send their re-
quests through a trusted server to the LBS. Anonymization is accomplished
in the trusted server. This is done by selecting an area called cloaking re-
gion (CR) and for a given object’s request, it ensures that at least k-1 other
object requests in that CR are sent to the LBS. Besides, [GHP08] employs
an untrusted server during data cloaking. Our approach is similar to these
technique only from the setup point of view; the trusted server of the former
12.2. Data Processing and Problem Formulation 235
guarantees privacy through anonymization while our trusted server provides
privacy through perturbation. [GHP07] propose a technique that effectively
handles the trade-off between privacy and data utility by restricting data
collectors and data mining operations to adhere to users’ privacy settings.
While another technique called SpaceTwist [YJHL08] uses anchor loca-
tion, our NNAR differs from theirs in that our NNAR is basically used to add
context to a differential private perturbed trace. k-Anonymity was achieved
in [TM08] by suppression. [ABN08] and [NASG09] achieved k-Anonymity
by generalization. The authors of [ABN08] used inherent GPS error to pro-
pose a (k, δ)-Anonymity algorithm called Never Walk Alone (NWA), where
δ represents the error radius. They achieved anonymity through space-
translation in the process of co-location. Our approach differs from [ABN08]
in two ways. First, our approach employs the notion of moving average and
secondly, we utilize the differential privacy paradigm while the approach in
[ABN08] is based on (k-δ)-Anonymity.
Differential Privacy: Relevant differential privacy related works were pro-
vided in Section 11.1.2 of the previous chapter. In addition, a differential
private times series technique was presented by [RN10]. [MKA+08] utilized
differential privacy to track commuters’ patterns. Also, [CPS+12] propose
a differential private spatial decomposition technique which can be utilized
to keep GPS traces private. Our technique differs from [CPS+12] in that
we perturb GPS traces with Laplace noise within a Running Window while
[CPS+12] presents an approach to minimize query error by configuring hier-
archical noise parameters in a non-uniform manner.
12.2 Data Processing and Problem Formulation
Foundational theoretical works [Dwo06], [DMNS06] of differential privacy
explained how to achieve differential privacy for predicate outputs (i.e. 0 or
1). However, many real life applications have more complex outputs. Hence,
in order to achieve differential privacy for trajectories, trajectory data needs
to be modeled to capture changes in a trajectory metric space.
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12.2.1 Trajectory GPS Precision
GPS position measurements are inaccurate. Research findings [TCY02] stip-
ulate that the use of Moving Average Filters can enhance the precision of GPS
measurements. In this study, we consider GPS positions computed from a
moving average filter as the true geographic location of an object instead of
directly using raw GPS data, simply because of their high precision. Hence,
raw spatio-temporal GPS readings which are associated with some errors will
be made accurate using moving average filters.
We build such a moving average filter by grouping instances of raw GPS
spatio-temporal data of a mobile object into data blocks over a specified time
slot. Each data block partition is called a Running Window. The time span
that bounds each Running Window is constant and the periodicity of this
time slot should take into consideration that an adequate amount of data is
present in the Running Window.
Definition 12.1 (RUNNING WINDOW): is a partitioned data block that com-
prises of a finite amount of raw GPS spatio-temporal data.
Creating High Precision Locations: A high precision geographic location of
an object is determined from a Running Window by computing the moving
average using the raw GPS points within that Running Window.
Definition 12.2 (HIGH PRECISION TRACE): A High Precision Trace is a spatio-
temporal data whose spatial and temporal values are determined by computing
a moving average for each domain using the moving average filter function
within a Running Window.
The moving average filter function f(x) is formalized in Equation 12.1.
f(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi (12.1)
Notations: Let RTri be a set of raw GPS points where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
A single raw GPS point of RTri is termed a Trace, and each trace given by
(xi, yi, ti) corresponds to a geographic position (xi, yi) at time ti. The set
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Figure 12.2: Differential Privacy in each Running Windows.
of raw GPS traces RTri does not represent the exact geographic positions of
an object because of the errors associated with GPS measurements. A more
accurate geographic position of an object called the high precision trace is
determined by partitioning RTri into several Running Windows Wj where
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · ,m}m<n and computing the moving average of Wj. Let HTrj
denotes a high precision trace of Wj. HTrj is considered as the location of
the object. Like RTri, the high precision trace HTrj is a spatio-temporal data
given by (xj, yj, tj).
12.2.2 Problem Definition
Definition 12.3 (PROBLEM DEFINITION): Assume that an outlier moving ob-
ject M sends a stream of raw spatio-temporal GPS data traces RTri to a ran-
domized mechanism A (x). Also consider that the mechanism periodically gen-
erates a high precision trace HTrj of M from Running Windows Wj, and then
computes the moving average of a Running Window. Perturb the high precision
trace HTrj in both space and time domains to produce a private trace HTrj,
such that the 	-differential privacy condition is fulfilled. The perturbed trace
HTrj should then be sent to the LBS or MOD.
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The problem definition requires that when raw GPS spatio-temporal data
stream is sent to the randomization mechanism; the data is first partitioned
into Running Windows and a high precision trace is perturbed or obfuscated
before it is sent to an MOD or LBS.
To address Definition 12.3, we construct a randomization mechanism,
whose main task is to perturb the high precision trace differential privately
and send each domain of the perturbed trace to the MOD or LBS as shown
in Figure 12.2.
Definition 12.4 (PROBLEM DEFINITION 2): Given a differentially private per-
turbed high precision trace HTrj and a defined radius rnn, determine the nearest
neighboring noisy location with the minimum Euclidean distance to HTrj such
that:
• If the distance between any NNAR location and HTrj is within rnn, it will
be considered as the noisy location.
• Otherwise HTrj is considered as the noisy high precision trace.
Simply put, after a differentially private perturbed trace has been com-
puted, the NNAR algorithm searches for a neighboring location from the
NNAR resource pool and checks if the latter location is within a given radius.
12.3 Location Privacy through Laplace Noise
Overview: At a higher level, we infuse differential privacy into a trajectory
metric space by probabilistically injecting Laplace noise to the moving av-
erage filter during the computation of a high precision trace. This prompts
the production of differential private noisy moving averages at the output,
which correspond to differential private high precision traces. Then, instead
of sending the high precision trace to the MOD or LBS, the differential pri-
vate noisy high precision trace is sent to the MOD or LBS.
Trajectory Perturbation: Our privacy settings is illustrated in Figure 12.2.
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Naively adding Laplace noise within each Running Window will produce out-
puts which have very low utility or noisy outputs whose semantic locations
have no meaning. To address this hurdle, we portray the events in each Run-
ning Window as a probabilistic process. Specifically, we consider the dataset
T1 that corresponds to a collection of raw GPS data within a given Running
Window as the original dataset. Removing one raw GPS spatio-temporal data
from that Running Window forms a new dataset T2 such that T1 and T2 differ
in just one single entry. Then, during the computation of a moving average
in that Running Window, the randomize mechanism A(x) adds a carefully
calibrated amount of Laplace noise to the true value of the moving average
to form a noisy moving average with a probability derived from the random-
ness of A. The Laplace noise is drawn from a sensitivity function derived in
the next section.
12.3.1 Sensitivity Function
Sensitivity is defined as the maximum possible change that occurs when a
single point is added or removed from a dataset. For a trajectory metric
space, we make use of the natural property of the high precision measure-
ment of a GPS geographical location using the moving average. Since the
high precision traces are destined to be sent to the MOD or LBS, and are de-
rived from the moving average function, this moving average function will
play an important role during the derivation of the sensitivity function of
the trajectory metric space. The moving average filter function is given by
Equation 12.1 in Section 12.2.1.
Sensitivity: To determine the sensitivity, we find the maximum possible
change that will occur when one raw GPS spatio-temporal point is added or
removed from the dataset T1 to form a dataset T2 within a Running Window.
This sensitivity is given by Equation 12.5.
S(f) = max
T1,T2
‖f(T1)− f(T2)‖1 (12.2)
Bounds of the Sensitivity Function: We theoretically investigate the
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bounds of the sensitivity function, since the latter function strongly influ-
ences the magnitude of the Laplace noise. The lower and upper bounds of
any high precision trace is given by Lemma 12.1. Simply put, Lemma 12.1
stipulates that the upper bound of any high precision trace (i.e., the output
of the moving filter) is less than or equal the position of the highest raw GPS
point in that Running Window.
Lemma 12.1 For each domain, the maximum change within a Running Win-
dow occurs if the trace with the smallest numerical value is removed.
max (|f(T1)− f(T2)|)∀T1,T2 ≤
1
N − 1
N−1∑
m=1
Am (12.3)
∀m = min (A) where Am is a finite set A consisting of m raw GPS point, and
min (A) denotes a trace with the minimum magnitude for a given domain in a
Running Window.
Proof 12.1 Given that the moving average filter function f(x) = 1
n
∑n
k=1 xk
acts on a finite set A of i traces in the Running Window. Assume that A =
{a1, a2, a3, · · · , ai−1, ai} where |a1| < |a2| < |a3| < · · · < |ai|. From this as-
sumption, it implies the trace with the lowest magnitude min (A) = a1 while
that with the highest magnitude max (A) = ai.
Given an average function f(x), to get the (lower and upper) bounds of f(x)
in a Running Window, we remove the traces with the highest (ai) and lowest
(a1) values. Removing a1 or ai from the setA results in the formation of two new
sets. Namely, Aa1 = {a2, a3, · · · , ai−1, ai} , which corresponds to the set where
the minimum trace value has been removed; and Aai = {a1, a2, a3, · · · , ai−1}
is the set formed from the removal of the maximum trace value. Mathemati-
cally, when computing an average function f(x) over a set of finite values, since
|a1| < |ai| ⇒ f(Aa1) > f(Aai). This means that the maximum change will
occur if the trace with the smallest magnitude is removed. Hence
max (|f(T1)− f(T2)|)∀A,A
a1
≤ 1
N−1
∑N−1
m=1Am
∀m = min (A)
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Thus, the bounds of the sensitivity function are finite and not large. This
will translate to moderate magnitudes of noise and good data utility.
12.3.2 Differential Private Trajectory Algorithm
Laplace Noise Addition: Algorithm 12.1 depicts the differential private per-
turbation algorithm. The algorithm takes in the following parameters as
inputs. The privacy level 	, the dimensions d to be perturbed, the number of
points per Running Window m, as well as the dataset T1. Streams of incom-
Algorithm 12.1: Differential Private Trace Perturbation
Input: Dataset T1, privacy budget 	, number of dimensions d, number of
raw GPS points per Running Window m
Output: differential private Noisy High Precision Trace (HTrj)
1 Partition: Partition and group m raw GPS points into a Running
Window
2 Moving Average: Compute a High Precision GPS trace ( HTrj ) from
Running Window j using Equation 12.1
3 Sensitivity: Get the sensitivity S(f) of the trajectory metric space using
Equation 12.5, T1 and T2; where T2 is formed by removing a point from
T1 for each Running Window
4 Perturbation: Add Laplace noise of Lap(S(f)
α
)d to the moving average
of a Running Window j to determine the Noisy High Precision Trace
HTrj
5 return: send HTrj to MOD or LBS
ing raw GPS data are separated into Running Windows (Line 1) based on m
and are used to compute high precision traces in Line 2 by employing the
moving average filter function. The sensitivity function which is required for
the derivation of Laplace noise is computed in Line 3. In Line 4, the Laplace
noise derived from the latter sensitivity function is injected to the result of
the moving average of a Running Window to output a differential private
noisy moving average. This is performed for each of the selected domains
or dimensions specified by d. The moving averages correspond to high pre-
cision traces HTrj, likewise, the noisy differential private moving averages
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HTrj are equivalent to differential private high precision traces.
Analysis of Privacy Guarantee by Laplace Noise: All noisy high preci-
sion traces emanating from the trusted server are differentially private.
Theorem 12.1 Algorithm 12.1 is 	-differentially private.
Proof 12.2 In Line 4 of algorithm 12.1, Laplace noise is added. Theorem 2.1
states that the addition of Laplace noise guarantees differential privacy. Also,
Line 4 is performed only once for a given Running Window and a given dimen-
sion. Since Laplace noise of Lap
(
S(f)
α
)
is used for the perturbation of data in
a Running Window, then according to Theorem 2.1, Line 4 guarantees 1 × α-
differential privacy. Because a spatio-temporal data contains three dimensions,
using the Sequential Composition [McS09], the total cost of privacy in a Run-
ning Window to perturb the different dimensions is α.|D|. Where |D| is the
number of dimensions and 2 ≤ |D| ≤ 3. ⇒ if |D| = 3, then each Running
Window is 3α-differential private. Thus, for a given Running Window dataset,
each noisy high precision trace sent to the MOD or LBS after noise addition by
the Laplace mechanism is α.|D|-differential private.
Therefore, if an overall privacy budget 	 is provided by the data miner, for
α = |D| , Algorithm 12.1 is 	-differential private.
12.4 Location Obfuscation
Location Obfuscation can be achieved by 1)Hiding Locations 2)Inserting
Dummy Regions 3)Merging Regions 4) Perturbation. In this study, location
obfuscation is accomplished by perturbation (using differential privacy). Lo-
cation obfuscation techniques generally ensure privacy by degrading the true
geographic location of an object. Most techniques [DK05], [ACD+07] usu-
ally define beforehand a region where the degraded location can lie on. This
is then followed by the distortion of the true geographic location to any po-
sition inside the latter defined region. In this work, the region on which the
perturbed location can fall on is termed the Obfuscation Region.
Obfuscation Region: [ACD+07] use circles to determine obfuscation re-
gions. Our obfuscation region(OBRegion) is a square grid with radius ro as
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depicted in Figure 12.3. It is connected to an arm that spans from the latter
grid to the moving object. Moreover, the perpendicular distance between a
moving object and the obfuscation region is called the Orthogonal Proximity
(ρ). Using such a structure ensures higher coverage for small grid radius.
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Figure 12.3: An OBRegion hosts several candidate traces.
The trusted server is responsible for the determination of obfuscation re-
gions and the obfuscation of traces as follows. Once a trace arrives at the
trusted server, it uses some user specified distance parameters (ro and ρ) to
determine an obfuscation region. Then, it populates this region with a finite
number of candidate obfuscation traces. Each of these candidate traces could
be chosen to replace the true location (i.e., the High Precision Trace in Section
12.2.1) of the object, thereby ensuring trace obfuscation.
Candidate Trace Generation: There are two ways by which the server
can generate candidate traces. 1) By randomly picking a finite number of
locations within the obfuscation region (during non-context aware location
obfuscation). 2) By choosing only locations within the obfuscation region
that have the same location context as the true location of the object (during
context aware location obfuscation). Formally:
Definition 12.5 (OBFUSCATION REGION (OBREGION)): is a square grid re-
gion that is determined by the trusted server with the use of a user defined
radius. It is also home to the k candidate traces generated by the trusted server.
The radius of the obfuscation region is denoted by ro.
The radius of the OBRegion is defined by the user. If the user fails to enter this
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radius, the default radius of the trusted server is used. Besides, k is a finite
positive integer. As expected, the server assigns only candidate locations.
The time domain of each candidate location (except the first trace) is derived
from the average velocity and distance of previous traces.
12.4.1 Location Privacy through Exponential Mechanism
As mentioned in Section 2.5.2, the exponential mechanism requires at its
input among others 1) input dataset 2) output range and 3) utility function.
Input Dataset: The dataset of a Running Window is used as the expo-
nential mechanism’s dataset. For example, assume that the dataset T1 cor-
responds to a collection of raw GPS data within a given Running Window.
Removing one raw GPS spatio-temporal data from that Running Window
forms a new dataset T2 such that T1 and T2 differ in just one single entry. T1
and T2 are sent as input dataset to a randomized mechanism A(x) as shown
in Figure 12.2.
Output Range: Like other location obfuscation privacy techniques [DK05],
[ACD+07], an obfuscation region that comprises of a set of locations is de-
fined beforehand as mentioned earlier. In addition, we indicated that the
trusted server determines an OBRegion and populates it with k finite can-
didate obfuscation traces. We tightly and strictly followed the theoretical
requirements [MT07] to create an output range. An obfuscated trace is des-
tined to fall on an OBRegion. Since the theoretical concept dictates that an
output range has to be made up of a finite set of elements, to define an out-
put range for a trajectory metric space that comply with this rule, we needed
to partition the OBRegion into sub regions.
The subdivision of the OBRegion is done by the central server as fol-
lows. The grid square of an OBRegion is (vertically) divided into N equidis-
tance sub-regions. Each of the sub-region is called Sub-Obfuscation Region
(Sub-OBRegion) and it is denoted by Si. Intuitively, after this division, the
candidate traces are distributed into the N Sub-OBRegions as illustrated in
Figure 12.4. Sub-OBRegions which do not contain candidate traces are dis-
carded and the size of N is reduced. In this study, the output range of the
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exponential mechanism is given by the finite set of Sub-OBRegions that con-
tain candidate traces. For example, the output range R for the OBRegion
in Figure 12.4 is given by R = {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}. The k candidate traces
are distributed within the different Sub-OBRegions. The Sub-OBRegion S3 is
discarded since no trace is found in it and N is updated to 4.
?????? ??
??? ???
???
???
???
???
???
???
???
???
???
???
???
?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ? ???????????
???????????????????????????? ??
Figure 12.4: Sub-OBRegion formed from an OBRegion.
Quality or Utility Function: As mentioned before, we consider the high
precision trace as the true location of an object. Intuitively, the closeness be-
tween a high precision trace and a given Sub-OBRegion of the output range
can be used to measure the quality of an obfuscated trace. Hence, the utility
function for our trajectory metric space is the Euclidean distance between
the high precision trace and the center of a Sub-OBRegion as formalized in
Equation 12.4.
U = −dist(HTrj − Sci ) (12.4)
where dist denotes the Euclidean distance, HTrj the high precision trace
and Sci is the center of the i
th Sub-OBRegion. Each Sub-OBRegion is given a
score based on its distance from the high precision trace by using this utility
function. The goal is to find an Sub-OBRegion that is closest to the high
precision trace. Hence, the smaller the distance, the higher the score. This
accounts for the negative sign in the utility function in Equation 12.4.
Exponential Mechanism: The exponential mechanism will now map
each Running Window (input dataset) to a given Sub-OBRegion (output
range) and use the defined utility function to choose the optimum location
which it can output as a good approximation of the original trace. We should
note that the input dataset variables (raw GPS points from a GPS Device)
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are independent from the output range variables (traces generated by Server)
since the former is retrieved from GPS readers while the latter is generated
by the trusted server without any knowledge or consideration of the former.
This independence is an important theoretical requirement when using ex-
ponential mechanism as stated by [MT07]. This further underlines that our
exponential mechanism meets all theoretical requirements.
12.4.2 Sensitivity Function
The utility function U(HTrj, f(T1)) reflects how good the output obfuscated
trace HTrj ∈ Si is for a raw GPS dataset T1 at a given running window. The
sensitivity of the utility function measures the maximum possible change that
will occur in a trajectory metric space when one raw GPS spatio-temporal
point is removed from the dataset T1 to form a dataset T2 within a Running
Window. This sensitivity is given by :
S(f) = max
HTrj∈Si,T1,T2
|U (HTrj, f(T1))− U (HTrj, f(T2)) | (12.5)
12.4.3 Differential Private Trajectory Algorithm
Noise Addition: Algorithm 12.2 shows the differential private obfuscation
algorithm, including the input parameters. Streams of incoming raw GPS
data are separated into Running Windows (Line 1) and are used to com-
pute high precision traces in Line 2. Besides, the server determines the
output range of the exponential mechanism by populating and computing
the Sub-OBRegions with candidate traces in Line 3. Non-context aware or
context aware candidate traces can be generated in Line 3 depending on
the candidate trace type Ct. Non-context aware candidate traces are gener-
ated by default. The utility function in Line 4 computes the score of each
Sub-OBRegion, and all candidate traces within a given Sub-OBRegion are
assigned the same score.
The most profound step of our algorithm (Line 6) is the selection of a
Sub-OBRegion based on the scores from the utility function. The exponential
mechanism chooses the Sub-OBRegion using the best score with a probability
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proportional to exp
(

2S(f)
.U
(
HTrj, f(T )
))
. Thus, the likelihood for a Sub-
OBRegion with a better score to be selected is of an exponential magnitude.
Finally, a trace within the chosen Sub-OBRegion is sampled and sent to the
MOD or LBS as a differential private obfuscated trace in Line 7.
Algorithm 12.2: Trace Obfuscation
Input: Dataset T1, privacy budget 	, size of Running Window n,
OBRegion Radius ro, N , Orthogonal Proximity ρ, Candidate
Trace Type Ct
Output: differential private obfuscated Trace
1 Partition: Partition and group n raw GPS points into a Running Window
2 Moving Average: Compute a High Precision GPS trace from that
Running Window using equation 12.1
3 Get Output Range: Use ro and ρ to determine the OBRegion. Populate
OBRegion w.r.t. Ct and divide OBRegion into N Sub-OBRegions
4 Utility Function: Allocate scores to each Sub-OBRegion using the High
Precision trace and the utility function in Equation 12.4
5 Sensitivity: Get the sensitivity S(f) of the trajectory metric space using
Equation 12.5, T1 and T2; where T2 is formed by removing a point from
T1 for each Running Window
6 Perturbation: Select an Sub-OBRegion and then choose a candidate
trace within the latter region by sampling with noise whose probability is
∝ exp
(

2S(f)
.U
(
HTrj, f(T )
))
7 return: the sampled trace and send to MOD or LBS
Analysis of Privacy Guarantee using Exponential Mechanism: All ob-
fuscated traces emanating from the trusted server are differentially private.
Theorem 12.2 Algorithm 12.2 is 	-differentially private.
Proof 12.3 In Line 6 of Algorithm 12.2, the probability of the exponential
mechanism to choose a Sub-OBRegion is given by
exp
(

2S(f)
.U
(
HTrj, f(T1)
))
.|Si|∑
i exp
(

2S(f)
.U
(
HTrj, f(T2)
))
dHTrj.|Si|
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where |Si| is the number of Sub-OBRegions. When the best Sub-OBRegion has
been chosen, a trace within the selected Sub-OBRegion is uniformly sampled
with a probability ∝ exp
(

2S(f)
.U
(
HTrj, f(T )
))
. Since obfuscation occurs
within a Running Window and we have a prior knowledge about the lower
and upper bounds the sensitivity function, this means integrating
exp
(

2S(f)
.U
(
HTrj, f(T )
))
delivers finite values. Hence sampling is being per-
formed such that:
Pr
[A(T1) = HTrj] = exp
(

2S(f)
.U
(
HTrj, f(T1)
))
∫
HTrj∈Si exp
(

2S(f)
.U
(
HTrj, f(T2)
))
dHTrj
Line 6 is performed only once for a given Running Window. Hence accord-
ing to theorem 2.1, Line 6 guarantees 1 × α-differential privacy. Since spatio-
temporal data entails three dimensions, the privacy budget needs to audit the
cost of privacy. Employing Sequential Composition [McS09], the total cost of
privacy in a Running Window to obfuscate the different dimensions is α.|D|.
Where |D| is the number of dimensions and 2 ≤ |D| ≤ 3.
It implies, if all domains of a trace are obfuscated (i.e., |D| = 3), then each
Running Window is 3α-differential private. Thus, for a given Running Window
dataset and its corresponding output range, each obfuscated trace sent to the
MOD or LBS after selection by the exponential mechanism is α.|D|-differential
private. Therefore, if an overall privacy budget 	 is provided by the data miner,
for α = |D| , Algorithm 12.2 is 	-differential private.
12.5 Location Data Utility
This section focuses on context aware location privacy and the new notion
of Nearest Neighbor Anchor Resource (NNAR). It explains the core concept
and presents the NNAR algorithm. NNAR is not a mandatory component of
the main differential private algorithms presented in the previous sections. It
could be optionally used to immensely enhance data utility while preserving
privacy.
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Context Aware computing motivations were described at the beginning
of this chapter. The second problem definition (Definition 12.4) requires the
determination of a nearest neighboring location, whose semantic location
context is similar to that of the trace that is suppose to be perturbed through
differential privacy.
Nearest Neighbor Anchor Resource: To some users, knowing the con-
text of their locations is an intrusion to their privacy. In contrast, there are
other users who would like to share (some of) the context of their locations
which do not hurt their privacy. Towards this end, NNAR is user driven in
order to put a user at the driver’s sit of her privacy. The user is given the
privilege to specify multiple categories that she wishes to emit to the LBS
or MOD. The server generates a resource pool based on the user’s current
location. This is utilized in Algorithm 12.3 to output a context aware loca-
tion. The resource pool of a NNAR is basically a list of location coordinates
mapped to some categories. These categories are generated by the server,
and they have similar location context to the original location. An example
of such categories include roads, shops, banks, restaurants. Table 12.1 illus-
trates the data structure of a NNAR resource pool. The nature of the user
defined categories should provide a high level generalization of the actual
location. Sub-categories such as place names and addresses are prohibited
as this might disclose private information.
NNAR Resource Pool
Latitude Longitude Category
23.845089 38.018470 Road
23.845179 38.018069 Bank
23.845530 38.018241 Shop
Table 12.1: Nearest Neighbor Anchor Resource Pool
12.5.1 NNAR Algorithm
Algorithm 12.3 depicts of our NNAR algorithm. When a differential private
noisy high precision trace is inputed into Algorithm 12.3, the NNAR algo-
250 Location Privacy of Moving Objects using Differential Privacy
rithm uses the user specified category to search and choose a list of locations
in the resource pool which has the same category as the high precision trace
(not the differential private noisy high precision trace) and has the shortest
distance to the differential private noisy high precision trace (Line 3 - 11).
Algorithm 12.3: NNAR Algorithm
Input: High Precision Trace HTrj, Noisy High Precision Trace HTrj,
Category Cat, Vicinity Radius rnn, Resource Pool LocPool
Output: Context Aware candidate traces
1 locationWithMinDistance ← HTrj ;
2 minDistance ← NULL;
3 while (categoryOf(HTrj, Cat) in LocPool ) do
4 currentDistance ← computeEuclideanDistance( HTrj,
currentLocationpool);
5 if ( this is the first LocPool Entry ) then
6 minDistance ← currentDistance ;
7 end if
8 if (currentDistance < minDistance ) then
9 minDistance ← currentDistance ;
10 end if
11 endwhile
12 if (minDistance is within rnn AND locationWithMinDistance is not
HTrj ) then
13 return: locationWithMinDistance;
14 end if
15 return: HTrj ;
This search is basically done by computing the Euclidean distance between
the noisy high precision differential private trace and each location in the
NNAR resource pool for that category (Line 4). The resource with the mini-
mum Euclidean distance is chosen. The algorithm then verifies if the chosen
location is within a given radius rnn.
There are three possible scenarios which might occur during data trans-
mission to the MOD and LBS.
1. If a location from the resource pool is found within rnn and that re-
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source pool location is not HTrj, then that location will be sent to the
LBS or MOD.
2. If a location from the resource pool is found within rnn but the resource
pool location is equivalent to HTrj, then the noisy differential private
trace HTrj will be sent to the LBS or MOD.
3. If no location is found from the resource pool, the noisy differential
private trace HTrj will be sent to the LBS or MOD.
As a summary of the above, the differential private noisy high precision
trace HTrj will be replaced by a location from the resource pool only if a
NNAR is within the specified radius rnn and that location is not HTrj .
12.6 Experiments
The implementations were done in Java and the experiments were conducted
on an Intel PC with 4GB RAM. To examine the strength and effectiveness of
our technique, we based our evaluations on two criteria. 1) Quantifying Pri-
vacy obtained by the user. 2) Quality and Utility of the obfuscated trace to
databases and data mining. In each of these criteria, we compared our tech-
nique with that of two state-of-the-art works. They include the Never Walk
Alone (NWA) algorithm [ABN08] and the Path Confusion (PPC) algorithm
[HG05]. Throughout this section, we will refer to these previous works as
NWA and PPC, respectively. In the k-Anonymity privacy paradigm, k denotes
the number of indistinguishable objects.
12.6.1 Experimental Dataset
We conducted our experiments with one synthetic dataset and two real datasets.
The Brinkhoff∗ Oldenburg synthetic dataset was used. We generated 101,070
traces. Besides, we utilized 90,104 traces from the GeoLife [ZLCX08] Mi-
crosoft Asia human mobility real datasets. In addition, the Athens Truck†
∗http://iapg.jade-hs.de/personen/brinkhoff/generator/
†http://www.rtreeportal.org
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real dataset that entails 276 GPS trajectories of 50 moving trucks in Athens
and a total of 112203 location traces was used.
12.6.2 Quantifying User’s Privacy
We utilized two metrics to analyze the privacy obtained by a user when us-
ing our approaches to attain location privacy. They include 1) Expectation of
Distance Error and Quality of Service (QoS) 2) Location Entropy.
Expectation of Distance Error and QoS with Exponential Mechanism:
These privacy metrics were proposed by [HG05]. Expectation of Distance
Error measures the accuracy by which an adversary can estimate the true
position of a moving object. It is given by:
E[d] =
1
NT
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
pi(t)di(t) (12.6)
whereN is the number of objects, di denotes the total distance error between
the true and obfuscated location, T the total observation time and pi(t) is the
probability to track a user. While [HG05] used the Reid’s Multi-Hypothesis
tracking algorithm to determine pi(t), we customized the definition of pi(t)
to our approach since it makes more sense. We assumed that the adversary
knows the OBRegion (which is the worst case scenario) and pi(t) is given by
the ability of an adversary to predict the correct trace from the joint set of
candidate traces and the true trace. On the other hand, QoS is given by:
QoS =
1
NT
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
√√√√ J∑
j=1
(a˜n(t)− an(t))2 (12.7)
where a is the domain, an(t) is the true trace and a˜n(t) the obfuscated trace
of user n at step t.
We passed the Geolife dataset which has a GPS sampling rate of 2 to 4
seconds into the randomized mechanism. The raw GPS data for each trajec-
tory was partitioned into blocks of 50 traces per Running Window because
of their low sampling rate. We considered the movement of a user with the
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Figure 12.5: Evaluation of differential private trace obfuscation.
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GeoLife dataset and perturbed the traces using our technique with an OBRe-
gion radius of 300, 500 and 700. We computed E[d] and QoS, and compared
our results with that of PPC. Figure 12.5(b) illustrates these results; our tech-
nique delivers a better QoS than the PPC technique. Figure 12.5(b) shows
that for an OBRegion radius of 300, an adversary is expected to make an
additional 18m error when comparing our method with PPC. This error dis-
tance increases as the size of the OBRegion increases.
In [HG05], Performance is given by the ratio of E[d] to QoS. We analyzed
the interplay between this ratio and 	 for OBRegion radius ro ≤ 500. Figure
12.5(c) shows that for a given ro, as 	 decreases, the the overall performance
increases. This can be explained by the fact that for each domain of the
trace, smaller values of 	 leads to greater distortion, hence causing the E[d]
to increase. Furthermore, Figure 12.5(c) illustrates that as the size of the
OBRegion increases, the overall performance increases as expected.
Location Entropy with Laplace Noise: Location entropy captures the uncer-
tainty of the adversary during the inference of the correct location. Location
entropy is given by:
Hl = −
∑
P (x, y) log2 (P (x, y)) (12.8)
where P (x, y) is the probability that an object is located at position (x,y).
We employed the Laplace noise approach to achieve differential privacy and
compared our method with the NWA technique for δ = 1000. Since NWA
does not anonymize the time domain, we left out the time domain of traces.
We used the Geolife dataset to track a user for a given time and determine
the uncertainty of the adversary for 	 = 0.1, 0.5, 1.5. Figure 12.5(a) depicts
the results of the experiment. Our technique produced superior entropy re-
sults when compared to the NWA, despite the fact that our technique uses
just a single object while NWA uses 20 and 5 moving objects. The figure
also shows that as 	 reduces (meaning stronger privacy), the uncertainty or
entropy increases. It is important to point out that our technique insert un-
certainty to each trace of a trajectory and does not depend on neighboring
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objects (like in k-Anonymity). Thus, if traces of an outlier object is passed
through our randomized mechanism with low 	 values, very strong privacy
is guaranteed.
12.6.3 Quality and Utility of Perturbed Trace
Range Query Distortion: After utilizing the Laplace noise approach to ob-
tain privacy, we evaluate the quality of our differential private perturbed
traces using the range query distortion measure provided by NWA [ABN08]
which is given by:
|Q (HTrj)−Q (HTrj) |
max
(
Q
(
HTrj
)
, Q (HTrj)
)
We used the same Oldenburg dataset and a similar query statement used
in NWA [ABN08] at Section 4C with k = 140. We used different privacy
levels 	 and a radius ranging from 300 to 4000. Figure 12.5(d) depicts the
outcome. It shows that as 	 increases, the range query distortion decreases.
That is, as the privacy increases (low 	) more uncertainty is injected to pre-
vent an adversary from infringing the users’ privacy. In comparison to NWA,
our approach shows a slightly lower distortion. In addition, only one moving
object was used in this particular experiment to further emphasize that our
approach protects outliers.
NNAR Evaluation: We conducted several experiments to evaluate the
NNAR using the Athens dataset with the Laplce noise approach. There is no
question about the benefits of context aware perturbed traces to database
queries. However, to evaluate the benefits of context aware perturbed traces
for data mining, we compared the utility of context aware traces produced
by Algorithm 12.3 and the differential private high precision traces outputted
by Algorithm 12.1 which are not context aware. We clustered each set of per-
turbed trace separately using KMeans and evaluated the quality of the cluster.
Figure 12.5(e) and Figure 12.5(f) show the F1 measure results of the context
aware trace and the differential private high precision trace, respectively. It
can be seen that the F1 Measure for context aware NNAR released trace is
better.
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Runtime: The time required to perturb traces depends on the type of
the perturbed traces to be sent to the MOD or LBS, as well as the size of the
Running Window. Context aware perturbation requires a longer time than its
counterpart as depicted in Figure 12.5(g). Figure 12.5(g) utilized the Athens
dataset using the Laplace noise approach. This extra runtime overhead stems
from the time needed to search for NNAR. We observe a similar runtime with
the exponential mechanism approach. Also, the higher the amount of traces
per Running Window, the lower the runtime. This is because, the number
of high precision traces generated will reduce if more raw GPS traces are
partitioned into a Running Window.
12.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented two novel techniques to achieve differential pri-
vacy for GPS data. Our techniques utilize a moving average filter to create
high precision GPS traces and then perturb or obfuscate these traces using
a differential private randomized mechanism. In addition, we introduce the
notion of Nearest Neighbor Anchor Resource, which ensures context aware
location privacy by capturing and storing the location context of an object in
an MOD or LBS, yet guaranteeing strong privacy. We demonstrate empiri-
cally that our technique protects outliers.
Chapter 13
Private Map Matching on Road
Networks
In Chapter 12, we presented some techniques to provide privacy for moving
objects. However, to ensure the privacy of moving objects on road networks,
most existing works - including our techniques in Chapter 12, do not enforce
a strict constrain that the anonymized or perturbed geospatial points should
lie on the road segments. In addition, humans armed with GPS-enabled de-
vices have proven to be effective sensors which can be beneficial to traffic
monitoring and other crowdsourcing services. However, they are discour-
aged to participate due to privacy concerns. Based on these drawbacks, we
make a case for fusing privacy to map matching in road networks.
As a result, in this chapter, we propose a novel privacy preserving map
matching technique that utilizes hidden Markov model, tangent distance and
geometric properties of road segments. The technique harnesses location
privacy by first performing map matching. Then based on a defined set of
a user’s sensitive locations, we introduce a new cost function and employ
it to determine a minimum cost alternate private route in our shortest path
problem. We demonstrate using the Microsoft Seattle real dataset the effec-
tiveness of our technique and show that it provides realistic privacy in road
networks.
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13.1 Motivations
Existing location privacy techniques are based on k-Anonymity [ABN08],
[VG08], [Liu09] and location obfuscation or perturbation [ACD+07] and
[HG05]. We observed that for moving objects on a road network, the per-
turbed paths resulting from these techniques are imprecise, since the sani-
tized points do not lie on the road segments. An attempt to reconstruct the
route of an object from the latter anonymization techniques yields paths that
do not correspond to the road network. Traffic monitoring systems strongly
require the precise geospatial positions of anonymized points on a road net-
work to analyze or predict traffic optimally. A location privacy technique
which is specifically geared for moving objects on road network is required.
To provide location privacy on a road network, the granularity of the road
segment has to be considered. While location privacy for places and regions
can be guaranteed by focusing on a coarser granularity or higher resolution,
location privacy on road networks needs to focus on a finer granularity to en-
sure that the perturbed points stick on the road segments. Hence, although
novel location perturbation techniques such a [ACD+07] and [HG05] pro-
vide strong privacy protection of an object’s location, these techniques do
not provide optimal privacy results on road networks.
In addition, humans armed with GPS-enabled devices have proven to be
effective sensors. Information emanating from human sensors can be utilized
for traffic monitoring, LBS and crowd sourcing services. A major obstacle
that hinders human participation is their privacy concerns. Map matching
is the process of matching GPS reading from a device to a road network.
Despite the recent advances and improvements in GPS technologies, GPS
measurements still suffer from impressions due to device error and other
transmission errors. Such errors have a significant impact when considering
the exact position of a GPS reading on a small area such as a road segment.
The map matching of points delivers better tracking and location prediction
results than points that are not map matched.
Providing an effective private map matching technique whereby a user
can choose to withhold her sensitive locations, yet share all non-sensitive
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locations can ease privacy concerns. Our contributions in this chapter is
twofold. First, we propose a novel HMM map matching algorithm that ex-
ploits the geometric properties of roads. Specifically, we introduce an ap-
proach that utilizes an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm and the
tangent distance to determine the level of GPS noise during the computation
of an emission probability. In addition, to infer the transition probabilities of
road segments, we tap the geometric characteristics of road segments. We
build transition and emission matrices and utilize the Viterbi algorithm to
match the GPS points to their corresponding road segments.
Our second contribution involves the merging of a user’s personalized
privacy settings to the map matching results. More precisely, we provide the
user an opportunity to specify k-sensitive or private regions with variable sen-
sitivity radius on a road network. Then, we introduce a cost function based
on three parameters. Namely, road network betweeness, node degree and
entropy. These parameters are used as weight of the Dijkstra algorithm to
determine the minimal cost alternative route for a given k-sensitive regions.
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 13.1.1 focuses on
relevant related works. Section 13.2 provides the problem definition and de-
scribes our map matching technique while Section 13.3 focuses on alternate
private route generation using a user’s privacy settings. Section 13.4 dis-
cusses the experimental results. In Section 13.5, a final conclusion is made.
13.1.1 Related Works
[KGMP07], [GL05], [TWHC04] and [MCA06] are some location privacy
works that are related to this work. Their descriptions were provided in Sec-
tion 12.1.2 of the previous chapter. In terms of map matching, some relevant
related works include [BPSW05], [LZZ+09], [GDM+12] and [TRL+09].
Specifically, map matching techniques can be divided into two major ap-
proaches. These include, the geometric [BPSW05], [LZZ+09], [KK01] and
probabilistic [LKK12], [NK09], [GDM+12], [TRL+09] based approach. Ge-
ometric based map matching involves the point to point comparison of GPS
reading and road segments, and subsequently matching the GPS reading to
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the best road segment. While geometric approaches focus on pairwise point
to point comparisons which is sensitive to noise, probabilistic map matching
techniques consider a set of points and employ different probabilistic model
to map GPS readings to road segments.
One such probabilistic approach is the utilization of HMM. [NK09],
[GDM+12] and [TRL+09] employ HMM for map matching. These techniques
consider the GPS reading as the observation while the road segment is taken
as the hidden state. [NK09] utilized the great circle distance as well as man-
ually estimating the variance of noise from a ground truth data during the
determination of the emission probability. In addition, [NK09] derived tran-
sition probability by comparing candidate road segments within a radius
of 200m, whose great circle distance and route distance are close. Unlike
[NK09], to compute the emission probability, we utilize the tangent distance
and we automatically estimate noise using an EM algorithm. On the other
hand, we utilize weighted expected distance resulting from the geometric
properties of road to compute the transition probability.
[GDM+12] propose an HMM based map matching technique which is
similar to [NK09] for stream data. The major difference between [GDM+12]
and our work is that they utilized road width and a speed penalty during the
estimation of the emission probability. Also, they employ a distance and mo-
mentum scoring function to compute the transition probability by training
an SVM to classify if a transition is correct or not. [TRL+09] matches Cell
tower Ids to road segments. Their technique takes at its input the observed
cell tower Ids and accelerometer information. Their approach relies on three
component to accomplish map matching, namely grid sequencing, smooth-
ing and interpolation, and the segment matching step. Their work differs
from ours in that they used turns and phone hints during segment matching.
13.2 HMM Map Matching
Map matching can be accomplished using two strategies. Namely, the global
and incremental approach. The global map matching approach considers all
points before instituting the new route while the incremental map matching
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variant periodically handles only a subset of the points. In this work, we
follow the global map matching paradigm and inject an additional privacy
heuristics to ensure that sensitive locations are matched to different routes
based on a cost function.
13.2.1 Problem Definition
Notations: Consider a sequence of GPS readings E = {e1, e2, · · · , en}, where
each GPS point reading ej given by (xj, yj, tj) depicts a geographic posi-
tion (xj, yj) at time tj. These GPS readings in E correspond to a sequence
of points on a road network R. A road network R entails multiple road seg-
ments R = {R1, R2, · · · , Rm} and each road segment Ri constitutes of a set of
points Ri = {ri1, ri2, · · · , riu}, where ri1 is a geospatial point on segment i. Due
to the errors associated with GPS measurements, the precise position of each
GPS reading ej does not match its corresponding point on the road segment.
In addition, in areas where such a GPS reading ej is situated among multi-
ple road segments, each road segment becomes a candidate road segment,
and the task is to determine the road segment to which ej corresponds to.
The objective of a match mapping algorithm is to correctly match each GPS
reading ej to a geospatial point rik on a correct candidate road segment Ri.
Definition 13.1 ( SENSITIVE LOCATION (Ls) ): is a circular region with a
defined radius. This region can span through multiple intersections or road
segments on a road network.
Definition 13.2 (PROBLEM DEFINITION): Given that a moving object M on
a road network has k sensitive locations Ls, perform a minimal cost location
perturbation to ensure that M is not associated with any of the k sensitive lo-
cations and all the non-sanitized and sanitized points lie on the road segments.
Definition 13.2 consists of two requirements. First, it requires that all
sensitive and non-sensitive geospatial points should be matched to their cor-
responding road segments. Secondly, k sensitive locations should be per-
turbed such that an individual cannot be associated with any of the sensitive
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locations. We satisfy the first requirement by the use of map matching while
we provide a minimal cost alternate private route generation algorithm to
accomplish the second requirement. Our map matching approach is handled
in the next section whereas Section 13.3 focuses on private route generation.
Figure 13.1 illustrates the satellite view of the GPS measurements from the
Figure 13.1: Satellite view: map matching problem of Seattle road.
Figure 13.2: Map view: map matching problem of Seattle road.
Microsoft Seattle dataset, where the read icons are the GPS readings ej while
the blue icon is a road segment point rik. First, the figure shows that the posi-
tions of the raw GPS points measurements ej fall on trees, instead of lying on
the road segment. The objective of map matching is to map these red icons
(ej) on a road segment. Figure 13.2 shows the map view of Figure 13.1.
13.2.2 Map Matching using HMM
We address the map matching problem by modeling our HMM as follows.
The GPS points ej read from a device are considered as the observations O,
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while the road segments Ri to which the GPS points readings might corre-
spond to represent the hidden states S.
Map Matching Framework Overview: A succinct overview of our map
matching approach goes as follows. We commence by determining the emis-
sion probability using the tangent distance metric. Then, we use the geo-
metric structures of road segments to derive the transition probability of two
road segment states. After the determination of the emission and transition
matrices, given a sequence of raw GPS points observationO = {e1, e2, · · · , en}
and a sequence of road segments S = {R1, R2, · · · , Rn}, we determine the
most likely sequence of states that corresponds to the observation sequence
O to obtain the result of our map matching technique.
Emission Probability: Emission probability is the probability that a given
GPS reading ej stems from a road segment Ri. For instance, Figure 13.3 de-
picts a sequence of GPS readings et−2, et−1, et, et+1 on a road R which consist
of three road segments R1, R2, R3. Each road segment in turn comprises
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Figure 13.3: Map matching on road network.
of set of geospatial points. That is, R1 = {r10, r11, r12}, R2 = {r20, r21, r22} and
R3 = {r30, r31, r32}. From Figure 13.3, there are three road segments. Our
objective is to find the probability that the GPS reading et comes from road
segment R1, R2 or R3. For a given road segment, we compute the Euclidean
distance between each point on a road segment rik and et. The point with the
closest distance to et is considered as the distance between et and the road
segment. For example, dist(et, r12), dist(et, r
2
0), dist(et, r
3
0) are the distances
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between et and road segments R1, R2 and R3 respectively, due to their close-
ness to et .
[SCDV00] stipulate that the Euclidean distance between two points is
sensitive to slight transformation between the points. They propose a dis-
tance measure called Tangent Distance which is translational invariant. Our
prime rational is to diligently and correctly determine the probability that
a GPS reading et emanates from a candidate road segment Ri. GPS reading
readings are imprecise. Utilizing the Euclidean distance measure for the pair-
wise comparison of a GPS reading and a point on the road segment will lead
to more imprecise measurements. As a result, in this work, we employ the
Tangent Distance to determine the emission probability as follows. Rather
than utilizing a single point (i.e., the closest point) from each segment, we
consider a set of point P from each road segment. Specifically, P consists of
the top-m closest points from the road segment to et, and P is perceived as a
pattern. Likewise, we consider et and its top-m preceding GPS readings as a
pattern E. Each pattern E is compared with a pattern P .
During GPS measurements, there is a slight translation of E in the x-
direction or y-direction or both, which leads to a deviation from the real road
segment pattern P . Based on [SCDV00], such a translation can be perceived
as displacing E about a curve in 2. In addition, the curve is nonlinear. Given
that the curve is represented by A(E, φ), where φ is the curve’s parameter, if
A(E, φ) is differentiable, then it can be considered as a manifold of the input
space. Besides, for φ = 0, A(E, 0) = 0, the approximation of A(E, φ) can be
determined using Taylor expansion in Equation 13.1.
A(E, φ) = A(E, 0) +
da(E, 0)
da
φ+O(‖φ‖2) ≈ E + Teφ (13.1)
where Te =
da(E,0)
da
.
A variation of φ towards 0 translates into a slight displacement of the
set of points in E along its tangent. Similarly, P is another point in the 2
space whose parameters can also be approximated using Equation 13.1. The
distance between E and P is the closest distance between their tangents.
We obtain the linear approximation using Taylor expansion and utilize it to
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compute the minimum distance between the two manifolds tangent spaces.
This minimum distance is the tangent distance between E and P , and we
determined it by solving the least square problem:
distT (E,P ) = minφe,φp ‖(E + Te)− (P + Tp)‖2 (13.2)
Furthermore, during the measurement of et, due to GPS measurement
errors encountered, it implies the correct position on the road segment is
given by rik = et − nt where nt is the measurement noise. We assume that
nt is a zero-mean white Gaussian noise whose probability density function is
given by Equation 13.3, where σ refers to the variance of the Gaussian noise.
f(x) =
1√
2πσ
exp(
−x2
2σ2
) (13.3)
Determining the amount of noise associated with et reveals the road seg-
ment from which the GPS reading et stems from. Toward this end, the emis-
sion probability P (Ri|ej) of our HMM is given by Equation 13.4.
P (Ri|ej) = 1√
2πσ
exp(
−distT (E,P )2
2σ2
) (13.4)
where distT (E,P ) represents the tangent distance of GPS reading pattern
E and the pattern of a road segment P . Due to the large number of road
segments which make up a road network, Equation 13.4 is employed only
for candidate road segments that are 150m within the proximity of ej. The
emission probability of any road segment beyond 150m is set to zero. We
utilize the EM algorithm to determine the variance of noise from Equation
13.4. P (Ri|ej) is obtained for each ej and utilized to build an emission prob-
ability matrix.
Transition Probability: The transition probability is the probability to move
from one road segment Ri to another road segment Ri+1. We present a
novel approach that captures and incorporates the geometric characteristics
of roads when computing the transition probability. Our transition prob-
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Figure 13.4: Tangent angle (β) and Deflection angle (θ).
ability is derived from a road geometry-based weighted expected distance
function. Our prime objective is to find the position (i.e., expected distance)
of a point on a road segment. However, the nature of a road segment (e.g.,
straight, sloppy or curvy) can reduce or increase the average velocity, hence
shed some light on how to infer the expected distance. We begin by deriving
weights from the geometric structure of road segments. Next, we describe
how the expected distance is computed and weighed during the determina-
tion of the transition probability of two states.
A road can be portrayed as a finite interchanging combination of a straight
lines, transition curves and circular curves as shown in Figure 13.3. In ge-
ometry, a transition curve is a curve whose radius l changes rapidly due to
the existence of a radial force. That is, rapidly from l = ∞ to a given value
B. In contrast, a circular curve is a curve with constant radius. Assume that
a, b, c are points on a road segment as illustrated in Figure 13.4. The com-
putation of the transition circle is complex since it requires knowledge of the
radial force which depends on the mass of the object. We craft a simple yet
effective technique to differentiate circular circle from transition circle using
the deflection and the tangent angle. The deflection and tangent angle be-
tween two road points a and b are determined by drawing a tangent about
the points as shown in Figure 13.4. These angles are utilized to determine
the likelihood of a transition from one road to another as follows. A tangent
angle ranging from 0 to 5 is considered to correspond to a straight road. If
the tangent angle is above 5 degrees, we investigate if it is a transition curve
or a circular curve. We define a threshold angle of τ = 20. If the tangent
angle (β) is 5 < β ≤ 20, we consider the curve as a transition curve, while
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for β > 20, we regard it as a circular curve. Table 13.1 illustrates the scores
allocated during the transition of different road segment types. The distribu-
tion of scores is based on the smoothness of the transition and the frequency
at which this can occur.
Intuitively, there is a high probability that an object remains on the same
road type for a considerable amount of time. For instance, a car moving
from one straight road segment to another straight road segment. Hence,
the maximum score of 1 is allocated. A transition from straight road to
circular curve is sharp and rare. Thus, we assign a minimum score of 0.4.
Furthermore, a straight road to transition curve and a transition curve to
circular curve represent smooth transitions, which are awarded scores of 0.9
and 0.7 respectively. We extract a portion of the Microsoft Seattle map
Transitions Smoothness Score
S → S Very Smooth 1
C → C Very Smooth 1
TC → TC Very Smooth 1
S ↔ TC Smooth 0.9
TC ↔ C Smooth 0.7
S ↔ C Sharp 0.4
Table 13.1: Comparison of road transition smoothness. S = Straight road,
TC = Transition Curve, C = Circular Curve
matching dataset that best articulates our road geometry concept on real
road networks. Figure 13.5 depicts a road in Seattle that can be divided into
a straight line, transition curve and a circular curve.
We determine the transition probability by weighing the Expected Dis-
tance derived from speed with the road transition scores. To determine the
expected distance or position of a point on a candidate road segment Ri,
which corresponds to a GPS reading et+1 at time t + 1; we first compute the
average velocity of the moving object at a preceding time et using δ road
points of Ri, which are nearest to et as given in Equation 13.5.
V¯t =
dist(rδt , r
δ
k)
T δt − T δk
(13.5)
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Figure 13.5: A road in Seattle divided into Straight line, Transition Curve
and Circular Curve.
where rδt is nearest road point ofRi to et and r
δ
k is the first road point from the
δ set of points on Ri. And T δt and T
δ
k are the nearest GPS reading observation
times to road points rδt and r
δ
k respectively. Then the weighted expected
distance d¯Ri,t+1 on road segment Ri at time t+1 is computed using Equation
13.6.
d¯Ri,t+1 = Wr · V¯t · Tt+1 (13.6)
where Wr is the road geometric transition weight and Tt+1 is the time t+ 1.
Example: Figure 13.3 depicts a road consisting of points on the road
segment and GPS readings at times et−2, et−1, et and et+1. Road segment 1
consists of points R1 = {r12, r11, r10}. Let’s assume that δ = 3, hence to compute
the average velocity on road segment R1 at time t, we utilize the road points
r12, r
1
1, r
1
0 as follows. First, the furthest great circle distance between the
last δ points in R1 is computed (i.e., dist(r12, r
1
0)), then the differences in
times of the nearest GPS observation to r12 and r
1
0 which correspond to time
t − 2 and time t in Figure 13.3 are retrieved. This is then utilized with
Equation 13.5 to determine the average velocity given by dist(r
1
2 ,r
1
0)
Tt−Tt−2 . After
the average velocity has been obtained, using Equation 13.6, the weighted
expected distance of a point on the candidate road segment R1 at time Tt+1
is given by Wr ·
(
dist(r12 ,r
1
0)
Tt−Tt−2
)
·Tt+1. The expected distance of all candidate road
segments are determined similarly.
The weighted expected distance for each candidate road segment’s points
are considered as the positions on the candidate road segments. We com-
13.3. Privacy and Map Matching Fusion 269
pare the great circle distance between the weighted expected distances of
each candidate road segment point at time t+1 with the position of the GPS
observation et+1 at t + 1. The candidate road segment point with the small-
est distance indicates the correspondence of that road segment’s point with
the GPS observation and we assign it the highest probability. The transition
probabilities are distributed on each row of the transition matrix such that
the sum of probabilities derived from the weighted expected distance is 1.
Matching GPS Readings to Road Segments: After the determination
of the emission and transition matrices, we match the GPS readings to road
segments using our model λ as follows. Given a sequence of raw GPS points
observation O = {e1, e2, · · · , en} and a sequence of points on a set of road
segments S = {R1, R2, · · · , Rn}, we find the most probable sequence of states
that corresponds to the observation sequence O. The later roads are the
road segments that correspond to the error prone GPS measurements. We
utilize our emission and transition matrices with the Viterbi algorithm to
find the most likely road segments that emanates from the latter observation
sequence. This resulting road sequence is the solution of the map matching
problem.
13.3 Privacy and Map Matching Fusion
The user’s sensitive location is a vital and pivotal ingredient to synthesize a
privacy preserving map matching route. Route privacy is achieved by deter-
mining and infusing one or more private alternate routes based on the user’s
sensitive locations Ls. That is, given that k sensitive locations are traversed
during a trip, we instill privacy into map matching by first determining k
minimum cost alternate routes within that trip. Then, the original trip is
imploded at each of the k sensitive locations and the alternate private routes
are merged to the original route. The cost function which plays a paramount
role in private route determination is derived in the next section.
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13.3.1 Cost Function
A road network can be potrayed as a graph where a node is a point on the
road and an edge is a road segment. We utilize several metrics in graph
theory to derive a cost function. These include, 1) shortest route distance
(SP ) , 2) node betweenness (NB) 3) node degree (ND) 4) node entropy
(NE).
Shortest route distances are obtained from a route planner. The shorter
the route, the smaller the cost. The betweenness centrality measure was de-
scribed earlier in Section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5. The higher the betweenness,
the more interconnected the road. Our goal is to select alternate routes that
are plied by many objects. This prevents the chosen private route from being
an outlier route, which undermines privacy. Hence, node with higher be-
tweenness are levied with lower cost to increase their odds of being chosen.
The node degree refers to the number of moving objects that traverse
the node. Like betweenness, higher node degree signifies that the road is
actively utilized. Based on this, we assign lower cost to nodes with higher
node degree. Furthermore, the node entropy measures the uncertainty of
the adversary to correctly determine that an attacker utilizes a road. Higher
entropies translate to stronger privacy, hence we allocate lower cost.
The cost function is derived from the aforementioned metrics as formal-
ized in Equation 13.7.
Cost = SP +NB +ND +NE (13.7)
This cost function is utilized as weight in a Dijkstra algorithm to find the
shortest path between k sensitive location to neighboring non-sensitive loca-
tions given the original route.
13.3.2 Alternate Private Route
Determining an alternate path serves as the path perturbation and goes great
lengths to ensure that all k sensitive locations are hidden.
Digraph Synthesis and Pruning: In our map matching settings, in order
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to determine the optimal alternate private route, we depict the road map as
a directed or digraph G(V,E). The intersection of a road corresponds to a
finite vertex set V = {v1, v2, · · · , vn}, where each node or vertex vi represents
the longitude and latitude of a point on the road, and the length of the vertex
set V depends on the sampling rate. On the other hand, the edges represent
the road segments, and each edge E is an ordered set of vertex pair, whose
arc from vi to vi+1 corresponds to a polyline linking two (sets of longitude
and latitude) points on a road segment.
Let Vs denotes a sensitive vertex set which entails a finite sequence of
sensitive (longitude and latitude) points that are located within a single Sen-
sitivity Radius of a user as shown in Figure 13.6. To protect the sensitive
locations in Vs, we compute a private alternate route by solving a shortest
path problem as follows.
First, we extract a digraph G(V,E) in the neighborhood of Vs and deter-
mine the source vertex S and all candidate destination vertices. The process
of extracting a graph from a map is insidious, challenging and can lead to
poor private route quality and search performance if the vertices are not cor-
rectly chosen from the massive amount of nodes on a road network. As a
recap, each vertex set V corresponds to a set of GPS points at a road inter-
section. The sensitivity radius plays a pivotal role during the extraction of
the digraph G. G is built using the following criteria.
1. The source vertex S ∈ G or source road intersection is the nearest
intersection to Vs which is outside the sensitivity radius and is located
before Vs with respect to the direction of motion.
2. The candidate destination vertex sets C = {V1, V2, · · · , Vq} are the q-
nearest neighboring intersections that are located after Vs with respect
to the direction of travel. q is a predefined parameter which increases
the strength of the privacy but leads to a decline in data utility. We
should note that C ⊂ G and S /∈ C.
After the digraph G(V,E) has been extracted, to strengthen privacy and
improve performance, we prune the candidate destination vertex set C. Prun-
ing is based on 1) the sensitivity radius, 2) if an intersection leads to a dead
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end and 3) if the intersection is part of the original trip route. Any candi-
date destination vertex C that is within the sensitivity radius, or is a dead
end or does not belong to the path of the original trip is discarded. Figure
13.6 illustrates a section of the road network and the pruning of intersec-
tions to construct a pruned digraph G(V,E) for a trip that starts from I1 to
I14. Candidate destination vertices I5, I6, I10 and I12 are pruned since they
are within the proximity of the sensitive radius. Furthermore, I9 and I11 are
discarded because based on the pruning of I5, I6, I10, I12 their intersections
become isolated and cannot be merged to the target destination I14. Also, I13
is eliminated because it is a dead end.
Figure 13.6: Private route generation.
Once the digraph G(V,E) has been pruned, we assign weight to all edges
(i.e., road segments) by using the previously described cost function. We
should note that the longitudes and latitudes of a candidate destination ver-
tex set and source vertex set are employed to determine the node between-
ness, node degree and node entropy of each intersection in the vertex set.
Finally, given our pruned weighted directed graph G(V,E), which is cre-
ated based on a sensitive vertex set Vs, to determine a minimum cost private
route from our source vertex S to all candidate destination vertices C, we
formulate the problem as a single-source shortest path problem and utilize
the Dijkstra algorithm to find the optimal private route. The Dijkstra algo-
rithm [Dij59] is a greedy algorithm, known for its efficiency and effectiveness
in finding the shortest path. In our private route determination settings, the
algorithm iterates through all unvisited candidate road intersections or ver-
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tices and at each unvisited vertex Vi, it computes and updates the minimum
cost path from all adjacent nodes to Vi using the betweenness, degree, en-
tropy and the distance metric. The minimum cost path from the source S to
all candidate destination vertex set C is outputted by the algorithm and it is
used as the alternate private path. The runtime complexity of the alternate
private route search is O(|E|log|V |).
Time Perturbation and Synchronization: In scenarios were no alternate
paths are possible, to achieve privacy, only the time domain is perturbed. In
this case, time domain sanitization is accomplished by significantly reducing
the time spent by an object at a sensitive location. This relays an impression
that the object swiftly transversed the sensitive location. Thus, an adversary,
looking at the timestamps of such a private mobility log cannot associate the
object to that sensitive location with a certain level of certainty and confi-
dence, hence providing a relax form of privacy for that sensitive location.
13.4 Experiments
Our experiments were implemented in Java and performed on a Microsoft
HPC Cluster. We based our evaluations on three criteria. 1) Investigate
the accuracy of our map matching algorithm at different sampling rates 2)
Quantifying privacy obtained by the user 3) Quality of the perturbed pri-
vate alternate route. For the first criteria, we compared our technique with
the map matching algorithm proposed by Newson and Krumm [NK09] and
throughout this section, we will refer to their work as NKMM.
13.4.1 Experimental Dataset
We conducted our experiments with the Microsoft Seattle real dataset [NK09].
The Seattle map matching dataset entails a test data, a ground truth data and
the road network data. The test data represents the movement of a vehicle in
Seattle for two hours and consists of 75321 spatio-temporal GPS points col-
lected at a sampling rate of 1 second, while the ground truth data comprises
of all road segments transversed by the vehicle during the journey.
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13.4.2 Map Matching Accuracy
Prior to evaluating the quality of the alternate private route, it is important
to investigate the accuracy of our map matching algorithm. We performed
different rounds of experiments to evaluate our map matching algorithm at
several sampling rates. The first set of experiments were performed using all
points on the test data which have a sampling rate of 1 second. While in the
other set of experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness of our map matching
algorithm for lower sampling rates ranging from 30 to 300 seconds by fil-
tering and discarded some points in the test data. In addition, we described
in Section 13.2 how the tangent distance utilizes the top-m preceding GPS
readings to determine the emission probability. We analyze the effect of m
on the accuracy of our map matching algorithm.
Figure 13.7(a) depicts the accuracy of our map matching technique for a
sampling rate from 1 to 300 seconds and for m = 2, 5, 10, 15. For a very high
sampling rate of 1 second and m = 2, our approach correctly detects all road
segments. We investigate the relationship between m, the map matching
accuracy and the sampling rate. We observe that the accuracy is higher for
m ≤ 5 at a low sampling rate of up till 90 seconds. In contrast, for m ≥ 10,
the accuracy plummets rapidly even for a low sampling rate of 30 seconds
and drops dramatically as the sampling rate increases. This can be explained
by the fact that for lower sampling rates, the neighboring GPS points become
sparse from one another and utilizing higher number of such widely sepa-
rated points for distance computation does not help in the proper estimation
of Gaussian noise buried in the GPS reading. As a result, road segments
cannot be precisely detected at lower sampling rates.
From our analysis, the best map matching result of our technique was
recorded for m = 5. We implemented the map matching algorithm of NKMM
and compared our result with NKMM as shown in Figure 13.7(a). Figure
13.7(a) shows that our map matching technique produces a better result
than NKMM for m = 2 and m = 5 for sampling rates ranging from 30 to 300
seconds.
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Figure 13.7: Evaluation of Map Matching and Private Route Generation.
13.4.3 Quantifying User’s Privacy
Location Entropy: We utilize the location entropy metric to analyze the
privacy obtained by a user during the detection of alternate routes. As pre-
viously alluded, location entropy computes the uncertainty of the adversary
to infer the correct location. Location entropy is given by Equation 12.8 in
Section 12.6 of the previous chapter. The rational of this experiment is to
measure the uncertainty of the adversary for a variable amount of k sensi-
tive locations over a very short period of time. Specifically, we considered
sensitive locations of k = 2, 7, 15, 20 within a radius of 4km. Figure 13.7(c)
depicts the results of the experiments.
We observed that the entropy is highest for k = 2 and remains stable after
100 seconds, while for k = 15 and k = 20, the entropies are low and keep
fluctuating. We analyze this behavior and it can be explained as follows. For
low k, there are few sensitive regions and there is a higher probability for
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finding an alternative route in a space of 4 km. Hence, this increases the
uncertainty of the adversary. However, if there are k = 20 sensitive locations
in the same 4 km space, there is a lower probability to find different routes.
This lack of alternate route thus reduces the location entropy. As a summary,
the lower the number of sensitive locations k , the higher the entropy.
13.4.4 Quality of Alternate Private Route
Ensuring route privacy through alternate route generation is a challenging
task, since the private or sensitive locations on the road are sandwiched be-
tween many non-sensitive regions. This provides the adversary with enor-
mous background knowledge to predict the probability of an object to pass
at one or more sensitive locations, if the object is observed at a non-sensitive
area of the road. Towards this end, we measure the quality of the generated
private route based on the ability of the adversary to falsely predict that an
objects plies a sensitive region. To evaluate this, we determine the ratio of
the cumulative probability of the mean square error E¯ given in Equation 13.8
E¯ =
∑t
j=1
(
xj − x′j
)2
t
(13.8)
where x and x′ are the true and predicted positions respectively. The out-
come of this experiment is shown in Figure 13.7(d), which depicts the prob-
ability of the adversary to predict if a sensitive region is visited. We perform
the experiments for sensitive regions k = 2, 7, 15, 20. Higher values of the
cumulative probability means greater chance that the adversary makes an
error. The Figure shows that the lower the number of sensitive locations
(e.g., k = 2), the higher the probability of making a false prediction. Also,
even with as many as 20 sensitive locations in an error radius of 4Km, the ad-
versary has more than 50% chance of making a false prediction. This demon-
strates that our private route generation technique ensures strong road pri-
vacy.
Furthermore, if the adversary makes a false prediction, it is important to
learn how far the predicted location x′j is from the sensitive location xj. As
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a result of this, we evaluate the magnitude of error made using the mean
absolute error (MAE) metric given by Equation 6.6 in Section 6.3 of Chap-
ter 6. The MAE metric reveals how close the predicted location is from the
sensitive location. Figure 13.7(b) illustrates the MAE for different cell radii
and k = 2, 7, 15. Lower mean absolute error suggests better accuracy, where
better accuracy means weaker privacy. For k = 2 and a cell radius of 3km,
the distance error between the adversary’s prediction and sensitive location
is 752m while a far lesser distortion error of 278m is observed when k = 20
sensitive location. The Figure shows that the higher the number of sensitive
location for a given cell radius, the lower the error, hence the more vulner-
able the location privacy of the object. We also observed that irrespective of
the value of k, there MAE increase as the cell radius size increases.
13.5 Conclusion
To conclude, in this chapter, we presented a novel privacy preserving HMM
map matching technique to achieve location privacy on road networks. Our
HMM map matching technique utilizes tangent distance and road segment
shape geometry to accurately map GPS points to road segments. In addition,
we proposed an minimum cost alternate private route generation technique
which is based on the user’s location privacy settings. We demonstrate on
real dataset that our technique provides high map matching accuracy and
generates strong privacy preserving alternative routes.

Part V
Conclusion and Outlook
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Chapter 14
Conclusions and Future works
This chapter provides a summary of the individual chapters of this thesis and
discusses some open research challenges in predictive analytics and privacy
preserving data mining.
14.1 Summary
In this thesis, we presented many novel predictive analytics solutions and pri-
vacy preserving data mining techniques. In chapter 3, we presented a loca-
tion predictive model to predict the top-1 and top-k future check-in locations
of a user. We introduced a technique that exploits the Poisson distribution
to infer the future check-in probability at a given space and time interval.
In addition, we presented a novel holistic approach that uses the Lipschitz
Exponent of wavelet spectral to quantify cascaded social influence.
We presented a novel CRF-based location predictive model in Chapter 4,
which is designed using Gaussian kernel density estimation (KDE), and some
newly proposed user preference, social influence and location influence mea-
sures. Specifically, we utilized Gaussian KDE clusters and wavelet cross cor-
relation to determine user preference. Besides, we introduced an enhanced
approach to effectively compute social influence using linear regression.
In Chapter 5, we presented a novel trajectory model coined TMC-Pattern,
which embeds infrastructural and behavioral patterns into the trajectory
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model. Besides, we introduced an approach that employs TMC-Pattern and
Prefix Span to discover context aware Region Of Interest(ROI). Moreover, we
presented a technique that uses TMC-Pattern and Markov chain to effectively
predict future locations.
We proposed a location prediction technique in Chapter 6 that relies on
frequent Nearest Neighbors (NN). We introduced a frequent NN search tech-
nique that searches for the optimal sequence alignment of neighboring ob-
jects with minimal gaps. We utilized the frequent NN to construct TMC-
Footprint trees that are combined with Markov chains to predict locations.
In Chapter 7, we proposed a novel predictive model that utilizes dyadic
wavelet transform, vector quantization and HMM to predict high level activ-
ities from low level sensor time series. We analyzed sensor time series using
wavelets, and introduced a new approach to extract signature feature vec-
tors that effectively differentiate activity time series from one another. Sub-
sequently, we proposed an approach to craft and train enhanced dedicated
HMMs for activity recognition.
Also, we introduced in Chapter 8 a novel optimization technique to design
a codebook from sensor time series during vector quantization. We then
presented an approach that couples the optimized codebook with CRF to
construct a robust predictive model for activity recognition.
We presented a FOG predictive model for Parkinson’s Disease in Chapter
9. We discovered that at the onset of a FOG time series, there is a significant
difference in the wavelet spectral sub-energies between a FOG episode and a
normal movement time series. Among others, we utilize this observation and
CRF to build a FOG predictive model that predicts FOG with a performance
of over 90 %.
We introduced a new attack model in Chapter 10 that undermines the
privacy of some degree anonymization techniques. Then, we presented a
structural network anonymization approach termed (k, δ)-core Anonymity,
which performs vertex and edge anonymization for small and massive net-
works with up to 1.7 million nodes and 17.8 million edges.
Injecting noise to a DBSCAN clustering heuristic, whose prime rational is
to separate clusters in the midst of noise is a challenging task. In Chapter
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11, we showed how a noisy DBSCAN heuristic can be characterized as a
probabilistic iterative process that is governed by a binomial distribution. We
then utilized this binomial relation, to craft two private DBSCAN algorithms
that satisfy differential privacy. In addition, we presented two synthetic data
generation techniques that exploit SVD and Markov chains.
We presented two location privacy techniques in Chapter 12, which are
based on differential privacy. We introduced a technique that utilizes Laplace
noise to perform path perturbation. Moreover, we proposed a new exponen-
tial mechanism technique that employs the notion of OBregion to guarantee
differential privacy during location obfuscation.
In Chapter 13, we proposed a private map matching technique that uti-
lizes a user’s sensitive locations to generate alternate private routes that have
optimal data utility, and also protect the user’s privacy. We achieved this by
first introducing an HMM-based map matching technique. Then, we com-
bined map matching to privacy by presenting a road privacy technique that
employs the Dijkstra algorithm.
14.2 Future Works
14.2.1 Combining Matrix Factorization and CRF for Sparse
Data Prediction
Prediction on sparse data is still challenging. Exploring a combination of
CRF and Matrix factorization is an interesting research direction that would
improve prediction performance in sparse data. Matrix Factorization is a
mathematical approach that is capable of compressing low rank matrices,
and it is now widely used in recommendation systems to recommend items
or locations to users. From a location prediction perspective, matrix factor-
ization is utilized to predict a location lj of user ui by determining the dot
product of the user and location feature vectors, which stem from a user
feature matrix U and location feature matrix L, respectively. The prediction
results of matrix factorization solely rely on the weights generated during
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training. During training, matrix factorization learns the weights of both the
user and location feature vectors using stochastic gradient descent.
While the stochastic gradient descent aims at minimizing the sum of
square error with quadratic regularization of the user and location feature
vectors, there is little room to tune the weights during training to take into
consideration certain important features in the underlying data. In contrast,
CRF weights computations during gradient ascent can be influenced using
additional feature functions. New approaches that investigate, design and
find ways to effectively merge the internal weights of both CRF and Matrix
factorization is an important future research direction, which would lead to
a surge in prediction accuracy for sparse data.
14.2.2 Utilizing Moving Clusters for Online Predictions
To perform location prediction, the predictive model relies on a trajectory
model to extract, simplify and model the underlying historical data of users.
Nowadays, there is a growing need to predict the locations of moving objects
on the move (i.e., online), which may not stop or stay at a position. This
implies, existing trajectory models which are based on the notion of "Stay
Time" would not effectively model historical mobility data, thus leading to
a drop in prediction accuracy. This challenge can be addressed by using the
idea of Moving Clusters [JYZ+08, LDHK10] to model trajectories.
A Moving Cluster can be described as follows. Given a collection of mov-
ing objects, clustering techniques such as [JYZ+08, LDHK10] choose certain
timestamps and separately perform clustering for the selected timestamps.
(The chosen timestamps are also called snapshots.) Then, an object is consid-
ered as a member of a Moving Cluster based on how often the object appears
in the clustering results of the different timestamps or snapshots.
Moving clusters provide a better understanding of the stochastic nature
of moving objects or the evolution of the paths of moving objects, which can
assist to make location prediction decisions. However, to discover moving
clusters from a collection of trajectories for a given time period or lifespan;
existing moving cluster algorithms [JYZ+08, LDHK10] utilize selected times-
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tamps or snapshots within the latter lifespan to detect moving clusters. This
approach is not conducive for prediction because it ignores a lot of points
during clustering, hence the clustering results are very sensitive to the points
of the selected snapshots. A better approach would be to perform clustering
by considering most of the points within the lifespan. Subsequently, the re-
sults from the captured moving clusters can be used by the predictive model.
The boon of utilizing moving clusters is twofold. First, it helps to model
the historical trajectories through clustering. Secondly, each moving cluster
exposes all nearest neighbors within a given lifespan. Chapter 6 proposed a
technique to search frequent nearest neighbors from TMC-pattern. A moving
cluster provides both information in one step (i.e., model a trajectory and de-
tect nearest neighbors). Thus, exploring ways to efficiently discover moving
clusters as a preprocessing stage of a prediction solution is a promising future
research direction, which would significantly propel prediction performance.
14.2.3 Privacy Preservation using Subspace Clustering
Nowadays, data is collected from multitude of platforms and assembled to
reveal the characteristics of an individual, entity, organisation or process,
thereby increasing the privacy concerns. The dimensionality of such data
is most often high - yet not every attribute is sensitive. Many existing pri-
vacy techniques consider the full space of data during anonymization, which
might lead to loss of knowledge from non-sensitive attributes. An interesting
future work will be to investigate and explore the usage of subspace clus-
tering to solve privacy issues by considering mostly sensitive subspaces of
private data.
14.3 Conclusions
We demonstrated on numerous occasions using real datasets that our pre-
sented predictive models address the predictive data analytics challenges,
which are primarily caused by the very sparse or overwhelming volume and
complexity of data.
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Furthermore, due to the sensitive nature of some data, which exacerbates
mistrust and individuals’ privacy concerns; we presented new enhanced pri-
vacy preserving data mining techniques that will protect data and ensure
that the privacy of an individual is not infringed. This thesis thus provides a
healthy cohesion or trade-off between privacy and data mining.
Part VI
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